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ABSTRACT 
 
Much of the scholarship on Europeanization has explained eastern enlargement 
according to the logics of materialism or constructivism. Materialists argue that 
candidates’ compliance with conditionality demands is rooted in strong external material 
incentives and a credible shot at membership, while constructivists point to shared 
identities, norms and values. These are valuable insights, yet they do not address a critical 
missing element – how the dispersion of ideas influences institutional outcomes in 
candidate states. This research demonstrates that in order for the EU to have a 
transformative impact on the political institutions of the states of former Yugoslavia, 
national political leaders must be able to communicate a satisfying narrative of EU 
legitimacy that resonates with national narratives of legitimacy when justifying policy 
choices. The project goes beyond an analysis of compliant/non-compliant behavior to 
unearth a greater understanding of how, at the hour of accession, elite discourse operates 
as an agent to reshape histories, form new identities, and mold preferences. Together 
these processes have profound policy implications for the new regimes, as they lead to 
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decisions that are consequential for institutional development at both the EU and state 
level. In particular, using a combination of content analysis and an original elite survey, 
this research finds that elites’ ability to express power through ideas and over ideas can 
transform power in ideas for the cases of Croatia and Serbia/Kosovo. For Croatia, this 
entails elites creating conditions whereby the public believes in the idea that EU 
membership represents an ‘escape’ from the Balkans as opposed to a ‘return’ to Europe. 
For Serbia/Kosovo, elites strive to convince citizens that EU membership signifies a ‘re-
branding’ of the Balkan image rather than an escape. The Serbia-Kosovo territorial 
dispute figures prominently in the picture as it pits new ideas – a re-branded ‘European’ 
Serbia – against old ideas wherein the Kosovo narrative is essential to Serbian national 
identity. Serbian elites work to persuade EU and national publics that these ideas are not 
in tension and promise to deliver on both – attain EU membership and keep Kosovo. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Introduction 
 
When clubs consider new members, the exercise is as much about self-reflection 
as it is about vetting inductees. It has become cliché in contemporary thinking about the 
state of affairs in Europe to describe this era as an ‘existential’ moment or a ‘crossroads.’ 
To indulge the cliché, western Balkan enlargement provides a space within that moment 
of existential reflection for the European Union to consider its character, purpose, and 
values – its identity. What is it? What does it do? To what extent can we decouple 
“Europe” for “European Union”? Why does it matter? To whom does it matter? These 
are immense questions and ideas. This dissertation attempts to offer partial answers to 
these questions and to understand how the answers given to these questions by political 
elites in candidate states interact with competing variables that explain why states choose 
to make an accession bid or not, how it influences their behavior during the process, how 
ideas shapes internal and external perceptions of national identity, and, reflexively, how 
new members mold perceptions of European identity.  
What is Europe? This is a question to which no definitive answer can be given, 
nor is it the principle inquiry of this dissertation. It must, however, be kept in the 
forefront of our mind as we treat this work’s central theme - western Balkan enlargement 
of the European Union (EU). The debates swirling over whether the European Union will 
deepen or disintegrate have not preempted it from expanding its membership or offering 
2 
 
candidacy and the future possibility of candidacy to more states since the onset of the 
Euro zone crisis in early 2009.  
Europe has been thought of varyingly as a project about cooperation and peace 
building; a counterbalance in a bipolar world of superpowers; an economic powerhouse; 
and a global leader in human rights, liberal democracy, and social justice. It is also 
thought of as having stood idly by or, at best, reacted slowly, while Yugoslavia in the 
1990s dissolved into a nightmare of unmitigated slaughter; something that has limited 
ability to constrain the power of the United States, Russia, or China; a two-tiered transfer 
union mired in a prolonged economic crisis that is widening the divide between its core 
and periphery; a place where right-wing populism and xenophobia are on a steady rise; a 
place where the country that promulgated Les Droits de L’homme takes action to 
forcefully expel one select group of people from the street of its capital; and it is a place 
where very few people vote for the individuals that represent them in supranational 
bodies, despite the profound influence these decision-makers have over the direction of 
policies that affect everyday life at the national level. 
Why does a country like the United Kingdom want out while countries like Serbia 
or Albania want in? Which of the above visions of Europe guide the trajectory, how do 
they weigh against one another, and how do individual states use these visions to project 
how they see themselves? It is in this broader context that we will take a fine-grain look 
at what Croatia and Serbia’s accession experiences reveal about the character, values, and 
identity of Europe and reflect on what their outcomes might mean for the future of the 
European Union. 
3 
 
 
  
Research Problem and Question 
 
Character, values and identity produce/reproduce institutions and history; 
likewise, history and institutions produce/reproduce character, values, and identity. We 
assume that this complex interaction results in a continuous causal feedback loop, which 
structures the parameters of how we access and make use of the material and ideational 
resources that are available to us within given circumstances. States of the western 
Balkans are faced with the proposition of joining the European Union. How states react 
to this proposition profoundly shapes the institutional framework that underpins the 
course of life for citizens and has consequential implications for the material and 
ideational goods that are at their disposal.  
Almost two decades removed from war, questions of ethnicity and nationalism 
continue to linger and threaten the peace in parts of former Yugoslavia. If the goal of the 
post-war era is to nurture the peaceful development of independent sovereign states with 
functioning democratic institutions and vibrant civil societies that respect human rights 
and diversity, is the key to realizing this goal found in the process of achieving European 
membership? If so, what are the internal and external forces that hinder or accelerate 
progress toward compliance with European standards/expectations? If not, then what are 
the internal and external forces that hinder or accelerate endogenous political 
development?   
As we look closely at the dynamics of this process, we will pursue three goals: 1) 
to understand the efficacy of EU conditionality as a policy mechanism used to induce 
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candidate states to converge to European standards of liberal democracy; 2) to determine 
how and the degree to which the politics of identity influence compliance through 
analysis of elite and popular discourse; and 3) to discover the degree to which patterns of 
institution-building are influenced by the relative power of competing ideas. 
I will demonstrate that in order for the EU to have a transformative impact on the 
political institutions of these countries, national political leaders must be able to 
communicate a convincing narrative of the EU’s legitimacy that resonates with national 
narratives of legitimacy. Leaders must communicate not only how the EU ‘fits’ into the 
picture of a country’s past, but how the EU represents a positive future, both materially 
and in terms of shared meanings of being. Even if leaders can meet the policy criteria to 
belong, they must convince their publics that they “belong” at a more existential level. 
The closer countries’ publics are to a sense of being “European”  (that the EU = “I”) at 
the beginning of the accession process, the easier it will be for elites to provide these 
publics with a satisfying pro-EU narrative, making compliance with EU standards more 
rapid and acceptable. The more publics view the EU as the “other,” the easier it will be 
for elites to provide satisfying nationalist narratives, making compliance slower and less 
acceptable. Nevertheless, all the countries of this study have moved or will move toward 
membership in time. This is not necessarily due to a triumph of a legitimizing EU 
narrative, but instead to the perceived illegitimacy of extreme nationalism – past, present, 
or future.  Speed of compliance can illustrate some aspects of the power of EU leverage, 
but the greatest indicator will be the qualitative nature of the major points of contention. 
If the EU can use the carrot of membership to mediate fruitful dialogue between Belgrade 
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and Pristina, potentially resolving Kosovo’s disputed sovereignty by facilitating 
cooperation, and leaders can effectively communicate the legitimacy of the outcome to 
the public, that would represent an immense act of influence as that issue speaks directly 
to these communities’ sense of being. Charting how the EU transforms actors with 
respect to being, saying and doing as they navigate the accession process can inform us 
how the EU acts as an agent to reshape histories, form new identities, and build 
institutions at both the EU and state level. In the end, this research finds that elites’ ability 
to express power through ideas and over ideas can transform power in ideas and define 
institutional trajectories.  
I will test the validity of these claims using a set of cases that include: Croatia, 
Serbia/Kosovo. The insights gathered while pursuing these goals will help us better 
comprehend the interrelationship between history, culture, discourse, and institutions in 
emergent democracies. The project will also shed light on the complex dialectic process 
of constructing polities and peoples and the relative impact of regional/global pressures 
on the prospects for democracy in transitional regimes.  
 
Structure of Argument 
 
In the broadest sense, I am trying to understand how transitional states can 
improve and develop their democratic political institutions in order to create an 
institutional environment that benefits citizens in terms of prosperity, security, and rights. 
For transitioning states within Europe, how do the pursuit of membership and the 
concomitant fulfillment of reform conditions lead to improvements in institutional 
quality? Is the EU a legitimate, effective, and desirable broker of institutional change? 
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What are the most crucial factors that animate the decision for states to either actively 
seek membership or to refuse or postpone it?  
Several of the successor states of former Yugoslavia are said to be sitting in 
‘Europe’s waiting room.’ In a region that has recently experienced unthinkable violence 
along ethno-nationalist lines, what is the role of identity in shaping these states’ EU 
trajectory? Will it help lead them in the door or does it keep them in the waiting room?  
More specifically, how does elite discourse function as a vector through which messages 
of collective identity are transmitted; and how do images of collective identity function to 
drive pro- or anti-integrationist political agendas?  
We assume that political elites who promote integration deem the EU a 
legitimate, effective, and desirable broker of institutional change. Likewise, the outcome 
of EU membership is seen as positive in terms of creating an institutional environment 
that bolsters citizen prosperity, security, and rights. We believe the opposite assumptions 
to be true for political elites that oppose integration. In order for elites to advance one 
agenda or the other, we assume that some form of justification must be presented to the 
public. The primary vehicle for this justification is a series of narrative images of what 
the EU is, what it does, and what it means. These images are disseminated to the public 
through elite discourse and rhetoric. 
In the course of this work, I will delineate between three primary strands of 
narrative framing that are offered as legitimate justification for or against membership – 
material (economic), political, and identity-bearing/associational. In each category, I will 
highlight the official narrative (i.e. the government’s story) and present rival narratives. I 
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will then look at public opinion data (Eurobarometer, Gallup Balkan Monitor) to 
determine the extent to which the elite presentation of the EU coincides with popular 
opinion. If not, how responsive will political elites be to their constituents’ opinions? 
Will they choose to change their rhetoric or change their action? Both? Neither?  
 
The main hypothesis driving this investigation is as follows: 
 
Despite the material incentives that motivate action in support of membership, the 
greatest hindrances to the adoption of EU standards are ideational disincentives. This is 
to say that political elites that are successful in communicating the idea that the EU is a 
legitimate actor that protects rather than threatens national sovereignty and identity (i.e. 
a sense of being), casting a narrative of ‘belonging’ or ‘returning’ to Europe, will win 
elections and implement EU compliance measures to advance on the EU path. The 
opposite will be true for leaders promulgating nationalist narratives, casting the EU as 
the ‘other.’ 
 
This work will build from Milada Vachudova’s theory that describes how 
domestic political elites in candidate states are induced to reform through the EU’s use of 
passive and active leveraging. Vachudova contends that it was the presence or absence of 
strong illiberal opposition to democratic reform that determined how domestic political 
elites responded to EU strategies of active and passive leverage in post-communist 
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candidate states.1 In Croatia and Serbia, however, it has been the relative strength and 
resilience of nationalist opposition to European Union membership that has determined 
how elites respond to EU pressures in the post-Tudjman and post-Milosevic regimes.  
The use of Vachudova’s framework serves two primary purposes. The first is 
organizational. The case studies I have chosen for this work, Croatia and Serbia, exhibit 
patterns of behavior that are easily mapped onto the ‘liberal’ and ‘illiberal’ dichotomy 
she creates for her group of case studies. These are not the most fitting labels, but 
Croatia’s reform trajectory closely matches that of her ‘liberal’ states (Poland, Czech 
Republic, Hungary), where the simple idea that attaining EU membership is a credible 
foreign policy objective (passive leverage) works to galvanize a strong pro-EU political 
consensus immediately following the death of Tudjman. Despite challenges along the 
way, for Croatia, the early political consensus pre-ordained membership, as it was a 
unified objective among domestic elites. Serbia’s reform trajectory, on the other hand, 
matches that of Vachudova’s ‘illiberal’ states (Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia) in that the 
EU must employ very deliberate policies toward these states (active leverage; negotiating 
reforms on specific points, demanding observable results) in order to move domestic 
elites to advance along the stages of candidacy toward membership. It is not until the 
election of Boris Tadic as president in 2008 that we witness a pro-EU political consensus 
in Serbia. The consensus, however, is not membership at any cost as no government of 
Serbia will claim to recognize the independence of Kosovo. “I Evropa i Kosovo” (“Both 
Europe and Kosovo”) is a popular political slogan that encapsulates the government’s 
                                                
1 Milada A. Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration After 
Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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platform. Political elites continue to stress that Serbia will not trade Kosovo for 
membership as it represents an integral source of national identification and symbolic 
meaning. Although some progress on a status solution has been made through EU-
mediated direct talks that offer rewards for compromise in terms of accelerating 
membership prospects, recognition of Kosovo as a formal condition of EU membership is 
a non-starter for the government of Serbia.  
In addition to these two cases being decent foils of one another, matching the 
categorization scheme of Vachudova’s case studies, the second purpose of using her 
framework is to challenge her theoretical assertion that reforms undertaken by domestic 
political elites in route to EU membership are primarily motivated by materialist logic 
and economic incentives. I will attempt to demonstrate that it is ideational forces – the 
weight of identity-bearing/associational narratives – that power the integration trajectory 
in one direction or the other. For Croatia, the Eurozone crisis significantly limits the 
possible motivating impacts of material incentives, yet integration moves forward. This is 
partly because of inertia, but partly because elites cast the EU as a place to which 
Croatians ‘belong.’ While elites present this message as one that gives Croatian national 
identity proximity to Europe, citizens tend to prefer to interpret the pursuit of 
membership as a way of distancing themselves from a highly stigmatized image of 
Balkan identity. This translates into just enough support for integration to justify elites’ 
policy decisions. For Serbia, the question of Kosovo is as the heart of national identity. 
Despite recent steps to normalize Belgrade-Pristina relations, there is strong nationalist 
opposition to the EU in Serbia, which grows when the EU is perceived to be pressuring 
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actions that could lead to formal recognition. Elites do present an image of Serbia 
‘belonging’ to Europe, but only a Serbia with Kosovo. Given the immensity of the 
symbolic value of this issue, Serbia will not blink. Until the status issue is formally 
addressed, Serbia will likely remain a candidate in perpetuity no matter how many pre-
accession funds the EU offers or how strong the EU economy becomes. As it stands, 
political elites cannot find a narrative that resonates in the public, which would justify a 
policy course that embraces the EU while abandoning Kosovo. Curiously, the current 
cadre of Serbian political elites is made up of former radical nationalists and Milosevic 
protégés who have experienced a role reversal, trumpeting the virtues of EU membership. 
Discussion of this phenomenon will be explored at length.   
While this does challenge the materialist account, the intent of my work is not to 
be purely constructivist. Its aim is to balance competing rationales for why states pursue 
EU membership and to understand why elites choose to instrumentalize one form of logic 
over another through discourse and messaging. Ultimately, this should lead to an 
explanation of how these choices influence differential paths of institutional 
development.  
Additionally, this dissertation takes ideas seriously. Ideas contain the power to 
shape our normative and cognitive understanding of the world. Individuals share and 
propagate ideas, and intersubjectively construct worlds of meaning. Consciously and 
unconsciously, these worlds of meaning shape our beliefs and our practices, and build our 
identities. Discourse is a vector through which ideas travel. The speaker and the audience 
engage the intersubjective dialogue, molding value and meaning in their society. Political 
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elites are in a unique position to structure the terms and content of this dialogue. 
Therefore, the ideas that elites propagate are central to the formation of meaning 
contexts. From these contexts flow behaviors and practices, which over time, harden into 
new identities and new institutions.       
 
Background 
 
Brief History of EU Enlargement 
 
Since the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1951, which founded the six-member 
European Coal and Steel Community, close strategic cooperative relationships among 
European countries have continued to evolve, intensify, and expand in terms of 
complexity and scope. At different moments over the past half-century, under a variety of 
circumstances, this community has welcomed new members and extended its reach 
throughout the continent. Fundamental to its purpose from the beginning was a 
commitment to preserve peace and security in the wake of the Second World War and to 
establish a common market where capital, goods, services, and people could move 
freely.2  
The first enlargement of the EU in 1973 included Denmark, Ireland, and the 
United Kingdom. A significant motivation for the UK to join was pressure from the 
United States to provide a counterbalance to France’s influence over European affairs and 
be a partner to represent US interests in Europe. The next wave of enlargement occurred 
                                                
2 Liane Malcos Keister, “EU Enlargment and Admission into the Schengen Zone: Once a 
Fait Accompli, Now a Moving Target,” Suffolk Transnational Law Review vol. 36, no. 1 
(2013): 119. 
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when Greece joined in 1981, followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. These new 
members were emerging from a period of dictatorship and the main theme of this 
expansion was about the consolidation of democratic systems of governance. By 
tethering themselves to the economic community, they would find solid moorings in this 
respect. Likewise, the community would be able to have a role in ensuring that there 
would be no backsliding to authoritarianism.  
In the aftermath of the Cold War, there have been three distinct enlargements. The 
first included Austria, Finland, and Sweden. These were countries whose Cold War 
neutrality barred them from pursuing membership with organizations developing a 
common foreign and security policy. These states joined in 1995. Also, in the first post-
Cold War phase, the territories of East Germany joined the community upon unification 
with West Germany in 1990. The number of members did not increase, but the 
population and territory did. Unlike, the enlargements to come – the ‘big bang’ 
enlargements of 2004/2007 and the ongoing western Balkan enlargement – East Germany 
did not have to undergo a formal process of vetting to determine if it was prepared to join 
or suitable for membership.  
The 2004 and 2007 enlargements represent the largest expansion of the European 
Union to date. The EU went from fifteen members to twenty-five in 2004 then twenty-
seven in 2007. The majority of these countries are former communist states of east and 
central Europe.3 This enlargement was widely seen as a high point in the history of the 
                                                
3 Malta and Cyprus were also included in the 2004 enlargement. 
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EU as it signaled a clear affirmation of liberal democratic norms and ideology. 4 It was 
also a moment of intense idealism.5 Behind the idealism, however, were concerns that 
rapid expansion of the EU would threaten internal order, create weaker external borders, 
and force painfully economic reforms that would widen distributional disparities and 
opening new divisions.6 Furthermore, concern that the absorption of so many new 
member states at once would stress the EU’s convoluted institutional environment 
reignited age-old debates about the role of national vs. supranational governance and the 
need for further federalization. 
Along side all of its enthusiasm for Europe, the ‘big bang’ enlargement brought 
with it new political, social, and economic challenges. The game was beginning to 
change. The ‘no’ votes to the French and Dutch referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in 
2005 left the Union questioning how to proceed. The French ‘non’ was taken as a sign of 
public frustration in response to the 2004 enlargement, the emblem of which was the so-
called ‘Polish plumber,’ who, envisioning a better life in France, could now leave Poland 
with the EU’s freedom of movement provisions. The French feared the influx of workers 
from the east would drive down wages and social standards.7 In the larger picture, the 
negative referenda deflated those who had visions of a deeper, more politically integrated 
                                                
4 Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and 
the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,” International Organization vol. 55, no. 
1 (2001): 47-48. 
5 Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Anna Vachudova, “National Interests, State Power, and 
EU Enlargement,” East European Politics and Societies vol. 17, no. 1 (2003): 43. 
6 Helene Sjursen, “Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the 
EU’s Enlargement Policy,” JCMS vol. 40, no. 3 (2002): 491-492. 
7 Gideon Rachman, “The Death of Enlargement,” The Washington Quarterly vol. 29, no. 
2 (2006): 53. 
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Europe. Conversely, this emboldened pro-deepeners to investigate new strategies to 
further the integrationist agenda.8  
Clearly, using the tools of direct democracy was having an adverse effect on this 
agenda. Putting important decisions about key treaties to parliamentary protocol was one 
option, yet that did not help address the underlying issue of trying to bring the Union 
closer to the people and make up some of its ‘democratic deficit.’ Yet, in light of the 
French and Dutch ‘no’ votes, it is not surprising that, when calculating their policy 
strategies, unless constitutionally mandated, political elites will selectively choose to 
employ the tools of direct democracy for questions of enlargement. It is challenging for 
political elites to control the enlargement agenda when a disenchanted public might vote 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ based on considerations that have nothing at all to do with the ballot 
question (i.e. don’t like the party of the person proposing the question, dissatisfied with 
national/local issues unrelated to the EU, etc.).9  
For political elites in the countries of the western Balkans, the next wave of 
accession candidates, the French and Dutch ‘no’ votes to the Constitutional Treaty 
produced great fear that their membership bids would be put on hold permanently 
because ‘the people’ had indicated that any further enlargement would not be acceptable 
and the political elites of member states would act in accordance with public sentiment. 
                                                
8 Alberta Sbragia, “The EU and Its ‘Constitution’: Public Opinion, Political Elites, and 
Their International Context,” PS: Political Science and Politics vol. 29, no. 2 (2006): 
237. 
9 Sara Binzer Hobolt, “Direct Democracy and European Integration,” Journal of 
European Public Policy vol. 13, no. 1 (2006): 156-157. 
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In addition to concerns regarding enlargement fatigue, as the intoxication of 
Central and Eastern European Countries’ (CEECs) successful accession bids began to 
wear off, closer inspection of the functioning of public institutions showed unsatisfactory 
outcomes in many of the new member states. Public administrations were weak and 
prone to corruption. Judicial systems were slow, arbitrary, and politicized. Political 
parties had captured civil service agencies and the media. The quality of democracy was 
vastly improved since the early days of transition, but the accession process distracted the 
political elite from the realities of its fragility and hollowness. For many of the CEECs 
EU enlargement worked miracles as an incentive for elites to begin to address questions 
of reform, yet the process of accession tended to prove sluggish or feckless in terms of 
meaning gains for institutional quality. 10 On top of that, when membership was granted 
and the incentive to at least putatively take on reform was gone, there was very little 
keeping new members from reverting to bad behaviors or establishing new ones.11 
 
Beyond the Big Bang 
 
A logical question to ask of the 2004/7 enlargement of CEECs is why did those 
countries accede and not the countries of the western Balkans? Many argue that by 2007 
Croatia was more prepared to become a member than were Romania and Bulgaria. Some 
pretty convincing reasons emerge when we take a quick look back at what was happening 
                                                
10 Wojciech Sadurski, “Accession’s Democracy Dividend: The Impact of the EU 
Enlargement upon Democracy in the New Member States of Central and Eastern 
Europe,” Yearbook of Polish European Studies no. 7 (2003): 35. 
11 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “Is East-Central Europe Backsliding? EU Accession is No ‘End 
of History,’” Journal of Democracy vol. 18, no. 4 (2007): 15-16. 
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at the time that most CEECs filed their applications for EU membership. Most filed in the 
mid-1990s, between 1994 and 1996. The wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were 
still raging and leadership was working toward the Dayton Peace Accords. What the 
states of Croatia, Serbia (then the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) or rump 
Yugoslavia or the third Yugoslavia), and Bosnia-Herzegovina were to become still hung 
very much in the balance. After the Dayton Peace Accords were signed, Croatia and 
rump Yugoslavia entered a period of authoritarian nationalism presided over by Franjo 
Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic, respectively. Both leaders were not particularly 
inclined toward Europe and vice versa. In 1999, while Milosevic was still the president of 
the FRY, he was indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) for war crimes. His refusal to turn himself into the Hague did not win 
him any favor in Brussels. In many ways, the transitional issues faced by former 
Yugoslav successor had extra layers of complexity over those of the post-communist 
wave of enlargement states. In addition to a transition to democracy and a market 
economy, these states had the additional challenge of transitioning to a market economy 
while it recovered from the ravages of war. Then, an additional post-nationalist transition 
needed to occur in order to begin to meet the requirements of democratic governance and 
even consider an orientation toward Europe. When this tilt occurred, however, the 
population threw its weight behind it and started to race toward the goal full throttle. This 
happened parallel to the welcoming of new members in 2004 – a moment when 
enthusiasm for Europe reached an apogee around the continent. As we will see, this 
changes in the intervening years.  
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Initial Commitment and Challenges from Recent Experiences 
 
On November 24, 2000 a summit was held in Zagreb between the EU and the 
heads of state of the so-called western Balkan countries to affirm the mutual objectives 
and conditions of political association.12 The states present at the summit were to develop 
a strategy for regional stability, which was to be achieved through cooperation, political 
dialogue, free trade, and a commitment to combat corruption and organized crime. 
Regional reconciliation efforts were to go hand in hand with the Stabilization and 
Association Process (SAP), formalizing the European prospective of the states.13  
The EU has difficultly maintaining a consistent approach to enlargement of the 
region. Its policy is often informed by extraordinary circumstances that the dissolution of 
former Yugoslavia brought with it. Accordingly, the SAP evolved into a mechanism 
known as European Partnerships (EP), which had the intention of combining policies of 
crisis management with bilateral as well as regional approaches to integration. The notion 
of EPs was adopted at the Thessaloniki summit in 2004. The agenda set forth at 
Thessaloniki again asserted that when these western Balkan states sign association 
agreements with the EU, they have full membership as their perspective, likewise the EU 
assumes the obligation to provide instruments that facilitate stabilization (i.e. financial 
assistance). A major outcome of the summit is the recognition that it is the process of 
                                                
12 Western Balkan states represented at the 2000 Zagreb Summit include Albania, the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  
13 European Commission, “Final Declaration of 2000 Zagreb Summit,” 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/Declang4.doc.ht
ml (accessed July 23, 2013). 
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accession itself that is key to the transformation of the region, both in terms of political 
institutions, but also in terms of peace and cooperation.14  
The challenges faced by these Balkan countries are not entirely new for the post-
communist enlargement era. Like the Visegrad, Baltic, and prior Balkan (Romania, 
Bulgaria) members, all prospective members must meet the Copenhagen criteria of 
liberal markets, competitive democracies that protect human rights, and accept all 
provisions of the acquis. Meeting these requirements can involve strenuous reform and 
governmental restructuring. All of the aforementioned post-communist nations were 
undergoing such change in the context of newly found independence and/or reestablished 
sovereignty. 
For the Visegrad countries, the challenges were mainly structural as there was a 
general willingness to “return to Europe” and detach from the sphere of Soviet influence. 
This willingness has been attributed to the existence of pro-democracy movements and 
civic activism that pre-dated the fall of the communist regimes – notably, Charter 77 in 
Czechoslovakia and Solidarity in Poland. This paved the way for smoother transitions to 
democracy and quicker progress along the European path because the leaders of these 
movements were able to convince the public of the long-term value of enduring harsh 
short-term economic policies such as price shocks.15 With the exception of Slovakia, 
whose EU ambitions would have been dashed had Vladimir Meciar been reelected prime 
                                                
14 Vladimir Gligorov, “European Partnership with the Balkans,” European Balkan 
Observer vol. 2, no. 1 (2004): 2. 
15 Op. cit. 1. 
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minister in 2002, EU compliance for the Visegrad countries can be interpreted as 
primarily driven by internal forces.16  
Post-communist independence in the Baltics can be viewed somewhat similarly to 
that of the former Yugoslavia states in the sense that their independence was carved out 
of a sovereign state of which the were once a part of the Soviet Union, as opposed to 
achieving independence from a prior regime. The largest challenges faced in the push to 
EU accession for the Baltics were related to citizenship and demography – whether or not 
to give citizenship to large populations of ethnic Russians minorities. The EU required 
these countries (Estonia and Latvia in particular) to harmonize its citizenship law with 
international protocols to reduce statelessness. Though these issues have persisted after 
membership was granted, comparing the responses of these countries to EU pressures in 
this domain to responses from the countries of this study is important because the issues 
evoke strong sentiments of identity, belonging, and collective memory. 
In Bulgaria and Romania, combating corruption and organized crime were some 
of the greatest challenges during their pursuit of EU membership and they continue to be 
a threat to democratic governance today. For instance, one year before Romania was set 
to enter the EU, it ranked 84th on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index, scoring 3.1 out of 10. A weak judicial system and rampant bribery were thought to 
dissuade foreign investors because contracts could not be properly enforced. EU officials 
were likewise concerned about whether or not subsidies would be appropriated in 
                                                
16 Christopher Lord and Erika Harris, Democracy in the New Europe (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 122.  
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accordance with their designated purpose.17 France, Germany, Belgium, and the United 
Kingdom exercised the maximum sever-year restriction of freedom of movement for new 
member states Romania and Bulgaria, fearing of an influx of migrant labor would disrupt 
national labor markets.18 Additionally, the predominance of trafficking coupled with 
these countries’ geopolitical positioning raised security concerns for the EU and 
continues to delay their entry into the Schengen zone. Some analysts say that accession 
was granted too early, before these countries met the structural conditions, and that the 
decision was based on the political grounds that these countries supported the 
international effort in the Kosovo War and their ability to assert influence in the western 
Balkans.19 Ambiguity over the broad nature and inconsistent application of the 
Copenhagen Criteria is also believed to have contributed to Bulgaria and Romania’s pre-
mature entrance into the Union. Even if conditions were not met in advance of 
membership, EU elites are said to have thought that experience in the club would turn 
domestic political elites into good liberal democrats over time.20 Nonetheless, the 
countries of this study – Croatia and Serbia/Kosovo – are not strangers to corruption and 
                                                
17 Joshua Gallu, “Are Romania and Bulgaria Ready? New EU Members Score Badly in 
Corruption Ranking,” Der Speigel, November 6, 2006. 
18 According to the 2+3+2 rule, old Member States have the right to impose restrictions 
on workers from new Member States for an inital transitional period of 2 years. After this 
period expires, the old Member State can review and extend restrictions for an additional 
3 years. After 3 years, another review is conducted and a final 2 years of restrictions can 
be added if there is considerable evidence that the workers coming from the new Member 
State are disrupting the labor force of the old Member State. After a total of 7 years, all 
restrictions must be lifted.  
19 François Frison-Roche, “Analyst: Bulgaria and Romania’s EU Accession ‘Was 
Right,’” euractiv.com, March 1, 2012, http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/analyst-
bulgaria-romanias-eu-acc-news-509933. 
20 Jan-Werner Mueller, “Eastern Europe Goes South: Disappearing Democracy in the 
EU’s Newest Members,” Foreign Affairs no. 93 (2014): 18. 
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organized crime. Leaders might see the lessons of Romania and Bulgaria cases as an 
opportunity to attack the legitimacy of EU institutions or as an opening to use political 
exploitation to gain access to its resources.   
With respect to the question of how the EU should deal with Kosovo, it does have 
experience considering the candidacy of a contested state – Cyprus. As with the situation 
of Serbia and Kosovo, there was hope that Cyprus’ bid for EU membership would bring 
opportunity for reconciliation between the Greek and Turkish communities and possibly 
unify both Greeks and Turks under one federal government linking two constituent 
states.21 Although there was hope that the accession process would induce a solution to 
the dispute, a formal settlement was never a precondition of Cyprus’ membership. The 
Annan Plan was put to the people in a referendum. It was supported by the Cypriot Turks, 
but not Greek Cypriots and was therefore voted down. Despite remaining divided, the 
Greek Cypriot part of the island entered the EU as a full member in 2004. Tensions 
remain high between the two communities, whose positions are buttressed by two 
influential regional actors – Greece and Turkey. Relations between these two states have 
important ramifications within the sphere of international relations.22 In particular, in the 
context of the EU, and Turkey’s EU ambitions, the unresolved Cyprus issue could 
prompt either Cyprus or Greece to block Turkey’s membership or be used by the Greek 
Cypriot government to exact concessions from Cypriot Turks.23 While the Cyprus 
                                                
21 This was the proposed Annan Plan.  
22 Andreas Theophanous, “The Cyprus Problem: Accession to the EU and Broader 
Implications,” Mediterranean Quarterly vol. 14, no. 1 (2003): 49. 
23 Jon Gorvett, “Talking Turkey: Bumps in Road to EU Accession Expose Cyprus, 
Kurdish Potholes,” The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (2005): 39. 
22 
 
example is different from that of Serbia/Kosovo, in both cases a status solution is sought 
and the EU membership carrot might present the best opportunity for resolution. In both 
circumstances, granting membership to one community may endow a disproportionate 
amount of power on that community over the other, prolonging or deepening the conflict. 
The EU may have missed an opportunity in Cyprus. It certainly does not want to make a 
similar mistake in Serbia/Kosovo. 
While many of the challenges these countries face are not new, what is novel is 
the added requirement of complying with the ICTY. Reconciling the 1990s wars is not 
only important for EU membership, but it is important for brokering sustainable peace 
and stability. Keen attention will be paid to identifying the internal and external forces 
motivating ICTY compliance and how this additional requirement influences the length 
of the accession process as well as interpretations of national image.  
All of these challenges form the backdrop of this story. We will explore how they 
are addressed in the course of the accession process and to what degree successful 
institutional development is possible. Central to this story is an examination of how 
political elites frame and react to the presented challenges. Do they deploy their words as 
transformative inspiration, empty promises, or legitimization of a pre-ordained policy 
program? Do they use all of these tactics interchangeably as they see fit? If so, under 
which circumstances, why, and to whom? These are the principle questions that will help 
us understand the how discourse operates with respect to institutional outcomes related to 
western Balkan enlargement of the European Union.  
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Empirics 
Two empirical projects form the basis of this dissertation’s findings. The first is 
an original survey of political elites from Croatia, Serbia, and Kosovo. This primary 
research was conducted during extended visits to the region between 2012-2013 and in 
2014. More than 50 individuals participated in focused discussions on the topic of their 
country’s EU integration story (See Appendix A for a sample of questions). The subjects 
were chosen in order to construct a representation of expert opinion. Participants were a 
diverse group of government officials, civil society leaders, academics, public 
intellectuals, and journalists. Individuals were recruited by referral. Approximately half 
of the participants were from Croatia, the other half to Serbia/Kosovo. Discussions with 
experts helped develop a more nuanced and contextualized understanding of the 
dynamics of political rhetoric as it pertains to integration. Results of the survey are 
discussed in detail in Chapters Three and Four. 
The second empirical project was a content analysis of political elites’ statements. 
While the expert survey helped decode subtextual aspects of elite discourse, the content 
analysis was intended to examine text at face value to discover trends and 
correspondences. Using Dedoose, a web app designed for qualitative research, over four 
thousand public statements made by figures serving as President and Prime Minister of 
Serbia between 2006-2012 and reported by the nation’s largest media outfit were coded 
and analyzed. Specifically, this effort was aimed at generating data to help us understand 
the volume and frequency of discourse Serbian elites were producing about Europe or 
about issues of national concern, such as the status of Kosovo. In addition to the volume 
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of discourse, the analysis examined if these messages were framed in terms of politics, 
economy, or identity. Results of the content analysis are found in Chapter Four. 
 
Outline of the Dissertation 
 
The rest of this dissertation will proceed as follows:  
 
Chapter 2 is a review of the literature and a justification of the case selection. Then, the 
next two chapters are an examination of the primary cases. Chapter 3 is devoted to 
Croatia, chapter 4 to Serbia/Kosovo. The case study chapters include results of the elite 
survey and content analysis. Finally, looking at a set of proxy factors that help to 
understand the relationship between national identity and EU compliance, Chapter 5 
offers comparative analysis and conclusions.   
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE AND CASE SELECTION 
 
 
Background Literature 
 
Since its inception, the EU has continued to enlarge in terms of member states, 
functional responsibilities, influence as political and economic actor, and much more. As 
the EU expands and sets its sights on integrating new members, a lively scholarly debate 
will persist that attempts to comprehend why the process of integration is seamless for 
some states and arduous for others. Previous work has presented material incentives, state 
capacity, sovereignty, public opinion, legitimacy, political culture, initial conditions, and 
identity as possible contributing factors that explain why some candidates comply with 
European standards and some do not. 
The EU’s use of conditionality has been accepted as a legitimate form of external 
influence24 because it takes the form of ‘contagion’ and ‘consent,’ not ‘control’.25 Instead 
of ‘control,’ the dynamics of integration have been described as a strategy of passive and 
active leverage. EU leverage results in an iterated electoral game where, in time, political 
actors are induced to move in the direction of liberal democratic reform and make a bid 
for EU membership. Through the use of conditionality, the EU’s active leverage helps to 
set the parameters and rules of the game.26 The theory of leverage is congruent with 
rational-choice theories, which contend that the causal mechanisms of conditionality are 
rooted in strategic benefit-cost calculations of material incentives made by elites in target 
                                                
24 Laurence Whitehead, The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and 
the Americas, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).   
25 Op. cit. 16.  
26 Op. cit. 1. 
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countries. Elites will seek to adapt behavioral standards if external incentives are strong 
and credible.27 
*** 
With recent histories of war, succession, and major economic transformation, 
forming an understanding of the development of sovereignty and state-building in this 
region will be critical to the examination of the dynamics at play. Tilly’s famous analysis 
of the formation of the modern state in Western Europe inspired the aphorism “states 
make war, and wars make states.”28 Noting the difference in the outcomes of war in 
Afghanistan and Vietnam, Taylor and Botea reexamine the dynamics of state-building in 
the context of the modern developing world. More often than not, war is more likely to be 
state-destroying rather than state-building in the developing world. Ethnic homogeneity 
or the existence of a long-standing political community facilitates the dissemination of a 
unifying national ideology, which in turn leads states toward greater success building 
institutions. 29 
Mostov argues that the modern states seek to build nations by becoming an agent 
for cultural, linguistic, or religious unification. This sometimes requires a state to seek to 
authenticate a ‘natural’ or ‘ancestral’ national community through histories of origin or 
                                                
27 Frank Schimmelfennig and Hanno Scholtz, “EU Democracy Promotion in the 
European Neighbourhood: Political Conditionality, Economic Development and 
Transnational Exchange,” European Union Politics vol. 9, no. 2 (2008): 188-189. 
28 Charles Tilly, The Formation of National States in Western Europe, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1975).  
29 Brian Taylor and Roxana Botea, “Tilly Tally: War-making and State-making in the 
Contemporary Third World,” International Studies Review vol. 10 (2008): pp. 28-29. 
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cultural myths.30 To this end, political elites may attempt to manufacture a preordained 
nationalist narrative despite the weakness of the veracity or evidence of its existence in 
order to advance territorial claims or bolster group solidarity and identification. What is 
problematic about the state acting as an agent of ‘unification’ is that, in the Balkans, the 
realization of ‘unity’ in the 1990s was carried out through a process of ethnic 
homogenization using the instruments of war, expulsion and assimilation. Given this 
history, it is reasonable to expect domestic resistance to the EU acting as an agent that 
‘unifies’ candidates with its purposes, asking them to ‘converge,’ ‘assume,’ or ‘integrate’ 
to their standards.    
Ethnically and religiously plural societies have difficulty in promulgating a 
unifying national ideology or vision for the state. Gellner defines nationhood as the 
bringing together of ethnicity and statehood.31 Furthermore, there is the principle that the 
political and national space should be one congruent unit. Congruence can be satisfied by 
an institutional arrangement such as a federation or by full territorial sovereignty. The 
extent to which elites used ethnic cleansing as a means of creating a more “pure” blend of 
ethnicity and state has created several setbacks to the state-building ambitions of the 
countries of former Yugoslavia. Contemporary state-building has suffered as a 
consequence of the nation-building ambitions of the leaders of the 1990s. The drive for 
independent sovereignty of ethnic nations upended the previous federal arrangement and 
has forced these nations to reset the state-building clock.  
                                                
30 Julie Mostov, “Democracy and the Politics of National Identity,” Studies in East 
European Thought vol. 46, no. ½ (1994): 24.  
31 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). 
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The issue of sovereignty is centrally connected to the development of state 
capacities. Borzel et. al. explain that the administrative capacity of the state can 
determine whether or not a given state will comply with the European law. They find that 
politically powerful member states are the most likely to violate European law, whereas 
small states with efficient bureaucracies are most likely to comply.32 In Bosnia-
Herzegovina (BiH), for example, it may not be a question of whether or not BiH wants to 
comply, but as a weak and fractured state whose disparate entities often work at cross 
purposes, if it can comply. According to Chandler, external regulation by international 
actors in BiH after Dayton had stymied organic development of local capacities.33 
On the EU side of the equation, the EU is still an incomplete polity. While both 
the EU and the newly formed states of the Balkans are still in the process of becoming, 
the states of the Balkans need more time to develop their own sovereign state structures 
before they can escape a history of internal division and external imposition.34 According 
to Noutcheva, the EU lacks strong normative justification in its demands related to state 
sovereignty in the Western Balkans because it lacks legitimacy.35 The perception that the 
EU lacks legitimacy creates political space for domestic actors to contest EU positions, 
which leads to fake, partial, or non-compliance with EU conditions.  
                                                
32 Tanja A. Borzel et al., “Recalcitrance, Inefficiency, and Support for European 
Integration: Why Member States Do (Not) Comply with European Law,” CES working 
paper, no. 151 (2007), 2. 
33 David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton, (London: Pluto Press, 
2000), 3. 
34 Kyriakos Kentrotis, “The European Union and the Balkans: Between Symbiosis and 
Integration,” Romanian Journal of European Affairs vol. 10, no. 3 (2010): 67-68. 
35 Gergana Noutcheva, “Fake, Partial and Imposed Compliance: The Limits of the EU’s 
Normative Power in the Western Balkans,” Journal of European Public Policy vol. 16, 
no. 7 (2009): 1065. 
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Furthermore, Europeanization influences adaptational change at the domestic 
level, on one hand, by elements of the formal institutional structure (multiple veto 
points), and on the other, a political culture with key individuals who promote value-
based change. Thus, change occurs as a function of the redistribution of power and 
political opportunity within the formal institutional setting, and the socialization of new 
norms and new identities within the political culture.36 Lenshow et. al. hypothesize that 
the closer countries are to one another in terms of initial conditions, such as culture, 
economy, and institutions, the more likely it is that they will share similar ideas and move 
to implement likeminded policy.37 Thus, the redistribution of political power and 
socialization of norms that Borzel and Risse suggest, will be much smoother if the 
candidate state is already ‘like Europe.’  
Media exposure and the infusion of information about the EU can have an effect 
on public opinion. Lecheler and De Vreese present a study that shows how news framing 
has a measurable effect on public support for or opposition to Serbia’s EU candidacy. 
Additionally, more media coverage raises awareness and political knowledge of the EU, 
which, in turn, is correlated with greater support for Serbia’s accession. Domestic elites 
may choose not to act in accordance with public opinion. Elites tend to be more pro-EU, 
                                                
36 Tanja A. Borzel and Thomas Risse-Kappen, “When Europe Hits Home: 
Europeanization and Domestic Change,” EUI working papers, Robert Schuman Center, 
no. 2000/56. European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy (2000), 1-2. 
37 Andrea Lenschow et al., “When the Birds Sing. A Framework for Analyzing Domestic 
Factors Behind Policy Convergence,” Journal of European Public Policy vol. 12, no. 5 
(2005): 797-798. 
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however, and if increased media reporting on EU issues leads to greater support for 
integration, it may be used as a strategy to legitimize compliant behavior.38 
*** 
Converse to the position of rational-choice institutionalists, social constructivists 
have argued that the logic of an incentive-driven rational-choice model of conditionality 
has largely ignored national identity as a variable that determines whether conditionality 
will be effective or not. National identity acts as a filter for public policy decision-
making. If EU conditions are perceived as being in conflict with national identity, states 
will not comply.39 Moreover, if a strong national identity resists initial efforts to 
democratize through conditionality, the socialization of democratic norms and practices 
will suffer, and the result will be ‘shallower’ democracy within the target state in the 
medium and long run.40 
Accordingly, identity can be viewed as a contributing factor that explains 
compliance or non-compliance. In general, the strength of ethno-nationalist identification 
in the Balkan region can be contrasted with weak identification with Europe. When 
considering how to order our thinking on the subject of identity and, in particular, on the 
matter of identity formation, three prominent lines of inquiry define the field. The main 
                                                
38 Sophie Lecheler and Claes H. De Vreese, “Framing Serbia: The Effects of News 
Framing on Public Support for EU Enlargement,” European Political Science Review 
vol. 2, no. 1 (2010): 75. 
39 Tina Freyburg and Solveig Richter, “National Identity Matters: The Limited Impact of 
EU Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans,” National Centre of Competence in 
Research, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, working paper no. 19 (2008), 
http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/publications/workingpaper/pdf/WP19.pdf.  
40 Solveig Richter, “External Democratization-Shallow Democratization? Political 
Conditionality and Democratic Socialization,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of 
the ISA’s 49th Annual Convention: Bridging Multiple Divides, San Francisco (2008).  
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cleavage lies between primordialist (a.k.a essentialist) and constructivist thinkers. The 
former explains identity as being a fixed and intrinsic quality of an individual or group’s 
character, while the latter explains identity as being produced by a series of 
technological, ideational, political, cultural, or institutional forces that shape patterns of 
meaning in our lives. Beyond these two, the third branch is the instrumentalist school, 
which is not concerned with whether or not one’s identity has been inherited through 
biological or sociological processes – identity has no intrinsic value; rather it is a shared 
set of underlying economic, cultural or political interests. The instrumentalist view is that 
elites invoke identity to tap into those sets of interests in order to gain access to the 
resources of the state.41 These theoretical distinctions can apply to analyses of both ethnic 
and national identity. 
This study is not intended to settle this debate. Instead, it will examine how these 
explanatory traditions are engaged through discourse and to what end. The way in which 
identity is framed can have a significant bearing on the mobilization of targeted 
collectivities that, in turn, can empower elites to pursue distinct policy goals that are 
perceived as being in the interest of the collectivity. Aroopala argues that campaigning 
and mobilizing groups using identity-based framing is most effective when individuals 
are nearer to attaining a goal.42 As the countries of the study, Serbia in particular, get 
                                                
41 Ashutosh Varshney, “Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Politics, eds. C. Boix & S. Stokes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
280-288. 
42 Christy Aroopala, “Mobilizing Collective Identity: Frames & Rational Individuals,” 
Political Behavior 34 (2012): 194-195. 
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closer to EU membership, this conclusion could be used to explain elite behavior – 
increasing the amount of rhetoric distinguishing Europeanist and nationalist priorities.  
The notion of identity framing is embedded in a larger theory of symbolic politics, 
which Kaufman says accounts for certain political outcomes, most notably extreme ethnic 
violence. According to his theory, group myths, fear of group extinction, and emotion-
laden symbols are used by elites justify hostility and make extremist policies more 
popular.43 Moreover, on the subject of political persuasion, Cruz argues that we cannot 
understand the dynamics of political and collective identities without first understanding 
collective memory and the rhetorical frames that dominate at critical junctures in a group 
or nation’s history. Historical events naturally divide individuals into different groups of 
shared experience, which shape group identities. Elites utilize images and rhetorical 
frames that resonate with a group’s collective memory in order to enhance group 
solidarity or mobilize their support. In addition, Cruz argues that the transformation of 
collective identities through shared historical experiences influences a nation’s political 
and economic development. In political competitions, how each competitor will frame 
the future depends on how they frame the past, and that can lead to a successful or 
unsuccessful electoral strategy and explain differential development trajectories. 44   
Goulding and Domic apply this understanding of historical images and rhetorical 
frames to Croatia, arguing that after the wars of the 90s, Croatian elites actively 
manipulated historical images to produce a politically constructed representation of 
                                                
43 Stuart J. Kaufman, “Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of 
Extreme Ethnic Violence,” International Security vol. 30, no. 4 (2006): 47-48. 
44 Consuelo Cruz, “Identity and Persuasion: How Nations Remember their Past and Make 
their Futures,” World Politics vol. 52, no. 3 (2000): 276. 
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Croatian heritage that was both convenient and acceptable – referencing the Revolutions 
of 1848 and memorializing figures like Ban Jelacic who fought to abolish serfdom and 
establish Croatia’s independence from the Hapsburg throne. This reinvention of the past 
creates challenges to authenticity. If the “return to Europe” narrative has dominated the 
reinvention of the past, then Croatia’s impending membership will bolster the 
authenticity of that claim.45 
For this study, nationalism is seen as being the most pertinent form of political 
and social identification. Csergo and Goldgeier define four distinct forms of nationalism, 
which help us understand the relationship between nationalism and EU integration. 
‘Traditional’ nationalism seeks to find congruence between political and cultural 
ownership of a nationally defined homeland. Traditional nationalists view the EU as an 
alliance among nation-states. This form is typical for the cases of this study. The other 
forms include: ‘sub-state’ (desires to strengthen political representation for the homeland 
vis-à-vis the state; EU as an alliance of nations or regions), ‘trans-sovereign’ (creates 
institutional links across borders; EU is an alliance of nations), and ‘protectionist’ 
(protects national culture in the face of immigration/social change; EU is an alliance of 
states). Furthermore, Csergo and Goldgeier argue that variation in ethnic composition can 
play an integral role in whether a group defines itself as a ‘homeland community’ or a 
separate nation, and whether groups will compete over the same ‘homeland’ territory.46 
                                                
45 Christina Goulding and Dino Domic, “Heritage, Identity and Ideological Manipulation: 
The Case of Croatia,” Annals of Tourism Research vol. 36, no. 1 (2009): 87. 
46 Zsuzsa Csergo and James M. Goldgeier, “Nationalist Strategies and European 
Integration,” Perspectives on Politics vol. 2, no. 1 (2004): 21. 
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Laible argues that because the EU has been successful in influencing candidate 
states’ policies on preserving and protecting the rights of minority groups the integration 
process is not the antidote for extreme nationalism. Instead, it preserves the salience of 
divisions and sub-state identities. Likewise, the EU gives separatist groups a new form of 
political capital and a forum to air grievances.47 
*** 
Nationalism and national identity are familiar concepts. The notion of ‘European’ 
identity is much more ambiguous. In general, Risse argues that one cannot begin to 
understand EU enlargement without taking identity politics into account. He argues that a 
majority of Europeans identify with both Europe and their nation-state. As to the content 
of European identity, on one hand, “European” elites see the EU as a modern political 
entity encompassing liberal values. The counter-vision to this is the Euroskeptic view of a 
nationalist Europe. Furthermore, regarding the ‘widening’ debate, and contrasting the 
ease of Polish accession with the difficulties of Turkish accession, Risse argues that the 
disparity between these cases suggests that there is a sense of “European-ness” in the EU, 
even if the precise character of “European-ness” is contested.48 
Along these lines, for Cerrutti, European identity is misunderstood. The problem 
is that a European identity that is as encompassing and extensive as national identity 
would necessarily compete with national identity, trying to supersede its power. For 
                                                
47 Janet Laible, Separatism and Sovereignty in the New Europe: Party Politics and the 
Meanings of Statehood in a Supranational Context (New York: Palgrave, 2008), 5. 
48 Thomas Risse, A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public 
Spheres (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 36. 
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Cerruti, political identity in the EU is a process. It is the feeling this quasi-polity’s 
members belong together with respect to some but not all things political because they 
share with each other certain values, principles and goals, including a sufficient degree of 
identification with the European institutions. In this sense, identity in Europe does not 
have to be exclusive or separate, instead, Europeans can draw from multiple sources of 
meaning as they work toward self-understanding.49 
According to Eder, collective identities are linked with the legitimacy of political 
institutions. Eder avoids the term “European identity,” and is cautious to draw definitive 
conclusions about collective identity and the EU. The EU can be seen either as a case of 
an emerging new type of collective identity-building or as a latecomer in the process of 
national identity-building. He argues that the people in Europe have not yet developed a 
strong sense of collective identity that provides them with a consciousness of their 
‘groupness’, but they certainly exist as a ‘group on paper’. They are a ‘people on paper’ 
in the sense that they are defined by technical means (passports) and legal rights that are 
part of being a citizen of the European Union. But this constitutes a group conceived of 
as a mere aggregate of people, who do not necessarily possess group consciousness.50  
Moreover, conceptualizing “European” identity as first-order creates false 
expectations. Elites should limit the use of political symbols to the strict minimum 
                                                
49 Furio Cerutti, “How Not to (Mis)understand Political Identity in the European Union” 
in Debating Political Identity and Legitimacy in the European Union, eds. S. Lucarelli, F. 
Cerutti, & V. Schmidt (New York: Routledge, 2010), 11-12. 
50 Klaus Eder, “Europe as a Narrative Network: Taking the Social Embeddedness of 
Identity Constructions Seriously’ in Debating Political Identity and Legitimacy in the 
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because they create expectations, for Euro-enthusiasts and Euro-skeptics alike, that a kind 
of nation-building process is being carried out in a manipulative top-down manner.  The 
European Union has neither the means nor the vocation to challenge the emotional 
monopoly of the nation state through its use of symbols.51 
Lucarelli provides helpful insights on process of identity formation. Both internal 
self-definition and external definition work in tandem to help us arrive at conceptions of 
‘self.’  External ‘others’ perform an important role in shaping new identities because they 
create distinctiveness, recognition, and labeling/bordering. It will be important for this 
study to understand how the EU functions as the external ‘other’ in our cases, and how it 
may serve to either challenge or reify nationalist conceptions of ‘self.’52 
*** 
Anastasakis describes how the accession process has changed for the Western 
Balkans vis-à-vis states of previous enlargements, suggesting that the EU is becoming 
less clear in its intentions, less transparent in its practices, and more inconsistent in its 
approach to conditionality. Today the EU requires more strenuous compliance for 
western Balkan candidates, while in the past it took a more lenient stance toward CEE 
candidates. The outcome is that the process emphasizes the ‘journey’ rather than the 
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destination.53 Moreover, Pridram asserts that the unprecedented difficulties of integrating 
the Balkans has led to the EU moving the conditionality requirements far beyond what 
was asked of the countries involved in the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. There is a vast 
gap in this region’s ability and the political will to institute change. This, coupled with 
‘enlargement fatigue’ on the part of member states, is making it difficult to find 
consensus on either side and more change forward.54 
On the other hand, Batt and Obradovic-Wochnik argue that although the Balkans 
states must meet the additional constraint of the ICTY, which is inconsistent with past 
practices, the candidacies of these states are qualitatively different from previous 
candidacies due to the nature of crimes committed in the wars.  Despite the inconsistency, 
the authors argue that it is imperative for Serbia and Croatia to comply with the so-called 
‘Copenhagen-plus’ criteria, to confront their recent history, and to delegitimize extreme 
nationalist ideologies.55 
Much of the research presented above was conducted to identify general trends or 
explanations for compliant/non-compliant behavior. Others argue that the factors that 
influence change must be considered on a case-by-case basis. Georgiadis writes that 
seeking mono-causal explanations, either exclusively external or exclusively domestic 
causes of change, represents an oversimplification of the interaction of the forces at play. 
                                                
53 Othon Anastasakis, “The EU’s Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans: 
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8, no. 4 (2008): 366. 
54 Geoffrey Pridham, “Securing Fragile Democracies in the Balkans: The European 
Dimension,” Romanian Journal of European Affairs vol. 8, no. 2 (2008): 57. 
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The empirical record from previous enlargements is mixed, and outcomes should be 
considered country-specific, with some countries responding more to external pressure, 
and others finding greater impetus for transformation through domestic determinants, 
legacies, or initial conditions. He argues that the need to ‘state-build’ on the heels of war 
in the Balkans requires these states to take a harder look inward, whereas states like 
Romania and Bulgaria, which are qualitatively different, have responded swiftly to 
external demands, eagerly willing to join the European family.56 
Bafoil supports the case-by-case approach, contending that, in previous 
enlargements, while there were pressures for the CEECs to ‘catch up’ with the West 
(modernization) and ‘return to Europe’ (Europeanization) after communism, the paths 
chosen by these countries must be understood as endogenous transformations particular 
to each country rather than externally induced change. The recasting of social equilibria 
after communism depended on resources accumulated over time, prior to, and after 1989. 
Thus, European pressure for change was presented through a national shaping of the 
dialogue, controlled by national elites, who couched the conversation in messages of 
reasserted sovereignty.57 
*** 
The term ‘discourse’ is used almost indiscriminately in academic writing and 
speech. Often this occurs without much regard to what precisely the term means or how it 
operates in the context in which it is being used.  Those who do address the term with the 
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goal of achieving some precision will address the differences between structuralist and 
post-structuralist linguistic philosophy, leaning on the ideas of Saussure, Althusser, or 
Foucault. In short, these figures have contributed greatly to our understanding of how 
language and communication function within social space. This study builds its basic 
assumptions about ‘discourse’ by borrowing liberally from the works of these thinkers 
and the schools of thought they have helped to forge. 
In particular, following Whisnant, ‘discourse’ is this study refers to: 
 
…very specific patterns of language that tell us something about the person 
speaking the language that person is a part of, the network of social institutions 
that person is caught up in, and even frequently the most basic assumptions that 
person holds.58  
 
Moreover, the treatment of ‘discourse’ here adheres to the Foucauldian principles 
through which ‘discourse’ a) creates a world, b) generates knowledge and truth, c) says 
something about the speaker, and d) embeds certain social actors with the power to 
produce truth. Likewise, the study seeks to identify “discursive formations,” which 
Foucault describes as occurring when “between objects, types of statements, concepts, or 
thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and 
functionings, transformations)…”59  
In addition, we assume that discourse fulfills a social constructivist role wherein 
the ascription of meaning in language is malleable and we use the meanings of language 
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to constitute and shape social reality. Thus, ‘discourse’ has the ability not only to 
constitute social reality, but, importantly, change social reality.  
Language, then, is not merely a channel through which information about 
underlying mental states and behaviour or facts about the world are 
communicated. On the contrary, language is a ‘machine’ that generates, and as a 
result constitutes, the social world. This also extends to the constitution of social 
identities and social relations. It means that changes in discourse are a means by 
which the social world is changed. Struggles at the discursive level take part in 
changing, as well as in reproducing, the social reality. 60  
 
The notion that ‘discourse’ can explain changes to social reality is extended to the 
realm of political institutions by assuming that the interests and preferences of political 
actors are likewise shaped by the social realities in which the live. Where we end up is 
with a discursive institutionalist methodological perspective whereby the communication 
of ideas structures interactive processes that help explain institutional change or 
continuity.61 In this study, that means institutions evolving to follow an EU trajectory or a 
non-EU trajectory. Further elaboration of the discursive institutionalist perspective will 
be provided at length below. 
*** 
As we work to establish a better understanding of  “European identity,” it is 
helpful to look back and see what official European decision-making bodies have said on 
the subject. In 1973, the foreign ministers of the nine member states at the time releases 
the Document on The European Identity, which offers an explanation of what European 
identity is and what it is intended to do. It stated: 
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The Nine wish to ensure that the cherished values of their legal, political and 
moral order are respected, and to preserve the rich variety of their national 
cultures. Sharing as they do the same attitudes to life, based on a determination to 
build a society which measure up to the needs of the individual, they are 
determined to defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of 
law, of social justice – which is the ultimate goal of economic progress – and of 
respect for human rights. All of these are fundamental elements of the European 
Identity.62  
 
This serves as a definition of sorts. What it intends to do is found later in the Document 
and is expressed as follows: 
The European identity will evolve as a function of the dynamic construction of a 
United Europe. In their external relations, the Nine propose progressively to 
undertake the definition of their identity in relation to other countries or groups of 
countries. They believe that in so doing they will strengthen their own cohesion 
and contribute to the framing of a genuinely European foreign policy. They are 
convinced that building up this policy will help them to tack with confidence and 
realism further stages in the construction of a United Europe thus making easier 
the proposed transformation of the whole complex of their relations in a European 
Union.63  
 
The definition provided is vague. Although we understand what constitute the 
basic content of the ideas of representative democracy, rule of law, social justice, 
economic progress, and respect for human rights, the Document does not define what 
might constitute the specific nature or content of a uniquely ‘European’ expression of 
these ideas. This ambiguity can be explained by a need for inclusion and ‘to preserve the 
rich variety of national cultures.’ What is clear, however, is that European identity is 
intended to promote cohesion throughout Europe and evolve as Europe evolves into a 
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more unified bloc of likeminded states sharing an affinity for the aforementioned 
umbrella concepts.   
Niemann and Schukkink look at why Portugal was an avid supporter of eastern 
enlargement. They argue that it is a combination of the Portugal’s own accession 
experience and how it connected that to the project of Eastern enlargement and how 
Portugal sees its own position in Europe in the 21st century. Portugal support of eastern 
enlargement is said to be an ‘identity endorsement’ that functions on two levels. First, it 
is a re-affirmation of a modern pro-democratic national identity that reinforces its own 
transition. Second, it is a recognition of Europe’s role in the promotion of democracy 
produces a certain kind of identity that consonant with national identity. Likewise, 
Portugal’s support is thought to place it closer to Europe’s core as the ‘identity 
endorsement’ is an endorsement of Europe’s core values.64 This behavior is consistent 
with the definition and aims presented in the Document on European Identity – Portugal 
was supporting the inclusion and cohesion of states committed to representative 
democracy.  
Much of the earlier research on the EU followed rational-choice logics in 
explaining complex phenomena like compliance or euroskepticism. These are so-called 
‘hard’ factors. There has been a recent push to probe the possible explanatory power of 
‘soft’ factors such as identity. Van Klingeren et. al conduct empirical research to try to 
understand the power of identity in explaining euroscepticism over time. They find that 
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identity factors explain as much of why citizen express euroskeptic views as economic 
factors. Although the authors expected the ‘soft’ factors’ would outweigh the ‘hard’ 
factors, they agree that this is a much-neglected area of study.65 This present study will 
help add to the research on how ‘soft’ factors can explain various aspects of 
Europeanization. 
The identity debate will persist. Fligstein et. al. write about how the Eurozone 
crisis has exacerbated tensions between ‘European’ and ‘nationalist’ identities and how 
this issue will remain central in European politics as the continent works itself out of the 
crisis. Those who participate in ‘Europe’ tend to feel closer to it and its values; those 
whose economic and social activities remain primarily local tend to espouse more 
‘nationalist’ identities. As the crisis has raged, hardship at the local level has given rise to 
more and more nationalist support, partially explaining the emergence of right-wing 
nationalist parties. Meanwhile, solutions to the Eurozone crisis will likely involve more 
cooperation between European partners. This is to say that in order to implement 
cooperative solutions, it will require more people to participate in Europe, increasing 
European identification. These two phenomena increase the gap between the two 
groups.66 This may appear problematic at first, but increasing polarization and contention 
may lead individuals to feel as if there is more at stake with respect to their identity and 
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make choices about themselves that reify one identity or the other. As we still struggle to 
understand what European identity is, a polemic struggle may lead to some clarification.  
*** 
 
One curious element of the puzzle of western Balkan enlargement concerns the 
emergence of a dynamic that Tim Judah has labeled the “Yugosphere.” Undoubtedly, this 
space is made up of the now independent republics of former Yugoslavia. Judah argues 
that while much attention has been focused on the fragmentation of these nations, which 
are commonly characterized as being blighted by extreme nationalism, strong cultural 
bonds have survived the wars and they now serve to unite people of the region rather than 
divide them. People of the region still speak the same language (with minor variations), 
enjoy the same food and music, and trade extensively among one another.67 Mazzuchelli 
recognizes the cultural universe that Judah calls the ‘Yugosphere,’ yet he argues that, in 
reality, it is difficult for individuals to fit this attachment alongside the new nationalisms 
of the independent states. As a result, expressions of Yugospheric attachment migrate 
away from physical territory on to the web.68 What makes this dynamic curious is that we 
are witnessing the transnational identity of a defunct country juxtaposed with newly 
formed national identities, which are, in turn, juxtaposed with an ambiguously formed 
transnational European identity as these states pursue integration. Judah does not see this 
as problematic, rather, it is a form of advantage. Affective attachment to the cultural 
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space of former Yugoslavia helps build cooperation among the states of the region, which 
can be translated into momentum for integration because, in Judah’s view, this space is 
not only compatible with European cultural space, but it is an important part of it. 
Accordingly, as Yugonostalgia grows as should progress toward integration because 
these countries can do more together than on their own.69  
*** 
As we are interested in explaining how and why the political institutions of the 
states of the western Balkans change in the context of European integration, it may be 
fruitful to put this puzzle under the lens of historical institutionalist analysis. Historical 
institutionalism stresses what kinds of processes characterize international relations, how 
legacies of founding moments can shape long-run power relations, whether or not new 
ideas become influential, the role of unintended consequences, and the prevalence of 
incremental reform over stasis and fundamental transformations. Scholarship in IR 
recognizes that history does matter.70 The challenge now is to identify how and when 
historical processes determine political outcomes.71 
Historical institutionalism generally describes long periods of stability interrupted 
by short periods of tumult followed a new political reality – a new regime, new 
coalitions, a new policy agenda, etc. Path dependency, critical junctures, punctuated 
equilibrium, and founding moments are terms associated with these phenomena and are 
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frequently employed in historical instituionalist literature.72 Peters et. al. view this 
conceptualization of historical institutionalism as overly simplified and limited. It gives 
too much explanatory power to fixed structural conditions and fails to look more closely 
at what is happening during ‘critical junctures.’ They argue that one can better 
comprehend the resulting change by looking at political conflict during the moments of 
tumult and discussing the ideas that are being contested and explicating why certain ideas 
prevail. This approach is thought to give historical institutionalism a much need boost of 
dynamism.73  
How should scholars look at these short unsettled periods that exist in a larger 
historical framework, but where rapid decision-making may have long-term institutional 
consequences? Capoccia and Keleman suggest an approach that rigorously reconstructs 
the decision-making processes during these periods. By placing decisions into series of 
analytic narratives, one can retrace how and why decisions were made. They also stress 
the importance of counterfactual analysis because, during critical junctures ‘normal’ 
structural conditions no longer apply, therefore many outcomes are possible. By tracing 
what could have happened, we more firmly understand what did happen in these cases. 74   
For example, Camyar and Tagma present a historical institutionalist account of 
why, despite the myriad of challenges, Turkey has continued to pursue EU membership. 
They argue that during its process of modernization, decision-makers chose to follow a 
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set of Western-oriented foreign policies. These policies became entrenched during the 
Cold War when Turkey experienced increasing returns from is engagement with the 
West. The foreign policy trajectory has not changed and, as a result, Turkey remains 
locked in to its membership bid, whether or not it will ever actualize.75  
Although discursive institutionalism is a relative newcomer to the scene as an 
analytic framework, it is beginning to be used in wider application, and, in particular, for 
studies that concern Europe. Discursive institutionalism encompasses the first three 
institutionalisms, using them as background conditions, but goes further to examines how 
discourse, language and the communication of ideas a play a casual role in explaining 
institutional reform. Discursive institutionalism takes ideas seriously, working to 
understand their content and to trace how interactive processes among various actors, 
audiences, and interlocutors impacts institutional change. Ideas can be categorized by 
level of generality (policies, programs, and philosophies) and type of content (normative 
and cognitive). Discursive interactions are classified into two basic types: coordinative 
(discourse among policy actors) and communicative (discourse between political actors 
and the public).76  
Policy level ideas are basic prescriptions for action to solve a given problem. 
Programmatic ideas define problems, consider the issues at stake, weigh norms and 
ideals, set goals, and select the methods or instruments to be applied to the problem. 
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Philosophies are deeper sets of values, knowledge systems, beliefs, or worldviews that 
are shared by a segment of society. Policies and programs are thought of as foreground 
since they are openly debated in public, whereas the philosophies that underpin policies 
and programs operate in the background.77 Agents draw upon both their background and 
foreground discursive abilities to drive institutional change – either through mastery of 
the ideational rules within given meaning context (background) or through external 
communication and persuasion (foreground).78  
Policies, programs, and philosophies contain two basic forms of ideas – normative 
and cognitive. Cognitive ideas are ideas about what can be done and how it can be done. 
Normative ideas are ideas about what should be done. Cognitive ideas are roadmaps or 
technical practices that are involved in solving a given problem, while normative ideas 
convey why those roadmaps and technical practices comport with a societies values and 
aspiration.79 
Political elites, both elected officials and civil servants, occupy an important 
position within the realm of communicative and coordinative discursive interactions, but 
they are not the only actors whose ideas have a bearing on institutional change. We can 
define broader categories of discursive actors to include epistemic communities, 
discourse or advocacy coalitions, and knowledge regimes. Epistemic communities are 
loosely connected individuals who share common ideas about the cognitive and 
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normative aims of a given policy venture and have access to instruments of change.80 
Advocacy coalitions are more tightly united around one given issue in a specific policy 
context. Discourse coalitions are similar to advocacy coalitions where actors share a 
social construct and communicate a similar story about a given problem, but discourse 
coalitions have broader reach across space and time than advocacy coalitions.81 
Knowledge regimes are sets of actors that produce and disseminate ideas that affect how 
policy-making is organized and operates. These actors produce data, research, theories 
and recommendations, which are considered in the course of crafting of public policies.82  
Recent examples of scholarly work drawing from the discursive institutionalist 
tradition include Schmidt’s analysis of the EU sovereign debt crisis, Herranz-Surralles’ 
study of the past three rounds of enlargement, and Zurnic’s examination of Serbia’s 
‘money in Cyprus scandal.’ What is common among these studies is that they each seek 
to understand why political elites speak one way among themselves (coordinative 
discourse) and another way to the publics the represent (communicative discourse). 
Furthermore, they seek to explain how and why institutions may change as a result of this 
discrepancy.  
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In Schmidt’s example, she argues that, when presented publicly, the proposed 
solutions to the sovereign debt crisis may have little effect because the markets may 
respond to them as too little, too late, with contingencies, or they fail because they were 
simply the wrong solution. Likewise, EU leaders send misleading or inconsistent 
messages to their publics, leaving the public unprepared to cope with the reform, which, 
in turn, leads to failure, and opens the political field up to challenges from the far right 
and left.83  
In Herranz-Surralles study, the author addresses the gap between elite and public 
attitudes toward enlargement, suggesting that successive enlargements go forward despite 
waning public support because there has been a gradual decrease in the amount of 
normative discourse that elites communicate to the public. Framing the need to enlarge to 
the public solely in terms of utilitarian justifications creates an inconsistency of the 
normative appeal between the coordinative and communicative discourses. Elites speak 
of the value of enlargement amongst themselves and figure it into their policy agenda, but 
elites have stopped selling that argument to the public, which leads to opposition to 
enlargement. Moreover, publics further resent EU elites who act in contradiction to 
popular attitude.84  
Zurnic takes a look at questionable financial transfers that took place between 
Serbia and Cyprus in the 1990s. In the post Milosevic era, elites have at times fully 
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supported an investigation of these dealings while at other times shut the investigations 
down. The author contends that elites choose to investigate and share information with 
the public when this form of discourse has the possibility of building legitimacy for an 
anti-corruption policy agenda. When elites choose not to investigate or to withhold, the 
decision is a joint response that is made to reduce political costs for the elite class.85  
In general, the discursive institutionalist analytic framework can be a useful 
approach to explaining political change. One criticism that has been leveled is that it 
inadequately accounts for relations of power in its analysis. To account for the weakness, 
Pannizza and Morrielli argue that discursive institutionalism could stand to benefit by 
being integrated with post-structuralist discourse theory. That way, we will have a more 
robust understanding the institutional basis of power relationships as well as how power 
can shape and modify political institutions over time, while recognizing actors individual 
agency to create or reinforce meaning through ideas and discourse.86  
Carstensen and Schmidt also respond to the criticism by introducing a framework 
that describes the relationship between power and ideas. Power is expressed three ways, 
through ideas, over ideas and in ideas. Power through ideas is the ability of actors to 
persuade others to think and do using ideational elements. Power over ideas is actors’ 
ability to control the meaning of ideas. Power in ideas is the authority of certain ideas 
over others. Power in ideas derives authority from background ideational conditions such 
as institutional set-ups, knowledge systems, or historically constructed forms of 
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meaning.87 These forms of power may interact. Actors may utilize the tactics of power 
through ideas to establish power over ideas and later consolidate power in ideas. 
Incorporating an analysis of power in ideas allows us to understand how political actors 
express and propagate their interests, and how those interests become formal policies, 
which can perpetuate or alter an institutional landscape. 
Foucault has written much on the subject of power in society (or, to use the terms 
above, power in ideas). Central to his thinking is the notion of discursive formations, 
relationships of power that make knowledge possible in society. What is of interest, and 
often hardest to identify, are the mechanisms by which power “reaches into the very grain 
of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their 
discourses, learning processes and everyday lives.”88 We consider discourse to be one 
such mechanism, and we must contemplate how best to explicate how it works.  
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) presents one such method. Fairclough defines 
CDA as:  
Analysis of the dialectical relationships between discourse (including language 
but also other forms of semiosis, e.g. body language or visual images) and other 
elements of social practices. Its particular concern is with the radical changes that 
are taking place in contemporary social life, with how discourse figures within 
processes of change, and with shifts in the relationship between semiosis and 
other social elements within networks of practices.89  
 
Discourse figures into social practices in terms of activity (how a social activity is 
performed), representation (how it is described), and being (how it constitutes a particular 
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identity).90 These elements interact with one another and can help reveal subtextual 
meaning and relationships.  
CDA’s evolution is related to theoretical developments in other school of thought 
such as post-structuralism, critical linguistics, and discourse studies. Wodak and Meyer 
suggest that the distinction between CDA and these other modes of thought lies in its 
problem-oriented, interdisciplinary approach. “CDA is therefore not interested in 
investigating a linguistic unit per se but in studying social phenomena which are 
necessarily complex and thus require a multi-disciplinary and multi-methodical 
approach.”91 This approach allows for a broad range of understanding of what discourse 
can be, including a historical monument, a lieu de mémoire, a policy, a political strategy, 
narratives, text, talk, a speech, or other forms of language.92 These are important tools 
that give researchers great latitude to investigate patterns of meaning across a variety of 
social contexts. What becomes potential problematic, however, is that adherents to this 
school admit that CDA has never attempted to be able to provide a single theory or a 
specific theory, nor is there a specific methodological characteristic to the CDA 
approach.93 While flexibility allows researchers to make choices appropriate for their own 
research, a lack of consistency and unity in the CDA approach can make it harder to 
identify or employ.  
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A concept that is related, and that will be of value to this study, is that of framing. 
Framing theory or framing bias centers around the idea that the way in which something 
is presented can affect the choices people make. In some instances, a frame may be so 
persuasive as to influence an individual to make decisions that are against their own best 
interest. In this sense, framing effects have the ability to contradict the decision-making 
behavior that is predicted by rational-choice theory. The nature of frames can be 
described as follows: 
Communication itself comes with a frame. The elements of the communication 
frame include: a message, an audience, a messenger, a medium, images, a context, 
and especially, higher-level moral and conceptual frames. The choice of language 
is, of course, vital, but it is vital because language evokes frames – moral and 
conceptual frames. Frames form a system. The system has to be built up over 
time. It takes a long-range effort. Most of this system involves moral and 
conceptual frames.94  
 
The framing concept can help us explain the behavior of political actors, especially 
political elites. One of the problems of research frames, however, is that in qualitative 
studies such as this, frame identification and measurement creates a significant empirical 
challenge. Therefore, in practice, in order to properly identify and measure frames in a 
reasonably objective and rigorous way, researchers tend to turn to the tools of discourse 
analysis.95 Indeed, this process ultimately leads to better conclusions about the effects of 
framing. 
*** 
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As the literature suggests, this is a complex debate with numerous moving parts. 
By examining this set of cases, I hope, foremost, to reach a better understanding of how 
these parts work together specifically in the Balkans, and, second, if possible, to find a 
series of generalizable conclusions that could apply more broadly to future candidacies 
throughout the region.  
 
Case Selection and Justification: 
 
As was highlighted in the introductory chapter, this work builds on the framework 
of Vachudova’s theory of leverage to explain political outcomes in candidate states 
seeking European Union membership. On one hand the choice to utilize this framework 
was made for organizational purposes – these cases (Croatia and Serbia/Kosovo) fit 
neatly into her liberal/illiberal dichotomy in terms of how the EU uses leverage on these 
candidate states in order to induce reform. On the other hand, her work serves as a 
theoretical point of departure. She explains the outcomes in her case studies in terms of 
material and economic interests, largely ignoring ideational interests such as national 
identity or the associational/reputational implications of membership.  
Currently, the western Balkan region is the central focus of the EU’s enlargement 
agenda (states like Turkey and Iceland are on the agenda, but remain peripheral). 
Naturally, this makes the study of the region at this time an excellent pursuit in terms of 
testing the validity of old theory on new cases. Vachudova has done just this. She has 
taken the lessons of her prior work and tried them on all the candidate and potential 
candidates of the western Balkans. (Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, Macedonia, and Albania) She finds that her theory still stands up despite the 
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difficult initial conditions (namely war) that differentiate the western Balkan cases from 
her previous set of cases that come from the post-communist enlargements of 2004/7.  
She argues that for elites in EU member states, geopolitical reasons dominate the 
reasoning for why enlargement goes forward despite the fact that these Balkan countries 
will provide very little economic payback for the Union. For national elites, however, 
economic payoffs are great, harmonizing with the acquis has ‘democratizing effects,’ and 
the lack of better alternative makes domestic elites choose EU-compatible platforms 
because it is in their national interest.96  
This study is not designed to refute those claims. They are, for the most part, 
accurate, yet overly simplified. Materialist logic is a factor that, in part, explains reform 
trajectories. In the western Balkan region, however, one cannot underestimate the power 
of ideational forces, especially those that are related to identity and collective memory. 
This study, then, will blend these logics and demonstrate how they are used in tandem to 
explain outcomes. Discourse is the vehicle through which we best understand which logic 
is at play at a given time. The operative logic is either revealed in the words that are used 
to persuade or justify an action, or it is revealed in the action itself when the action is at 
odds with a rhetorical platform. Vachudova’s theoretical framework as well as her 
application of the framework to the western Balkan region is a good jumping off point. In 
this close examination of the Croatia and Serbia/Kosovo cases, we will have a more 
complete picture of both the material and ideational dynamics that explain how and why 
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European Union enlargement functions in this region, and hopefully provide insight that 
may be relevant for future enlargements.  
Beyond these, a comparison of Croatia and Serbia/Kosovo’s EU membership 
journeys is logical for several more reasons.  While these countries are unique, together 
they possess several key similarities and differences that justify their comparison. In 
terms of similarities, each posses formal relationship with and declared commitment to 
the European Union. Each have been subject to long periods of outside occupation. Each 
were part of former Yugoslavia. Each experienced war as part of the disintegration of 
former Yugoslavia. Geographically, there is no dispute over whether or not the territory 
of these countries is part of Europe. With these background conditions, the cases 
resemble a natural experiment because they can loosely be considered ‘as-if” random 
(although the partitioning of former Yugoslavia was by no means arbitrary). Moreover 
the researcher has no control over the assignment of treatment (i.e. one cannot control the 
elite messages individuals are exposed to, nor influence how the EU chooses to exert 
leverage over these candidates). 
Although these cases share many similarities, they also vary on the basis of 
observable differences. Croatia is a Roman Catholic country. Prior to the Yugoslav years, 
it spent much of its existence being controlled by the Hapsburg empire (from Budapest 
after the Ausgleich of 1869). Serbia is predominantly eastern Orthodox, when you 
consider the Albanian population in Kosovo, this adds a significant Muslim population to 
the demographic mix. Prior to the Yugoslav era, these lands were controlled by the 
Ottoman Empire. Serbia and Montenegro also experienced a significant period of 
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independence in the 19th century after the Congress of Berlin in 1878. During the 
Yugoslav era, despite the national capital being located in Belgrade, Croatia was much 
more economically developed region than Serbia or Kosovo. We will look at how elites 
draw on some of these background differences in the construction of the narratives they 
present to the public, and how/if that explains differences in our variable of interest – 
compliance, as measured by a state’s progress toward membership and the fulfillment of 
conditionality demands.  
The main methodological tools that will be used include an original survey of 
semi-structured interviews of experts from the region, content analysis of mass media, 
and discourse analysis of selected speeches and statements made by influential political 
elites from the cases under examination. A more detailed summary of the each method 
used will be presented in the chapters that follow as an accompaniment to the results 
yielded. 
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CHAPTER THREE: CASE STUDY #1 – CROATIA 
 
 
Chapter Synopsis 
 
This chapter will present a case study of Croatia’s process of EU accession. If we 
hold the assumption that EU accession for the states of former Yugoslavia is to be a 
matter of ‘when’ and not ‘if,’ then we must focus on how to explain variation in the speed 
of progress toward membership. Furthermore, we must assess the value of the outcomes 
of the process beyond understanding membership, in and of itself, as the primary 
outcome. In the framework of Vachudova’s theory, the more potent form of leverage 
found present in the Croatian case is passive leverage. This settles the ‘if’ question early 
on, and the political consensus that this form of leverage produces is never challenged 
even when the instruments of active leverage work to stall and frustrate the proceedings, 
constantly pushing back the ‘when.’ Although public support for membership wanes over 
time, the use of discourse as a tool to bolster enthusiasm is rarely employed. Political 
messaging is sometimes used to present a legitimizing narrative of a set of policy 
decisions, yet the strategy of the political elite was to communicate as little as possible. 
The less the public knew, the smaller the probability it would be able to mount an 
effective opposition to the agenda for institutional reform steered by the political elite. 
Identity-based narratives of ‘belonging’ have a role to play, as they strongly anchor the 
pro-EU political consensus, and there is hardly any doubt in the public mind that Croatia 
‘belongs’ in Europe, hence there has not been a pressing need to instumentalize this 
narrative after the early 2000s. This is to say that, in general, discourse and ideas do not 
principally explain Croatia’s institutional development, rather geopolitical posture (EU is 
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the ‘only game in town’) and events (Eurozone Crisis/ICTY conditions) play a much 
more defining role. But, to distinguish this work from Vachudova and to add to her 
findings, below we reformulate our understanding of passive leverage and show how it is 
moored by a discursive institutionalist framing of power consolidated in the idea of the 
EU. The result is that Croatia joined the EU in 2013, but it is not the EU that it 
envisioned it would be joining when it began the process twelve years earlier. Moreover, 
the push to harmonize laws with the acquis has significantly improved the quality of its 
democratic political institutions making them more transparent and accountable. 
Paradoxically, this came about through an elite-driven process that was characterized by 
a sheer lack of communication, transparency, or public participation. Croatia is now part 
of Europe, but the sentiment they experience as they cross the threshold is not jubilation, 
rather apathy and resignation. As Europe continues to sputter along, it is in this sense that 
they might truly be able to feel that they finally ‘belong.’ 
 
History of Accession Process 
 
Soon after the death of President Franjo Tudjman, Croatia held parliamentary and 
presidential elections in early January 2000. The elections were heralded by the 
international community as historic as they paved the way for a transition from the 
autocratic leanings of the Tudjman regime to a regime committed to the principles of 
democracy. For Croatia, this moment signaled the beginning of a rapprochement with the 
European Union.  
At the time of the Thessaloniki Summit, which affirmed a regional commitment 
to European integration, Croatia was already well ahead of its neighbors on the European 
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path. It had signed its Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in 
2001 and filed its application for membership in 2003. In 2004, it officially became a 
candidate state. It was at this point, when the process would take one a different 
character, moving from passively reaffirming its desire and prospect to join to actively 
negotiating the accession treaty and working through the chapters of the acquis 
communautaire.  
Accession negotiations began in October 2005. Croatia had difficulty in meeting 
numerous aspects of Copenhagen Criteria, but it was able to close all chapters of the 
acquis by the end of 2011. In general, civil and political rights are being reasonably well 
respected. Improvement was needed in terms of impunity for war crimes, judicial reform, 
freedom of expression, and transparency of public administration. Croatia has, for the 
most part, participated in regional cooperation efforts and honored its international 
commitments. It continues to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, but it needs to provide better access to critical documents and make 
greater efforts to combat impunity by safeguarding witnesses and ensuring their 
attendance at trials.97 In addition, despite having an adequate legal infrastructure to fight 
corruption, more must be done to prevent corruption at the local level. Improvements in 
the areas of fundamental human rights, in particular respecting minority rights and the 
rights of the LGBT community must continue to advance. Finally, more efforts are need 
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to facilitate refugee return. Implementation of housing care programs for returnees must 
develop more rapidly.98  
As for economic progress, Croatia was able to sufficiently satisfy the macro-
economic and fiscal framework of EU economic policies. Croatia has had difficulty with 
competition and growth since 2008, but this was mostly spurred by the global economic 
downturn. The downturn exacerbated several structural deficiencies such as poor labor 
market performance, poor credit markets, over-reliance on public financing, and a lack of 
long term strategic budget planning. Privatization is progressing slowly, but the state 
continues to occupy a significant place in Croatia’s economy.99 Most notably, Croatia 
was required to restructure and privatize three major shipyards – Brodosplit, Brodotrogir, 
and 3. Maj.100 This was one of the last outstanding items to be addressed prior to 
accession. If Croatia did not comply by the time of accession, the Commission would 
have been empowered to recover all the restructuring aid that was given to the shipyards 
in questions since 2006.101 
Ultimately, Croatia was able to satisfactorily meet EU standards and conclude the 
negotiation process. This process, however, was arduous and more demanding than that 
of previous enlargements, unfolding over the span of six years. The key innovation that 
differentiated this negotiation from the previous ones was the introduction of a system of 
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‘benchmarking.’ This system was laid out in the official negotiating framework agreed to 
by Croatia and the EU prior to the beginning of talks, stating: 
[…] the Commission will lay down benchmarks for the provisional closure and, 
where appropriate, for the opening of each chapter. The Union will communicate 
such benchmarks to Croatia. Depending on the chapter, precise benchmarks will 
refer in particular to legislative alignment with the acquis and to a satisfactory 
track record in implementation of key elements of the acquis demonstrating the 
existence of an adequate administrative and judicial capacity. Where relevant, 
benchmarks will also include the fulfillment of commitments under the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement, in particular those that mirror 
requirements under the acquis. Where negotiations cover a considerable period of 
time, or where a chapter is revisited at a later date to incorporate new elements 
such as new acquis, the existing benchmarks may be updated. […] Croatia will be 
requested to indicate its position in relation to the acquis and to report on its 
progress in meeting the benchmarks. Croatia’s correct transposition and 
implementation of the acquis, including effective and efficient application 
through appropriate administrative and judicial structure, will determine the pace 
of negotiations.102  
  
Benchmarking was intended to rectify deficiencies in the process to ready candidates 
for membership, deficiencies that were made overt in light of the Union’s experiences 
with Romania and Bulgaria. While there is still no viable mechanism to ensure post-
accession compliance with the acquis, the object of benchmarking was to increase the 
intensity of scrutiny at the beginning of the process in order to fortify the quality of 
reform or to oversee that proper implementation measures have been adopted. 
Undoubtedly, for Croatia, this innovation had the effect of protracting the negotiation. 
Additionally, the purpose of benchmarking was to return greater control of the 
process to the member states after the fifth enlargement (the ‘big bang’ enlargement). 
Increasing concerns about the preparedness of candidates and the ever-increasing 
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institutional complexity led to sharp criticisms of the Union’s enlargement strategy as 
well as its ability to meet the obligations it has to the new members. With member states 
able to control the pace of accession, it could ultimately control its ‘absorption capacity,’ 
taking on new members at a speed that reflects not only the readiness of the candidate, 
but the readiness of the Union itself to have that candidate become a member with full 
rights and privileges.103  
Beyond that fact that the rules of the game had changed, it is important to 
understand how the game itself changed during the course of Croatia’s membership bid. 
The fallout from the French and Dutch ‘no’ votes meant that the Croatian political elite 
would have to decide on how to manage their strategy when it came to the domestic 
public sphere. As will become apparent in forthcoming passages, the elite class, fearing 
how detrimental the mechanisms of direct democracy could be to the EU-agenda, chose a 
path of non-transparency and non-engagement vis-à-vis the public. 
Still, despite the negative referenda, the underlying need to review the usefulness 
of the existing framework of European treaties in light of the welcoming of ten new 
members, and the need to produce a streamlined document that incorporated all prior 
constitutive treaties did not disappear when the French and Dutch electorate cast their 
votes. From there, the Union continued its efforts and furnished the Lisbon Treaty in 
2007.  Ratification of the treaty proved difficult again, with the Irish electorate rejecting it 
in 2008. In 2009, all member states had finally ratified. During this two-year period, 
Lisbon became the Union’s priority and the fear was that western Balkan enlargement 
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would take a back seat to Lisbon.104 This hiatus, which came three years into Croatia’s 
negotiation, represented yet another setback, causing a recalibration of Croatia’s 
accession timetable. Aside from the additional time, member states’ focus on ratifying 
Lisbon contributed to a growing sense of frustration among the political elite responsible 
for the negotiations that the way forward would remain marked by unpredictability and 
confusion due to the fact that the nature of the process and the nature of the Union itself 
were inexorably linked, both evolving in tandem. 
The push for Lisbon was not only borne out of a desire to provide an overarching 
framework for the Union’s main constitutive treaties, but it emerged out of the need to 
amend the Union’s decision-making rules. The actions Slovenia took to block Croatia’s 
accession talks over a border dispute105 represent a clear illustration of the frustrations of 
unanimity decision-making. With the new benchmarking system, it was within the 
purview of Slovenia or any member states’ authority to block this candidate on any given 
point of the negotiation. 106 While this was indeed in line with international agreements, it 
was widely viewed within the Croatian political space as Slovenia using its position in 
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the Union to gain the upper hand to resolve bilateral issues.107 In essence, this behavior 
was interpreted by the Croatian side as Slovenia holding its accession bid hostage and 
blackmailing Croatia to change an international boundary in order to serve the interests of 
Slovenia, not those of the Union. 
The global economic downturn, which began in 2008 and would be compounded 
by the Eurozone crisis proved to be an important contributing factor that helps explain the 
long duration of Croatia’s accession journey.  Not unlike most member states, the effects 
of the global economic downturn in the western Balkans was characterized by declining 
GDP, falling rates of investment, weaker industrial output, rising unemployment, and 
rising deficits. Moreover, these states experienced various spill over effects from their 
neighbors’ fragile economies including a decline in foreign direct investment, export 
revenues, and remittances from migrant workers abroad.108  
Wracked with these many economic difficulties, the conditions for development 
were far from favorable, let alone the type of development that was needed to satisfy the 
economic criteria required for accession. Furthermore, enlargement fatigue and the fear 
that there would be a massive influx of migrant labor coming from the Balkans led many 
member states to reorient policy priorities to the domestic front and to take a cautious 
approach to initiatives promoting further enlargement.109  
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In sum, Croatia’s journey to membership has been a long and winding road. It is 
important to consider that the pace of the accession proceedings was influenced not only 
by the extraordinary circumstances of a post-conflict candidacy, but also by the ever-
evolving nature of the Union itself. The introduction of benchmarks into the negotiation 
process, the expansion of the Union from 15 to 27 members, the French and Dutch 
negative referenda, the Lisbon Treaty, and economic crises in Europe and around the 
globe have all contributed in making Croatia’s path to the EU unpredictable, frustrating, 
and, at times, seemingly interminable.  
 
Official Narratives 
 
Before understanding how European Union membership can affect political 
institution-building in the states under investigation here, we must first examine why 
domestic elites chose to seek to join the EU or why they do not. In Milada Vachudova’s 
theory, she divides the European Union’s ability to influence domestic elites to make 
reforms in pursuit of membership into two categories of leverage – active and passive. 
Active leverage involves direct or deliberate policies designed to induce reforms. Active 
leverage normally occurs during the period of accession negotiations when states are 
harmonizing policy with the acquis. She describes passive leverage in the following way: 
 
Passive leverage is the traction that the EU has on the domestic politics of 
credible candidate states merely by virtue of its existence and its usual conduct. 
This includes the political and economic benefits of membership, the costs of 
exclusion, and the way the EU treats nonmember states.110 
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In the case of Croatia’s accession to the EU, active leverage mechanisms were certainly 
employed in order to encourage meaningful domestic reform, yet it was the EU’s passive 
leverage that would prove to have the most significant traction in moving Croatia’s 
political elite to pursue membership.  
The power of the EU’s passive leverage becomes apparent when we look at the 
manner in which political elites characterized the advantages of membership to their 
public. Throughout the accession process when elites chose to communicate what EU 
membership would mean to Croatia, they did so by describing the rationale for 
membership according to three overarching discursive frames – the economic, the 
political, or the identity-bearing/associational.  For political elites, the substance of these 
narratives is thought of as providing a normative basis for the legitimization of policy 
decisions.   
It is the ideas that are embedded in these discourses that give meaning to material 
interests and shape political institutions. If institutions are thought of as “ideas frozen in 
time,” institutional reform requires a concerted effort to challenge status quo ideas.111 The 
effort consists of first persuading the public of the merits of the ideas. Power through 
ideas leads to power over ideas. In time power over ideas becomes power in ideas, which 
become institutionalized and “frozen in time.”  
*** 
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The official narrative that has been put forth by political elites in both Croatia and 
Serbia to persuade the public as to the merits of EU integration and convince the public 
that the EU will offer salvation and that it is worthwhile to adhere to their stringent 
conditions can be characterized along three major themes. These themes represent tactics 
through which elites express the power of ideas as they work to build support to 
consolidate these ideas as stable institutions. 
 
Economic 
 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the wave of democratization and 
liberalization efforts that swept across Europe in the early 1990s, there were some who 
believed that Croatia’s future in what was then the European Communities was quite 
promising. Yugoslavia’s economic policy of self-management was thought to have made 
it better prepared than the other post-communist countries to absorb the shocks brought 
about from the transition to a free market economy and to adapt its economic policies to 
fit the requirements of future membership. Any such optimism about Yugoslavia’s 
European prospects or those of its successors was quickly squashed when it descended 
into a bloody war of dissolution. In addition to the immense cost of life and vital 
resources, the cycle of violence and ethnic turmoil that persisted throughout the majority 
of the decade stunted any progress toward economic reform. However, in the beginning 
of the 2000s when the dust began to settle and when the Tudjman regime was replaced by 
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one that was more committed to economic and political reform as well as regional 
cooperation, Croatia’s economy began to witness a period of stability and growth.112  
In 2004, for instance, GDP growth was measured at 3.8 percent. In 2005, it was 
4.3 percent and 6.0 percent in the first quarter of 2006. Yet, despite positive indications 
that the liberalization effort was yielding returns, these numbers were accompanied by a 
host of negative economic trends including accelerating inflation and growing foreign 
and public debt.113 Moreover, the speed of economic reform was burdened by excessive 
involvement of the state in industry and slow privatization.114 Political elites viewed EU 
membership as a vehicle to enhance their economic position, making further gains on 
GDP returns of the early 2000s and rectifying the accompanying deficiencies. Therefore, 
the message it presented to the public regarding the economic benefits of membership 
can be summarized as follows:   
The EU will bring allow tariff-free access to the single market, it will help spur foreign 
investment, it will open up new business opportunities, and will allow labor to more 
freely across borders, all of which will lead to a general improvement in levels of wealth 
and prosperity. 
 
The official statement of Croatia’s economic objectives, as envisioned at the 
beginning of the EU negotiation process, are outlined in the Government’s Strategic 
Development Framework 2006-2013:  
The goal we wish to achieve is social prosperity through development and 
employment in a competitive market economic acting within a European welfare 
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state of the 21st century. […] The general starting points for this strategy are 
openness and membership of the European Union. Globalization and 
rapprochement to the European Union have raised both hopes and fear in Croatia. 
[…] there is hope that the standard of living will improve over the long term in a 
period of peace and prosperity in an integrated Europe. […] Openness represents 
a general framework for this strategy. […] The role of direct foreign investment is 
essential in this process. […] In the globalized EU environment, states compete to 
offer the most productive business environment and an efficient business 
infrastructure. In order to encourage exports and to create a business environment 
attractive for investment, it is necessary to achieve synergy between economic 
policy and efficient institutions.115  
 
Political elites have cast the economic narrative in very straightforward terms from early 
on and carried the message forward throughout the entire accession process. On the 
occasion of Croatia initialing its SAA agreement with the EU, Minister for European 
Integration, Ivan Jakovic, described the development as: 
[…] a big opportunity for Croatia’s economy to which the doors of the EU market 
are opening, but also [it] presents a clear message to the EU business people that 
Croatia is a country with prospects for investments.116  
 
Shortly before the European Commission decided to grant Croatia candidate status, Prime 
Minister Ivo Sanadar expressed the following: 
Croatia is ready for Europe and for helping the international community reach 
lasting political stability in South East Europe. [My] government’s priorities [are] 
reinforcing democracy, economic growth, and higher living standards and 
purchasing power. The war stalled Croatia’s development. Without the war, 
Croatia might now have been among the countries joining the EU on May 1 
[2004].117  
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Finally, at the hour of accession, on July 1, 2013, stressing the importance of economic 
cooperation in a globalized marketplace given Croatia’s small size, Prime Minister Zoran 
Milanovic stated: 
[…] freedom, opening borders and communication [are] Croatia’s interests. Those 
big and strong can close their borders on their own. Small ones have no other 
option but to be open, in contact with the world and that is the only way to make 
progress, be safe, independent and wealthier.118  
 
The cumulative effect is expressed as follows: 
 
Voices in favor of enlargement need to be heard in Europe, and the United States 
has an important role to play in encouraging western Balkan states to undertake 
some reforms essential to EU membership, such as improvements in the security 
sector. Absent that kind of cooperation, Europe runs the risk of leaving some or 
all of the western Balkans outside Europe’s new borders. This would re-create the 
dividing lines, Ottoman from Hapsburg, Roman Catholic from Orthodox and 
Muslim, that sliced the southern part of the continent from western Europe for 
centuries. The result would be a poverty-stricken group of states, surrounded by 
EU members but encumbered by travel restrictions, weaker governments, 
organized crime, and questionable business empires, in short, a ghetto that could 
create criminal and even security risks for Europe.119  
 
 
Political 
 
The wars of dissolution not only had a profound effect on Croatia’s economic 
development in the post-communist period, the conflicts also hindered the progression of 
the country’s political development. Early efforts to engage the states of the Western 
Balkans in Europeanization programs (such as Thessaloniki) are thought to have had a 
more immediate impact on regional politics than economics. Conditioning further 
progress on the EU path through actions promoting regional cooperation was a strategy 
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intended to display that the countries of this region had the ability to ‘speak with one 
voice’ as it pertains to a common future.120 These initial demonstrations opened these 
countries to the EU, but the work needed to bring political institutions to requisite EU 
standards was far from complete. Nevertheless, political elites also spoke with ‘one 
unified voice’ in terms of the types of political institutions they would work to build in 
the post-communist, post-conflict, and post-nationalist period – liberal democratic 
institutions.  
The EU policy vis-à-vis the Balkan candidates and potential candidates can be 
described as conditional support for reforms in the direction of Europeanization. 
The recipe is encoded in the Copenhagen accession criteria demanding a 
prospective member to endorse the community values of democracy and rules of 
law in order to be admitted as an equal member of the club. The EU membership 
conditionality touches on the core of the political systems of would-be members 
and affects a wide spectrum of policy domains through legal harmonization with 
the acquis communautaire. The ultimate objective is diffusion of the European 
norms and governance practices prior to a country’s accession to the EU. 
Democracy-building features high on the enlargement agenda.121  
 
The EU uses membership conditionality as a means of inducing institutional change and 
promoting socialization of liberal democratic norms through a strategy of 
intergovernmental reinforcement of material rewards such as aid and assistance 
programs.122 Whether or not one agrees that the material incentive of membership, which 
underscores the EU’s economic prowess, as being the greatest motivator of reform, the 
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processes of political and economic reform are intertwined. Candidate states must adopt 
the full acquis, thus accepting and, in time, internalizing the EU’s legislative framework, 
which is based on a liberal democratic platform.123  
Furthermore, Croatia, like its Western Balkan neighbors, is a state with a small 
population that finds itself surrounded by EU member states. Its politics and economics 
are increasingly tied to the actions of its neighbors, who frequently act in concert with EU 
demands, making small states such as Croatia inadvertently subject to the outcomes of 
decisions made in Brussels. By bidding to become a member states, Croatia is taking the 
necessary steps to gain a seat at the table where so many important decisions are already 
being made on their behalf, yet without formal representation. By becoming a participant 
in European decision-making bodies, the enlargement process will lead to a commitment 
on the part of Croatia to wrap itself in the on-going process of creating and implementing 
law, and producing European social norms.124  
In view of these dynamics, the political message presented to the public by elites, 
can be characterized as follows: 
The EU will help bring the national legal order up to snuff in terms of internationally 
recognized standards of liberal democracy, and promote improvement in the domain of 
respect for fundamental human rights and rule of law. Additionally, it is a vehicle for 
these countries to bolster their decision-making capital on the international stage by 
participating in the various European institutions and deliberative bodies. 
 
The political narrative, like the economic narrative, was a mainstay in the 
rhetorical arsenal of the political elite throughout the accession process. Soon after the 
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2000 elections, the first in the post-Tudjman era, special rapporteur for UN commissioner 
for Human Rights in Bosnia, Croatia, Yugoslavia said this: 
In the past ten years Croatia was an abnormal country, but we hope that it has 
now definitely chosen democracy and the promotion of human rights, becoming a 
normal European country…[Croatia is] now beginning its voyage into the 
European Union….The feeling for democracy is very strong in Croatian society, 
which was proved by the past elections…The Government must show signs that 
Croatia is becoming a normal European country as soon as possible.125  
 
In 2005, opponents of the ruling HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) Party were calling 
for early parliamentary elections. Prime Minister Ivo Sanadar urged against this for the 
following reasons: 
Early elections would not be good for Croatia because they would stop the 
reforms that have been launched and slow down the accession talk with the EU. 
Croatia must show that it is a stable democracy with a four-year term cycle. […] 
[It is] important to strengthen all systems in the country so as to gain the best 
possible position for the negotiations with the EU and draw up quality 
programmes to obtain funds from the EU pre-accession funds.126  
 
When Germany, the final member state to ratify Croatia’s accession treaty, put its 
signature on the document in early June 2013, Minister of Foreign Affairs and European 
Integration, Vesna Pusic, released this statement: 
The long, complex process of EU accession [has] brought about a big transformation 
of the country. […] From a country focused on state building and alignment with the 
European legislation and other standards, as of July 1 [2013] Croatia becomes a 
country that will participate in the definition and setting of standards.127  
  
 
Identity-bearing/Associational 
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Beyond the political and economic narratives, which represent forms of 
justification for elite political behavior, a third narrative that is presented to the public can 
be thought of as the identity-bearing or associational narrative. It can work in tandem 
with the political narrative or economic narratives to compliment them or it can be 
applied independently to produce its own effect. The content of this narrative draws 
heavily on history, collective memory, symbolic geography, and socio-cultural factors. 
These factors can be posed as matter of fact propositions or highly constructed or re-
imagined interpretations of historical ‘truth.’ The wars of the 90s demonstrated the most 
violent and radical expression of the politicization of identity in the region. Post-war 
identity discourse faced the dual-problematic of, on one hand, de-emphasizing identity, 
and on the other, finding the tools to construct new identities in an emergent polity. 
Croatia’s bid to become a member state of the EU, and the accompanying discourse, 
played an integral, albeit contested, role in addressing the post-war identity problematic.   
In the theory on identity construction, the notions of boundary definition, in-
groups vs. out-groups, and the self-identification in contrast to the ‘other’ figure 
prominently. The wars of dissolution functioned to produce literal boundaries, which 
were intended to circumscribe the geo-political space around groups of people based on 
predominantly ethnic, religious, and/or historical characteristics. The underlying current 
of perceived ‘otherness’ in the lands of former Yugoslavia is well-captured by what 
Milica Bakic-Hayden describes as the “phenomenon of nesting orientalisms.” 
The phenomenon of nesting orientalisms is evident in the former Yugoslavia and 
its successor states where the designation of ‘other’ has been appropriated and 
manipulated by those who have themselves been designated as such in orientalist 
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discourse. Thus, while Europe as a whole has disparaged not only the orient 
‘proper’ but also the parts of Europe that were under oriental Ottoman rule, 
Yugoslavs who reside in areas that were formerly the Habsburg monarchy 
distinguish themselves from those in areas formerly ruled by the Ottoman Empire, 
hence ‘improper.’ Within the latter area, eastern Orthodox peoples perceive 
themselves as more European that those who assumed identities of European 
Muslims and who further distinguish themselves from the ultimate orientals, non-
Europeans.128  
 
A simple, reduced expression of this is reflected in a quip that is commonly used in the 
region, which goes: ‘Where are the Balkans? … east of where ever I am standing.’ This 
suggests two things. The first is the nesting orientalisms phenomenon is present – the 
further east one travels, the less ‘European’ one becomes, and the more ‘Oriental’ or 
‘other’ one becomes. Europeaness is associated with being ‘civilized,’ whereas the 
attributes of ‘backward,’ ‘primitive’ or ‘violent’ can be ascribed to one’s oriental-ness. 
Moreover, the notion of the ‘violent’ Balkans gives rise to the second inference stemming 
from this quip. The term ‘Balkan’ is highly stigmatized to the point that it becomes 
desirable to disassociate oneself from any possible connection to it – nobody wants to be 
‘in’ the Balkans, let alone from there.   
Given the history of conflict in the region during the 20th century, from the Balkan 
Wars of 1912 and 1913, to the two World Wars, to the wars of succession in the 1990s, 
there is, no doubt, empirical validity to the idea that this region has experienced violence. 
Yet, the nesting orientalisms phenomenon suggests that when one looks to the east, the 
groups found there are progressively more violent by nature – it is an inherent or 
essentialized attribute. In order to recast the perception of having this attribute, it is 
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strategically advisable for nations to proximate themselves with the west. The process of 
gaining EU membership is seen as satisfying that objective.  
Croatian people feel left out. In geographic, historic and cultural terms Croatia 
undoubtedly belongs to Europe, and there is a feeling of belittlement, as Croatians 
see ‘Europeans’ perceiving them as the ‘out group.’129  
 
The psychological impact of feeling belittled or left out exposes a very confusing 
dynamic. Croatians are embittered by Europe applying the ‘out-group’ treatment to it, 
which is based on socially constructed notions of Croatia having an inherently 
‘violent’/‘Balkan’/‘backward’ essence, while the Croatian appeal is based on irrefutable 
empirical or essential evidence of its geographic, historical, and cultural belonging. The 
response is then to use a social constructivist approach to remove the essence of their 
‘Balkan-ness.’ In the eyes of the political elites, the most powerful tool for this is 
pursuing membership in the European Union.  
Given the extraordinary amount of media coverage and the prominence of the 90s 
wars on the international stage, it was incumbent upon the political elite class to restore 
the detrimental reputational effects that these conflicts had on Croatia’s international 
image. Political elites needed to formulate ways to confront the country’s ‘troubled past’ 
and rectify its ‘war-torn’ and ‘savage’ image. One such way was through its tourism 
industry. Instead of political elites directly recognizing the difficult episodes of the past, 
the chose to use the tourism industry as a way of culturally reframing the country as 
being identical to its western European neighbors, thus drawing attention away from the 
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war.130 With its spectacular Adriatic coastline, Croatia is fortunate to be endowed with 
immense natural beauty, making this a viable strategy of reputation management.  
Another way in which Croatian political elites worked to confront the ‘troubled 
past,’ was through a program of promoting identity convergence with European norms 
and social values.131 By linking aspects of Croatian state identity to the process of 
Europeanization (through EU membership) and de-linking it from memories of war, 
elites had found an appealing way to frame the difficult costs of the accession process as 
part of a project of reasserting its belonging to Europe, and more importantly establishing 
its uniqueness from the other states of the region in order to ‘de-Balkanize.’132 More 
specifically, post-war identity discourse did not only attempt to severe Croatia from the 
Balkans, but it aimed to promote the idea that Croatia is much more comfortably labeled 
Central European (like Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic) or Mediterranean (like 
Italy, Spain, or Portugal).133 In this sense, there are multiple layers of the belonging or 
returning narrative, although the Balkan escape narrative appears more powerful than that 
of returning or belonging to Europe. The story about belonging simply affords the elite a 
convenient vehicle to enact the escape. In sum, the identity-bearing or association 
narrative can be put as such: 
To join the EU is to join an elite club of advanced democracies. Being a member-state 
means being progressive, liberal, modern, and credible. Moreover, it makes you more 
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“western” – it is means of escaping the stigma of being labeled as “Balkan” – i.e. 
backward, eastern, warring, and divisive.  
 
There are numerous examples of political elites presenting these messages to the public. 
For instance, former President Mesic said in a 2003 speech: 
Croatia is a country whose history reaches far back into the past of Europe, a 
country that has always been and has never stopped being part of the European 
countryside…We have given our contribution to Europe innumerable times in the 
past. We want and are capable of doing the same in the future as well…We expect 
Europe to recognize us and accept us as its inseparable part.134 
 
Reinforcing this idea and speaking at the same event, the former Prime Minister Ivica 
Racan said: 
The citizens of Croatia have expressed these choices in their wish for a ‘return to 
Europe,’ with the strong belief that Croatia’s belonging to a historical and 
contemporary European context is an unquestionable foundation for the right to 
make this dream come true…neither can the EU consider integration complete 
without a state stretching across the area where Mitteleuropa meets the 
Mediterranean.135 
 
 
Competing Narratives 
 
The images presented above represent three overarching discursive frames that 
Croatian political elites utilized to persuade the public of the merits of pursuing the path 
of European Union membership. In general, these frames depicted a highly favorable 
vision of the European Union and its potential to have a transformative impact on the 
new state. This is to be expected if we adopt the popular view that pursuit of EU 
membership is an elite-driven process or that political elites have a tendency to prefer 
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membership to non-membership. It is important, however, not to ignore that many 
competing narratives exist that offer a picture of what the EU might mean for Croatia. 
Again, they can be categorized according to the established economic, political, and 
identity-bearing/associational frames. 
Various actors, mainly civil society or the NGO community, represent what can 
be characterized as advocacy or discourse coalitions that present competing ideas to those 
presented by political elites. While they may wield power over strands of alternative 
thinking, they do not have power over the dominant discourse by virtue of their 
positioning within the political structure of society. Thus, they must work more 
vigorously to employ power through their ideas if they wish to see those ideas 
transformed into new institutions.  
 
Economic 
 
Perhaps the most significant economic narrative is that which offers a re-
evaluation of the economic prowess of the EU in light of the Eurozone crisis and the 
global financial crisis. With other EU countries in the Mediterranean basin – the so-called 
PIGS countries (Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain) – facing massive bailouts and 
imposed austerity measures, the image of the EU as a beacon of prosperity was quickly 
eroding. In the climate of crises, EU candidate countries such as Croatia were forced to 
deal with multiple exogenous shocks simultaneously. Reductions of trade with neighbors, 
capital inflow and foreign assistance, coupled with the needs full liberalization prior to 
accession exposes these countries to macroeconomic instability and creates the possibility 
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for increased reliance on aid from international financial institutions.136 Given these 
conditions, the idea that joining the EU market would lead to greater prosperity was 
called into question. With the economic incentive significantly diminished, if not gone, 
many in the Croatian public felt as if EU accession meant that were ‘getting on a sinking 
ship.’ They saw their fate as being that of Greece or Spain, rather than Germany or 
Austria. If the EU is a ‘transfer union,’ they would not want to join simply to become 
another debtor state.  
When it comes to empirical evidence to back a narrative that showcases how the 
economic incentive of membership is dramatically in decline, many Croatian will point to 
their next-door neighbors, Slovenia. Sharing many similar background characteristics 
(culture, history, economy), Slovenia, which entered the EU in 2004, was widely touted 
as a success story. With a record of political liberty and prosperity, it was seen as having 
completed an impressive “threefold” transition – independence, political democracy, and 
a free-market economy.137 Yet, the initial success of Slovenia has been significantly 
hindered by the financial crisis. Slovenia has witness a decrease in manufacturing and 
trade, loss of confidence in financial markets, loss of real estate values, higher 
unemployment, and a decrease in the general welfare and purchasing power of population 
as a result of increased price of goods matched with stagnating wages.138 Many Croatians 
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see Slovenia as a cautionary tale. Entering the single market will have a destabilizing 
effect. Wages will stay stable, but the price of goods will increase. Domestic companies 
will not be able to compete with multi-national corporations despite an increase in 
foreign direct investment profits from foreign capital will travel back to the country of 
origin.139 In this sense, EU integration not only has negative effects on the domestic 
economy in the short-run, it further exacerbates north-south/creditor-debtor distributional 
disparities within Europe.  
Another phenomenon that is present in parts of former Yugoslavia is something 
that is referred to as ‘Yugo-nostalgia.’ This term requires further elaboration. In the 
context of EU competing narratives, ‘Yugo-nostalgia’ has economic, political, and 
identity-bearing/associational manifestations. For the economic, while the rest of the 
former communist states were embracing democracy and free markets, it was not the 
triumph of capitalist ideology that brought about the end of the Yugoslav socialist 
project, it was the rise of militant ethno-nationalism. In the midst of the wars and then the 
ensuing Tudjman years, it was easy to focus attention on the need transition away from 
nationalism toward democracy and free markets. What was forgotten was a generation of 
people, who, in addition to their strong ethno-nationalist identification, continued to 
believe in the socialist ideology. Relative to the other former centrally planned economies 
of Eastern Europe, the ‘self-management’ model is seen as being open to extensive 
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international trade, and a model that prioritizes social justice over market efficiency.140 In 
a country that was rebuilding from war, memory of a bygone era where, although not 
perfect, the quality of life and the provision of public services was perceived to be much 
better. Joining the EU and accelerating the pace of market liberalization in order to meet 
economic conditionality benchmarks leaves an unsettling feeling for a generation of 
people who were socialized in the Yugoslav tradition and continue to believe firmly in its 
economic ideology.  
 
Political 
 
As for competing political narratives, accession to the EU presupposes significant 
limitation on sovereignty as member states are required to accept the provisions of the 
acquis, participate in common institutions, and rely on joint decision-making 
mechanisms.141 If one of the primary objectives of the war was to gain independence and 
establish a sovereign nation-state, then entering the new union can be cast as being 
counterproductive with respect to the hard-fought and newly won sovereignty.  
Moreover, critics of the EU are quick to point out certain aspects of what the EU 
is and draw parallels between it and former Yugoslavia. The EU is a loose confederation 
of peoples and states, with multiple languages, cultures, and historical legacies. Like in 
Yugoslavia, in the EU there is a common currency despite decentralized fiscal policy and 
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enormous asymmetries in productive capacities. The scope of the asymmetries is largest 
in view of the vast disparities between the core and periphery. Deficits of democracy and 
failures to meet expectation have fueled a resurgence of nationalist movements. With 
these ingredients, people are not only reluctant to join the EU, they fear that the EU will 
soon share Yugoslavia’s fate,142 as disintegration is near (although peaceful).143  
Even before these conditions were present, the Constitution of the Republic of 
Croatia stated the following: 
It is prohibited to initiate any procedure for the association of the Republic of 
Croatia into alliances with other states if such association leads, or might lead, to 
a renewal of a South Slav state community or to any Balkan state form of any 
kind.144 
 
Indeed this was written to avoid a reconstitution of Yugoslavia, yet the resemblances 
between the EU and Yugoslavia are clear to most and very unsettling to some.  
As for the argument that the EU’s political conditionality measures, which 
promote transparency and rule of law, detractors claim that legislative reforms along this 
vein are done so as a matter of formality. They are declaratory or de jure at best. Despite 
‘reforms,’ it is politics as usual. Politicians are still corrupt and self-interested. Now the 
prize is bigger – a potential career in Brussels. All member states are guaranteed at least 
one commissioner, a position of great influence, arguably of greater influence than any 
other political position in a small country, even head of state. Neven Mimica became the 
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EU commissioner for consumer policy when Croatia joined the union. He had been 
intimately involved with Croatia’s accession prospects from the beginning, leading the 
negotiation for the SAA agreement and chairing the country’s integration committee. No 
doubt these experiences qualify Mimica as a candidate for the position, but as a career 
politician there is an expectation of reward after paying one’s dues.145 
Along with an EU commissionership, Croatia also gains twelve Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) by joining the Union. During the April 2013 election to 
select individuals for these new posts, there was debate over whether or not to hold these 
elections on the same date as local elections. Concerns were raised over the additional 
cost of holding two separate elections and the fear of low voter turnout (exacerbating the 
democratic deficit). There was an even greater fascination, however, over the salaries that 
the new MEPs would be earning in Brussels. At nearly 8000 euros per month, MEPs earn 
more than three times what they would if they were serving in the Croatian parliament 
(2600 euros per month). The figure is staggering to the average Croatian who is scraping 
by just to meet basic necessities.146  
As for corruption, former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, who pushed hard to 
advance Croatia down the EU path during his administration, has become the emblem of 
corrupt politics. Sanader was sentenced to ten years in prison for accepting a five million 
euro bribe from the Hungarian oil company MOL to secure the company rights in 
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Croatia. He was also accused of war profiteering and receiving over half a million euros 
in kickbacks from the Austrian bank Hypo Alpe Adria during the wars of independence 
when an international trade embargo had been placed on Yugoslavia.147 Other forms of 
corruption have been noted that directly facilitate foreign investment transaction to make 
Croatia a more attractive destination for capital in the single market. For example, in 
2009, the government passed an eminent domain law, which allows the state to 
expropriate property for any purpose that is deemed to be for the public good. Normally, 
this applies to the construction of public utilities. Much to the chagrin of its many of its 
residents, this law is being applied, however, in the picturesque hill top town of 
Motovun148 in Istria (a UNESCO World Heritage Site), to seize land for the purpose of 
building a golf resort, which is being developed by the British-owned Jupiter Adria 
Limited.149 With examples such as these, there is worry that corrupt politicians would be 
willing to sell Croatia’s land and heritage to the highest bidder. The EU creates an 
international trade and business climate that facilitates these transactions and increases 
the incentive for lawmakers to bend the rules to further expedite more transactions.   
 
Identity-Bearing/Associational 
 
Again, the EU reminds people of the former Yugoslavia, the notion of an 
imposed/semi-constructed “European” pseudo-supranational identity is ill-conceived and 
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works against the idea of independence and autonomy. This sentiment pulls in two 
directions, both compete with pro-integrationist discourse that stresses ‘belonging’ or 
‘return’ based on a shared set of historical and cultural values. The first is concerned with 
any effort bolster solidarity through the manufacture of a common identity. The EU 
makes expressed efforts through policy to promote intercultural dialogue in order to 
promote social cohesion among members and potential members. The aim is to enhance 
the credibility of the project by promoting interactions that edify a ‘European identity.’150 
To many, these efforts appear inauthentic, and even dangerous when considering the 
ultimate backlash in Yugoslavia. Additionally, the idea that a ‘European identity’ even 
exists is highly questionable to many Croatians, and if it were to it would most likely not 
carry with it any significant emotional resonance. There is not a strong feeling of 
connection with Croatians’ ‘European’ brethren in Paris, Oslo, or Berlin. 
The second relates to how distinguishing its uniqueness of culture, language, and 
state was one of the guiding objectives of the independence effort in Croatia. The 
separation of the Serbo-Croatian language into Croatian, Serbian, and Bosnian languages 
represents an excellent embodiment of this principle. In Croatia, from early on in the 
1990s there was a significant political intervention made on the part of nationalist leaders 
to disassociate the official language of Croatia from Serbo-Croatian. Differences between 
Serbs, Croats, and the various peoples of Bosnia had been once defined in terms of 
religion or ethnicity identities were being redefined in linguistic terms – what alphabet 
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you use.151 The promotion of a common European identity is perceived as suppressing 
these new forms of identity expression and re-establishing a program of cultural 
homogenization.  
One narrative that has currency stems from the response of the then European 
Communities (EC) to the conflicts of the 90s. Wracked by indecision and divided support 
for the positions of the different Yugoslav republics involved in the conflict, the EC was 
unable to swiftly intervene, identify the problems, and mediate to find a peaceful 
resolution.152 That Europe sat on the sidelines seems inexplicable to most. Those who 
express disdain for Europe on this count attribute it to Europe’s view of the Balkans at 
the ‘other’: 
Today, the very word “Balkans” conjures up images of intrigue, war, and human 
suffering on a scale abhorrent to Western society. To some people, the Balkan 
countries lack a clear Western orientation and carry far too much cultural baggage 
to belong in the European club. Western leaders refer to the region as the back 
door to Europe, the Balkan powder keg, or Europe’s doorstep. What these 
euphemisms hide is, perhaps, the wish that the Balkans were located anywhere 
other than in Europe.153 
 
The question for Croatians then is, if Europe cares so little about the people of this region 
that it would ignore that genocide and human atrocity was happening to a people that saw 
themselves as European, why join them or be like them? In light of such inaction, the 
legitimacy of the EU’s character as a moral actor becomes highly questionable. 
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Again, the feeling of Yugo-nostalgia creeps in and influences how people 
perceive the European project. Fondly longing for and reminiscing about the days of 
Tito’s ‘Brotherhood and Unity,’ where children sang folk songs that celebrate multiple 
ethnicities, religions, and tolerance for all peoples, many ‘Yugoslavs’ felt more 
‘European’ during this era than they have since the break-up of the federation.154 The 
values of multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism and respect for other peoples were strong - 
values that proponents of European project proudly espouse. Mobility, although 
improving as states of this region progress along the EU path, was much more 
challenging for citizens of these states in the immediate post-conflict era due to visa 
restrictions than it was during the Yugoslav times when citizens could travel to nearly all 
the current EU member states visa free. According to Jansen, in the post-war period the 
EU created what he calls an ‘immediate outside’ in the Balkans. The immediate outside is 
reserved for states that do not yet meet the conditions of membership, but presumably 
will work toward meeting the criteria to become part of the inside in the future.155 The 
bordering of geopolitical space and intentional placement of the former Yugoslav state on 
the outside of Europe revives nostalgic sentiments for Yugoslavia while at the same time 
fomenting antipathy for the EU. 
 In general, competing narratives offer an alternative idea to the dominant idea that 
political elites disseminate in their official discourse. These ideas and the actors that 
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propagate them, however, are not always opposed to the overarching idea of EU 
accession. It is more a matter of taking issue with the methods of implementing that idea. 
For instance, in order to make the technocratic changes required to satisfy the acquis, the 
government will look to the expertise of members of civil society. These epistemic 
communities and knowledge regimes offer recommendation within their sector of 
expertise. Members of this community may agree with the object of the EU condition 
within their sector, yet lambaste the government for complying because compliances is 
the minimum response and reform should go much deeper. Actors such as these, although 
presenting a discourse critical of the official discourse, function to reinforce power in the 
dominant idea rather than challenge it.  
 
Public Opinion Data 
 
The preceding section describes various presentations of what the EU is and what 
it means. Political elites mainly work to promote a positive image of the economic, 
political, and associational benefits of membership. Counter-elites, consisting primarily 
of intellectuals, opposition parties, civil society and citizen groups, do their part to put 
forward competing images of the potential harms of membership. In order to have a 
better picture of how these messages impact citizens’ thinking on a broad scale, we can 
look at public opinion polling data. Data is derived from the Gallup Balkan Monitor, 
Eurobarometer, and a generational survey conducted by the European Fund for the 
Balkans.  
 
Implications for Official Narratives 
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(Source: Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2011)156 
 
The following polls support the image that the EU will have an overall positive 
impact on the economy. A majority of respondents believe that EU accession will bring 
more employment opportunities, more development, and more competition for national 
businesses. Competitiveness can be construed as both positive and negative. On one 
hand, privatization of national businesses is a condition of membership and is intended to 
increase competition within the country. However, others believe that the protections that 
are in place for state-owned industries make them more resistant to the pressures of 
external competition. 
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According to these polls, respondents believe that there are several positive 
political benefits to EU membership. An overwhelming majority of people think that it 
will be easier to travel after accession. Along this vein, increased labor mobility is also 
seen as a positive economic benefit. A comfortable majority of people agree that rule of 
law will be strengthened as a result of accession, although only a plurality think that it 
will lead to greater political stability. 
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In terms of how respondents self-identify, not surprisingly nearly 80 percent 
identify strongly with Croatia (either extremely, very, or moderately). Respondents were 
more tepid when it came to Europe with approximately 40 percent identifying strongly. 
Still, more people identify with Europe a little than not at all. When combining all of 
those factors, on could characterize attachment to Europe as generally positive, but not as 
enthusiastic as attachment to Croatia. When compared to “Balkan,” however, Europe 
fares much better. At 42 percent, ‘not at all’ to the question ‘do you identify with the 
“Balkans”?’ was the strongest response on any category. Nearly as many people claim 
not to identify with the Balkans as people who identify extremely and very strongly with 
Croatia (42 percent and 45 percent respectively). These data support the idea that there is 
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an aversion to the Balkan image. While there is not enthusiastic identification with 
Europe, respondents have stronger positive attachment to Europe than they do to the 
Balkans.  
 
Implications for Competing Narratives 
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The figures above show an image that contradicts the perception that the 
economic benefits of EU membership are generally positive. They show that respondents 
believe that accession is likely to be more beneficial for big business and those who are 
already well off. Small and medium enterprises may benefit, but they are just as likely to 
experience disadvantages. A plurality of respondents believe wages will lower and that 
national resources will be exploited after membership. Again, if we juxtapose the figure 
that shows that people think that accession will create more competition for national 
business with the poll about exploitation of national resources, one can conclude that 
people are concerned about the external economic threats that Croatia may be vulnerable 
to as a member state. 
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In terms of political considerations, respondents were more or less divided when 
it came to the question of less corruption after accession with “no” slightly edging out 
“yes” for a plurality. This suggests that people do not definitively think that 
harmonization of national laws with those of the acquis will change the culture of 
political corruption. When you compare that the data which indicate that a decent 
majority of respondents believe that politicians with have more advantages after 
accession, it is hard to make the case that it will be anything but ‘business as usual’ for 
politicians – meaning corrupt and self-interested. Conversely, the idea that Croatia will 
experience a loss of sovereignty after it becomes a member is not supported, with 48 
percent of participants responding ‘no’ and 36 percent responding ‘yes.’  
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Again, this figure shows that there is modest identification with Europe. Yet, the 
strength of that attachment is not great, nor does it compare with identification with 
Croatia. This suggests that the label ‘Europe’ is probably best employed as a second-
order identity descriptor. If one were to ask if a “European identity” (i.e. a European 
demos) existed it is likely that the notion would receive even less support.  
                                                
161 Ibid. 
98 
 
 
Vs. EU 
 
Using Eurobarometer 2013 data, we can compare the attitudes of Croatians to 
those of the citizens of the other EU member states on a broad array of issues. 
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(Source: Eurobarometer, 2013)162 
 
Concerning economic issues, both Croatians and citizens of the EU27 have a 
negative view of the economic situation in their respective countries. Croatians are 
decidedly more negative in terms of their general assessment of the economic situation, 
but they are also less optimistic that the situation will improve in the next 12 months. 
Conversely, Croatians are more optimistic about an improvement in the economy of the 
EU in the next 12 months than people from the EU27. Also, despite having a negative 
view of their country’s economy in the aggregate, at the individual household level, a 
majority of respondents from the EU27 described their financial situation as ‘good.’ A 
majority of Croatians described theirs as ‘bad,’ yet there is a significant difference in the 
magnitude of the negative response (97 percent say the economic situation is ‘bad’ while 
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only 58 percent say their household financial situation is ‘bad’). Finally, both populations 
cited unemployment and economic situation as being among the most important issues 
facing their country with Croatians expressing greater overall concern for both issues.  
The general picture that emerges from the Croatian side is that although there is 
some optimism that the EU’s economy could rebound, the assessment of the domestic 
economic situation is quite grim. The polling was conducted in May 2013 as the country 
was on the verge of accession. This could suggest that the elite narrative of economic 
benefits no longer carries much weight. If it did, one would expect more optimism about 
a domestic economic turn around in the period when the country is acceding.  
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In terms of trust for institutions, there is not a great deal of trust to be found. Both 
populations tend to trust EU institutions more than they trust the institutions of their own 
country. Croatians have more trust in EU institutions than the EU27 and the ‘tend not to 
trust’ gap between EU and national institutions is much bigger for Croatia than the EU27 
(54 percent-79 percent versus 60 percent-71 percent respectively). This suggests that 
Croatians may view EU institutions as more legitimate than those at home. Political elites 
might not frame it in that way as not to discredit themselves, yet it becomes easier to push 
forward a pro-integration agenda if citizens have a modicum of belief in its credibility. 
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(Source: Eurobarometer, 2013)164 
 
When asked to respond to what the EU means personally, the response receiving 
the greatest support among Croatians was ‘freedom of movement.’ Additionally, more 
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Croatians believed the EU means economic prosperity than it does loss of cultural 
identity or democracy. Even though the aforementioned surveys regarding the economy 
suggested that the narrative of economic prosperity might be losing resonance, these 
survey suggest that when comparing the types of personal responses that the economic, 
political, and identity-bearing/associational narratives evoke, it is the economic story that 
comes out ahead with people putting greater stock in the material as opposed to ideational 
ramifications of membership. The EU27, however, responded in greater support of 
democracy than the economy, and were less threatened by what effect the EU has on 
cultural identity.  
 
Generational 
 
We can also compare attitudes across generations to see if there are any 
significant trends.  
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(Source: European Fund for the Balkans, 2011)165 
 
There is a clear difference between the generation of Croatians that were born in 
1971 and 1991 in terms of support for membership and the economic effects that 
membership will bring. The older generation is much less supportive of membership and 
believe that membership will be more harmful than beneficial for the economy. The 
younger generation is much more positive on both counts.  
                                        Figure 42                                   Figure 43 
The EU will disintegrate like Yugoslavia? 
- 1971
very likely
32%
likely
47%
uniikely
15%
very 
unlikely
6%
The EU will disintegrate like Yugoslavia? 
- 1991
very likely
43%
likely
11%
uniikely
34%
very 
unlikely
12%
 
(Source: European Fund for the Balkans, 2011)166 
 
When asked to predict if the EU would disintegrate like Yugoslavia, the older 
generation who lived through the disintegration of Yugoslavia believed it to be more 
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likely when you combine the total ‘very likely’ and ‘likely’ responses. The younger 
generation, however, appeared more certain that EU disintegration was ‘very likely.’  
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The older generational cohort is more threatened by the effect the EU will have on 
national identity than the younger cohort. This is predictable if one considers that it was 
the older generation that fought the “Homeland War,” and that the younger generation 
came of age in a world that was increasing interconnected as a result of globalization 
pressures where national identity is becoming de-emphasized.  
 
General Change over time 
 
In the early 2000s, support for EU membership was very high hovering in the 70 
percent to 80 percent range.  
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(Source: adapted from Franc and Medjugorac, 2013)168 
 
The early enthusiasm for EU integration began to flag once the accession 
negotiations began. There was a steady downward trend in support than ended in 2011 
when there was a spike in citizens who deemed membership as ‘good.’ This can be 
attributed to that Croatia closing the negotiation talks that year and after a long difficult 
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journey the finish line was in sight. What is curious, however, is the high number of 
respondents that consistently choose ‘neither’ or ‘don’t know.’ This suggests a general 
mood of indifference and apathy, or that large segments of the population may not be 
informed. The next section will be devoted to exploring what factors might be at play and 
how they may be operating to achieve such as result. 
 
Referendum 
Figure 51 
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(Source: Election Commission)169 
 
The referendum on EU membership was held on January 22, 2012. The 
referendum passed by a comfortable margin. Turnout, however, was low at only 43.51 
percent. The government did not insist on a turnout threshold of 50 percent +1 to validate 
the result. By exploring the communication strategy of the government and juxtaposing it 
with what we have already learned about the accession process, narrative frames, and 
public opinion, we can derive more robust conclusions regarding the interaction of forces 
that explain the outcome of Croatia’s membership to the EU. 
 
Communication Strategy 
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Accession to the EU is a major public policy. Given the wide range of impacts it 
will have on a state’s foreign and domestic policies, communicating the foreseen 
consequences of membership to the public in order to cultivate an informed citizenry 
should be of paramount importance to political actors that claim to be improving the 
democratic character of governance in a transitioning state. Elites in Croatia had formed a 
political consensus early on in its pursuit of membership, which was also coupled with 
high public support. As the journey toward accession began to face obstacles, with led to 
its protraction, and Europe fell into crisis, public opinion began turn in the direction of 
opposition, yet the elite consensus stood firm. With so much of the reform program set 
into motion and anticipating an eventual referendum on membership, the elite class 
would need to determine how to address waning public support in order to assure that the 
end goal of membership would not be in jeopardy at the ballot box.  
In was clear that citizens felt that the process was non-transparent and non-
accessible. These concerns are not unique to Croatia. In 2006, in response to general 
concerns in this area (also the growing democratic deficit), the European Commission 
published a White Paper on Communication Policy. In the same year, the Government of 
Croatia produced a Communication Strategy for informing the public of the impacts of 
European integration. While these appear to be proactive and well-intentioned policy 
objectives, we will assess their efficacy and authenticity with respect to competing policy 
objectives in the upcoming passages.   
The Communication Strategy that the Government of Croatia published in 2006 
was, in fact, the second such strategy it had put forth in the period it was actively 
108 
 
pursuing membership. The previous Strategy document was completed in 2001, but 
responding to feedback from the public as the process evolved, it was determined that a 
greater effort was needed to raise public awareness about the EU. The Strategy was based 
on the following stated principles: 
 
• It is of the utmost importance that the stand of the Croatian public on EU and 
EU accession be rooted in sound knowledge and complete understanding of 
the relevant facts. It is necessary, therefore, to counter any potential anti-EU 
mood or Euroscepticism by furnishing the public with information in a timely 
manner and in as complete a form as possible. 
• This requires a well-harmonized action of communication with the general 
public and all social groups, particularly with the media, the youth, economic 
subject, civil society, farmers and the rural population as well as the groups 
of population which are particularly susceptible to change.170  
 
The major goals and purposes of this strategy are: 
 
• The Croatian public should be acquainted with the advantages to EU 
membership, but also the reforms this entails. 
• The Croatian public should be acquainted with the possible consequences of 
not becoming EU member. 
• The Croatian public should be adequately prepared to participate in 
discussion on EU membership and should have an active role in the accession 
process. 
• [to] make information transparent and easily accessible. 
• [to] eliminate ungrounded and wrong stereotypes about matters related to the 
integration process and the EU. 
• [to] emphasize the responsibilities and obligation which accompany the 
benefits of membership.171 
 
The main targets of this strategy are media, the youth, and groups particularly susceptible 
to change (which include farmers, rural population, inhabitants of areas of special state 
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concern, island inhabitants, physically disabled persons, senior citizens, persons working 
at home, the unemployed, and persons who have abandoned school). The tools to be 
employed to reach all of these populations include thematic publications, TV and radio 
programs, public discussions, seminars, public events, an info-line, internet pages, and 
EU info points. The Government relies on civil society and media to act as ‘multipliers’ 
to amplify the message to as many target social groups as possible. Additionally, it relies 
on close cooperation with partners at the Delegation of the European Commission to the 
Republic of Croatia to provide information and support in accomplishing its 
communications objectives.172  
Croatia’s communication strategy mirrors EU’s communication policy, which 
seeks to bridge the ‘communication gap’ between the EU and its citizens by improving 
civic education and connecting citizens and their political institutions through 
encouraging active participation and two-way dialogue in all matters. The EU’s policy 
also utilizes the media and civil society as vital points of information dissemination.173 
Although they are closely interlinked, the main difference between the two approaches is 
that the EU’s communication policy is intended to nurture the development of a 
European public sphere, a space where Europe debates European issues, whereas in 
Croatia the intent is to create a dialogue about the national implications of Europe in the 
national public space. Both recognize, putatively at least, that in order for there to be 
healthy democracy in their respective polities, which are set to overlap and create shared 
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communicative spaces, greater citizen awareness and participation in decision-making is 
a must. Accordingly, “citizens can expect Europe to offer them prosperity, solidarity, and 
security in the face of globalization.”174  
When it comes to implementation of the Communication Strategy, some of the 
partners in civil society took their marching orders and were able to carry forth the 
Government’s message through publications devoted to showing the benefits of EU 
membership. One example is a publication commissioned by the Konrad Adenaur 
Foundation with research conducted by analysts from the Institute for International 
Relations, Zagreb. It is titled: Croatia in the European Union: What Can Citizens 
Expect? The piece does well to showcase the positive economic and political benefits of 
EU membership with statements such as the following: 
Membership in the European Union is a guarantee of political stability and well-
functioning public institutions which will act as guardians of democracy, rule of 
law, human rights and respect of the minority rights. As a member of a 
community with approximately half a billion people, Croatia will enter a zone of 
political stability, which will enable overall social and economic development of 
the country. The application European standards will assist further 
democratization of Croatian Society.175  
 
Undoubtedly, this statement offers a clear illustration of the elite political and economic 
narrative frames previously discussed. In this instance, elites are utilizing civil society to 
channel the communication of their discourse. This is in line with the objectives of the 
communication strategy, yet it is messages such as the following, which suggest that 
despite its best intentions, the strategy might be missing its mark: 
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The fact that the political parties in Croatian Parliament have attained consensus 
on the accession to the EU is to be most welcomed. Therefore we hope that this 
publication will be of help to those that carry the political responsibility and that it 
will contribute towards scatter of citizens’ fears and prejudices in the villages, 
countries and towns. The citizens should be aware how it is only logical that 
accession to the EU will affect their lives, as the processes of harmonization with 
the EU’s body of law and the normative apparatus of the Brussels based joint 
institutions, will introduce changes that the citizens will have to adapt to 
(emphasis added).176  
 
While a publication such as this can serve as a medium for elites to broadcast a desired 
political message, the sentiment that citizen ‘will have to adapt to’ the changes brought 
about be EU reform indicates a top-down approach to communication. It may have the 
impact of informing the citizens about what politicians want them to know about the EU, 
but it does not invite two-way dialogue, which can work to stifle citizen participation and 
citizen ‘buy-in.’ Communication of this sort is simply the transmission of information. 
Despite an expressed desire to be more informed, this type of communication only 
discourages input and continues to alienate citizens from having the ability to shape the 
substance of the information that affects them. The way this changes things?  Now 
citizens know what happens behind closed doors, but they still can’t do anything about it. 
In this way, there is no substantial shift in the way that information is communicated, it 
remain uni-directional and top-down, therefore in order to have a more informed citizen 
body, the government should reconsider it’s entire approach to communication policy.177  
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The inability for both Croatian and European political elites to distinguish 
between information and communication has continued the practice of fact transmission. 
In order to improve the quality of communication, both must work to generate interest in 
the substance of issues about which the public is being informed so that they will 
genuinely wish to participate in the political process.178  
Unfortunately, this was not achieved in Croatia. In addition to civil society, the 
Government’s communication strategy leans on media to get the word out about Europe. 
Lamentably, the manner in which is did so had very little effect on stimulating interest or 
a participatory response. For instance, the majority of media reports that dealt with the 
accession negotiation where highly technical in nature, employing jargon that did not 
connect with the general public. Reports were mostly used to convey that a chapter of the 
negotiation had been open or closed. Very little effort was made to express the meaning 
or content of a given chapter. The overall impression was that the EU process was best 
handled by politicians and bureaucrats, who, at best, will give a descriptive and 
technocratic progress report from time to time.179  
The overall effect this has is profound. Citizen are given the impression that no 
matter what they do, they cannot steer the course of public policy with respect to EU 
integration (or most other issue areas really). This breeds a general sense of apathy and 
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indifference. It is the idea that despite the half-hearted symbolic overtures to ‘enhance 
communication,’ like every candidacy before, and like the EU itself, this is an elite 
project. Croatia’s candidacy is no exception.  
…they [the Croatian public] believe that even if they voted ‘No’ in the 
referendum on EU membership, the pro-EU political elite would managed to find 
a way to overturn the result; if in the end Croatia did not achieve membership, 
then it would be due to decisions taken by external forces (the EU itself of some 
of its Member States) and not because Croatia had done or failed to do something. 
This sense of the outcome being all be inevitable regardless of what happens on 
the ground is at the root of the relative indifference in Croatia towards EU 
accession.180  
 
This sense of disenfranchisement was not unknown to the state administration. In fact, 
many argue that it was calculated in order for the integration agenda to move forward 
without strong public opposition. By creating a mood of indifference, people may not 
have liked the prospect of joining the EU, which is reflected in opinion polls, but they did 
not care enough to do try to do anything about it. If this was indeed a calculated elite 
strategy, it had just one hitch – the referendum. The strategy needed to find a way to 
counteract the sentiment of disenfranchisement and indifference to the extent that citizens 
would mobilize to vote. Elites were not necessarily interested in getting a majority of 
citizens to vote an enthusiastic ‘Yes!’, but rather, it just needed enough people to show up 
and say ‘meh, why not?’.   
The government’s campaign for the referendum began in early January 2012. It 
was to be a short three-week campaign leading up to the vote on January 22, 2012. 
During this time, the government blasted the airwaves with taped messages from 
President Josipovic, Prime Minister Milanovic, and Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
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European Integration, Vesna Pusic. In addition, the foreign ministry published various 
data and documents about the potential impact on of the EU on its website, and sent out 
over two million booklets and pamphlets with basic information about the EU.181 There 
was a noticeable change in the volume of information the government was projecting. 
Opposition groups also began to counter with their own message campaigns and worked 
to mobilize their core constituents. The reaction to the uptick in public discourse 
surrounding the EU question was mixed. On one hand, citizens felt that the government’s 
effort were too little, too late – ‘Why now? You have ignored us for nearly a decade. You 
took our support for granted until you realized you might not have it.’ On the other hand, 
since both camps were projecting their messages, citizens welcomed this brief period of 
vigorous debate and took it seriously. 
Although the volume of discourse may have increased, the government did little 
to elevate the quality of the debate during the campaign for the referendum. The 
pamphlets that were put out were thought to be highly superficial in nature, bordering on 
propaganda.  Even many of those voting ‘yes’ to the EU were offended by the 
government’s efforts because they underestimated and insulted citizens’ intelligence. 
University students in particular have been shown to be highly educated and informed 
about Croatia’s EU negotiation process and EU enlargement policy in general.182 
Tending to be pro-EU, students have taken a greater interest in the process, as they are 
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the population with the greatest stake in the results of the referendum. Despite being 
insulted, citizens such as these were not likely to have switched their vote to ‘no.’ 
Instead, they were left feeling jaded and put off – conditions that would ease the post-
referendum transition back to indifference. 
As was mentioned above, voter turnout for the referendum was low (approx. 44 
percent). Croatian political elites did not insist on adhering to a 50 percent +1 rule to 
confirm the results of the referendum. They would have preferred to see a more robust 
turnout because it would have endowed the result with more democratic legitimacy and 
made it appear as if the choice to join Europe was a choice made by citizens rather than 
elites. There was fear that the campaign to breed indifference may produce a low turnout. 
In order to mitigate the risk, elites took action well ahead of the referendum in 2010 to 
change the constitution as not to require a 50 percent turnout threshold to validate 
referendum results. Anticipating waning enthusiasm for EU membership from the public, 
this move sent a clear signal to both European political elites and the Croatian public that 
EU membership was the one and only option for Croatia. 
Moreover, in an op-ed written shortly after the referendum, criticism leveled at 
the government’s handling of the EU campaign is explained as follows: 
If the Croatian government had not in the meantime changed the constitutional 
law on the referendum, the referendum would have failed for lack of voter 
turnout. But the Croatian political elite avoided this ‘trap’ in time, and they can 
now clink glasses over the fruits of their long effort to persuade the people on the 
future of the country… The low turnout, however, does leave a bitter taste, 
indicating as it does that the arguments put forward by the political leaders in 
favour of the EU have been unconvincing and that they have failed to inspire 
citizens to take part in a vote of such historical importance… The Croatian 
government even betrayed that part of the pro-European but democratically-
minded public that denounced the lack of equal treatment for organisations and 
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groups that opposed joining the EU, in terms of financing and media slots to 
present their arguments. Instead of an information campaign, it has been a 
propaganda campaign.183 
 
Indifference breeds a very low level of expectation for what the EU will be able to 
do to improve the quality of life after Croatia’s entry. Citizens receiving subsidies from 
the state fear it will be more difficult for the state to administer domestic programs under 
the new EU framework, which will lead to a decrease in living standards. Furthermore, 
upon its accession, Croatia will instantly be relegated to Europe’s periphery.184 As a 
peripheral EU state, it is likely Croatia could re-assume the ‘problematic,’ ‘Balkan’ 
moniker if it is seen as contributing to a further weakening of the European economy. At 
best, citizens expect that Croatia will simply be forgotten, and they can resume the day-
to-day slog of muddling through.  
In the end, the indifference protects the political elite from punishment at the 
ballot box. Citizens view EU accession as neither the cause nor the remedy for improving 
the standard of life. Even if the process was elite-driven, the outcome is seen as having a 
non-effect. Voters link a political candidate’s support for this policy decision to the 
outcome, yet because the impact of the outcome is seen as negligible, there is little 
motivation for the voter to either reward or punish a candidate for pushing forward the 
EU agenda. Whether or not one can prove that a communication strategy to promote 
indifference was meticulously calculated or a product of a lack of capacity, there is little 
                                                
183 VoxEurop, “A Small ‘Yes’ to Europe,” (January 23, 2012) 
http://www.voxeurop.eu/en/content/press-review/1432971-small-yes-eu.  
184 Francesco Martino, “Croatia, The New, ‘EU-Indifferent’ Member,” Osservatorio 
Balcani e Caucaso (June 24, 2013), http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Regions-and-
countries/Croatia/Croatia-the-new-EU-indifferent-member-137241.  
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doubt that the political elite recognized how a broadly uniformed and indifferent citizenry 
could be applied to their advantage. As a consequence, beyond occasional declaratory 
gestures of forthrightness and transparency, little was done to abate the effects of the 
communication gap in a meaningful way.  
 
Impact of Accession Process on Political Institutions 
 
If public enthusiasm for becoming a part of the European Union has steadily 
declined over the decade-long accession process and a large segment of citizens no 
longer feel its draw, then what, if any, might be the positive outcomes that result from the 
drive to membership? Anecdotally, opinion-makers from civil society, the government, 
and academia describe a noticeable improvement in the quality of political institutions 
and the functioning of democratic procedures. They generally attribute the improvement 
to the process of harmonizing laws and policies to the acquis during the period of 
negotiation.  Using data from Freedom House and Polity IV, we can see that the trends in 
the indices these outfits use to measure democratic quality tend to support this perception. 
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Figure 52 
Freedom Ratings (Croatia)
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(Source: Freedom House, 2013; Scale – 1 to 7 where “1” is most free and “7” is least 
free.)185 
 
The above graph is derived from Freedom House’s most recent “Freedom in the 
World” Country ratings (2013), which track the quality of political and civil rights in a 
given country and how susceptible these rights may be to forms of oppression. Ratings 
range from “1” (most free) to “7” (least free). In addition to a numerical rating, countries 
are assigned a label of “Free”, “Partly Free,” and “Not Free.” The data presented here 
cover the period between 1999-2013. There is a clear downward trend in both political 
rights and civil liberties during this period, which indicates general improvement. The 
most significant drop occurred between 1999-2001, which coincided with the death of 
                                                
185 Freedom House, Freedom in the World, Country Status and Ratings 1973-2013 
(Washington, 2013).  
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Franjo Tudjman and the democratic election of a new regime. Civil liberties have 
remained stable since 2001, while political rights showed further improvement between 
2009 and 2010 (toward the end of the negotiation), achieving the best possible rating of 
1. Croatia was labeled “Partly Free” in 1999, but it was upgraded to “Free” in the 
immediate post-Tudjman era. This regime change event may be the largest contributing 
factor explaining the improved ratings. In the push for EU membership, it can be said that 
further improvement did occur, however, since the ratings were already very good, it 
might be more powerful to describe the accession process as preventing a backslide and 
working to consolidate democratic gains.  
                                                Figure 53 
NIT 2013, Institutional Data (Croatia)
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DS=Democracy Score; C=Corruption; NDEM=National Democratic Governance; 
LDEM=Local Democratic Governance; CS=Civil Society; IM=Independent Media; 
J=Judicial Independence; EP=Electoral Process 
(Source: Freedom House, 2013)186 
                                                
186 Freedom House, Nations in Transit (Washington, 2013). 
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This graph is taken from Freedom House’s 2013 “Nations in Transit” 
Europe/Eurasia study, which monitors the performance of a host of indicators187 of 
democratic institutional health. Again, the scale ranges from 1 (best) to 7 (worst). These 
data cover the period between 2004-2013, which roughly matches the period of 
negotiation and active engagement between Croatia and the EU in the lead-up to 
membership. For the most part, we see declining trends over time, signaling improvement 
in many areas. In the domain of independent media, however, there is an overall increase 
in the rating score, meaning the democratic quality of independent media has worsened in 
this period. The greatest improvement came in the realm of corruption, yet the rating was 
observed to be a “4” in 2013, which is still quite poor. In general, the ratings are moving 
in the direction of quality, but there remains room for more to be done.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
187 DS=Democracy Score; C=Corruption; NDEM=National Democratic Governance; 
LDEM=Local Democratic Governance; CS=Civil Society; IM=Independent Media; 
J=Judicial Independence; EP=Electoral Process 
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Figure 54 
State Fragility Index - Croatia (Polity 
IV)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
 
(Source: Polity IV, 2012)188 
 
This graph shows Polity IV’s State Fragility Index for Croatia during the period 
between 1995-2012. The State Fragility Index measures a state’s capacity to manage 
conflict, make and implement public policy, and deliver essential services. Scores range 
from “0” (no fragility) to “25” (extreme fragility). Again, the general trend is downward 
in the direction of stability. Croatia was moderately fragile in the period following the 
war. It witness two significant drops in fragility, the first came with the post-Tudjman 
regime change, the second came with the country gaining EU candidate status. Having 
registered a score of “2” since 2010, Croatia can be considered to have very low fragility 
and to have made significant improvements during its period of post-conflict transition.   
 
                                                
188 Polity IV Project, State Fragility Index and Matrix (2012), 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/SFImatrix2012c.pdf.  
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Figure 55 
Polity Score - Croatia (Polity IV)
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(Source: Polity IV, 2012)189 
 
This graph shows Polity IV scores for Croatia beginning with its independence in 
1991 and continuing through to 2012. Polity Scores are a generic indicator of patterns of 
authority. Scores range from -10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full democracy). As we can see 
here, Croatia became more authoritarian during the course of the Tudjman years, 
particularly in the post-war period. After his death, we see a drastic shift to democratic 
rule with the change in regime and the improvement continues throughout the 2000s in 
the period where EU membership is a distinct political goal. Score reach their highest 
mark in 2005 (“9”) and remain there through 2012. Similar to the Freedom House ratings, 
one can point to the regime change as having the greatest influence on improvements to 
                                                
189 Polity IV Project, Polity IV Annual Time-Series 1800-2012 (2012), 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2012.pdf.  
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democracy, but the quality has persisted through the negotiation and Croatia continues to 
post nearly the best possible scores in terms of democratic indices.  
When you couple these findings with the anecdotal perceptions of expert opinion 
makers, the gains can be described as real. Since Croatia did pursue EU membership, we 
lack the requisite counterfactual needed to make a conjecture as to the attribution of 
causality, but many argue that political elites would have never made the institutional 
reforms they did without the EU incentive structure and its technical guidance.  Others 
may argue that the gains are superficial, that government lacks the capacity to implement 
the reforms it has made. In other words, these rating represent an assessment of the de 
jure state of affairs, whereas the de facto state of affairs is far more corrupt, ineffective, 
and ruled by a handful of well-connected elites. Either way, however, hardly anyone 
would argue that even despite a strong presence of nationalism, Croatia could revert to 
what it was during the Tudjman years, and it would be practically impossible to witness 
the recreation of a state resembling Yugoslavia. The implication here is that whether or 
not one believes that the above indices accurately reflect some objective measurement of 
the quality of democratic institutions, the notion that Croatians cannot imagine returning 
to previous forms of governance indicates that the democratic reforms pushed forward 
through the accession process have begun to become entrenched, stable practices. This, in 
and of itself, is a positive development. Whether or not one can fully attribute this to the 
role of the EU, it is clear that the negotiation did play some part in the outcome.  
 
Recent Developments 
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Acquittal of Generals Gotovina and Markac 
 
As for Croatia, one source of resistance to EU conditionality policy has been its 
record of compliance with the ICTY. The reasoning behind Croatia’s reluctance has 
much to do with the perception of the meaning of the war’s objectives and its outcomes. 
According to Dejan Jovic, Croatia’s three main post-Yugoslav objectives were: 1) 
international recognition; 2) reintegration of all of its territories; and 3) the establishment 
of a more ethnically homogeneous state.190 In the course of the war, all three objectives 
were achieved. In the mind of many nationalists, this meant that Croatia was the clear 
victor in the wars of the succession. From this perspective, Croatia’s ‘Homeland War’ 
(domovinski rat) was a war fought to protect ethnic Croats from Belgrade-supported 
aggression and to prevent Serbs from establishing a ‘Greater Serbia’ on Croatia’s rightful 
‘homeland.’ Those who fought in the war to protect the homeland are considered valiant 
national heroes. This narrative, however, either selectively omits or is indifferent to the 
realities of Operation Storm, whereby some 150,000-200,000 (the precise number is 
disputed) ethnic Serbs were forcefully displaced from Krajina and made to take refuge in 
western Bosnia-Herzegovina or Serbia. The purpose of the ICTY is to seek justice in 
response to these actions. In so doing, the tribunal demanded trials for the individuals in 
charge of Operation Storm, Generals Ante Gotovina and Mladan Markac. This was met 
with great opposition in the Croatian public because it signified a concerted effort on the 
part of the international community to turn its ‘national heroes’ into ‘war criminals.’  
 
                                                
190 Op. cit. 179, 38. 
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Figure 56 
 
 Image 1: Graffiti on the clock tower in the main square of Premantura, 
Istria reading: “Ante Heroj” (Ante [is a] hero).  
Furthermore, as seen the lens of the war’s outcome, nationalists attached certain 
assumptions to spoils of victory: 
If you […] win a war, you do not heed any ‘conditionality policy’ or any such 
similar advice from the European Union. If you are convinced you were able to 
win a war on your own merits, it is difficult to accept external pressure to reform. 
The increased confidence that came with winning the war was a major stumbling 
block to initial cooperation with the ICTY.191  
 
After his initial indictments in 2001, Gotovina spent four years in hiding. In 2005, 
following an intelligence lead supplied by Croatian officials, he was arrested in the 
Canary Islands by Spanish police and then extradited to The Hague. Markac voluntarily 
surrendered himself to The Hague in 2004. The timing of the arrests coincides closely 
with the opening of accession negotiation with the EU. It is argued here that the 
compliant actions of the Croatian government with respect to the capture of these 
generals represented a quid pro quo for gaining a date to begin the negotiation. The cost 
                                                
191 Ibid., 38-39. 
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of pushing the negotiation down the road is seen as being higher than a blow dealt to 
national pride.  
Nevertheless, the Generals stood trial. In April 2011, Gotovina and Markac were 
found guilty of joint criminal enterprise and sentenced to 24 and 18 years in prison, 
respectively. Croatian attorneys appealed the convictions and on November 16th, 2012, 
the two Generals were acquitted and immediately set free. Reactions to the acquittal put 
into sharp relief the contrasts between Croatian and Serbian political elites’ attitudes 
toward the role of the ICTY in the administration of justice.  
On the day of the ICTY ruled to acquit the Generals, Croatian President Ivo 
Josipovic proclaimed that this: 
[…] legal and just ruling has confirmed what we in Croatia have believed all 
along – that generals Gotovina and Markac are innocent, that the Croatian 
leadership and armed forces did not act as an organized criminal enterprise with 
the aim of expelling civilians, our fellow citizens of Serb ethnicity, that Croatia 
did not commit ethnic cleansing, and that our struggle for freedom was just and 
honourable.192  
 
Josipovic, however, does temper this triumphalism with a call to continue to 
adjudicate the past, and continues: 
It remains our responsibility to take care of all victims of the war and to prosecute 
all individual crimes that were committed during the war, which unfortunately 
were also committed by defense forces. The Croatian state is not responsible for 
crimes committed by individuals, but is responsible for bringing every perpetrator 
to justice regardless of who they are.193  
 
Conversely, on the subject of the recent verdicts, Serbian President Tomislav 
Nikolic commented: 
                                                
192 HINA, “Croatian President Says ICTY’s Acquittal of Generals Legal, Just,” 
(November 16, 2012). 
193 Ibid. 
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 […]the ICTY passed a political instead of a legal ruling. […] The people of 
Serbia were a victim of genocide and gravest crimes, pogroms and torture in the 
recent history and Serbs were labeled as criminals who should keep quiet and be 
ashamed. […] this is a paradox which must never be allowed to happen again.194  
 
Furthermore, in response to these verdicts, Serbia has chosen to reduce 
cooperation with ICTY to the technical level. Granted, most of the major work of the 
ICTY has already been completed, but, high profile decisions remain to be made in the 
trails of Bosnian Serbs Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic for their involvement in the 
Srebrenica massacre, and Goran Hadzic for war crimes committed against Croats and 
non-Serbs in Eastern Croatia. Serbia’s reduced cooperation sends clear message of 
dissatisfaction to the EU. The perceived partially of the Tribunal undermines Serbia’s 
confidence in the EU to act as a legitimate broker of post-conflict reconciliation. 
Although Serbia has retracted for now, going forward, it is likely that the already strained 
dialogue between the two entities will be colored by a deeper sense of mistrust as a result 
of these rulings.  
The statements presented, of course, do not represent the full spectrum of 
discourse as regards the acquittals. There are stripes of differentiation in between such as 
the messages emanating from civil society and Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) such as Documenta, which urge leaders to continue to prosecute war crimes. 
These are important voices, however, the magnitude of their discursive power is arguably 
less than that of the aforementioned political leaders and the Tribunal.  Embedded within 
the political elite is a unique agency to generate or produce “truth” in the public mind. 
                                                
194 Tanjug, “Serbian President Sees Acquittal of Generals as Politically Motivated,” 
(November 16, 2012).  
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Should it be in the strategic interest of political leaders to recast the narratives of the past 
in stark terms – ‘winners’ vs. ‘losers’, ‘victims’ vs. ‘perpetrators’, or ‘heroes’ vs. 
‘criminals’ – as opposed to shades of gray, the climate is ripe for the messages to be 
internalized and held to be true. Citizens will believe what is convenient to believe and 
the actions of the Tribunal make it easier to separate collective memories of the War and 
the justice/injustice of the peace into categories of acceptability. Whether it is framed as 
an exoneration of Croatian guilt or the West’s persistent indictment of Serbian 
culpability, these are messages that have wide resonance in the Serbian and Croatian 
public consciousness. In the jubilation following the acquittals, many Croatians quickly 
forgot the initial pain of handing the Generals over to The Hague. What is likely to be 
lost in the messaging is the role of the EU and how it has served to reify these versions of 
historical ‘truth’ through its conditionality policy.  
 
Bilingualism in Vukovar 
 
Another example of how, despite meeting all the conditions of EU membership 
including all the provisions to safeguard minority rights, ethnic divisions and the 
animosities of war continue to remain powerfully salient to this day, one can point to 
citizens’ reaction to the introduction of bilingualism in the town of Vukovar in eastern 
Croatia. The town of Vukovar witnessed some of the fiercest fighting in the early stages 
of the war of succession. The town is inhabited by a significant minority of ethnic Serbs 
(approx. 32 percent in 1990 and 34 percent today). In 1991, the JNA and groups of non-
regular Serbian paramilitary fought the highly out-gunned Croatian National Guard to 
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claim the town, which became part of the self-declared Republic of Serbian Krajina. The 
battle fully destroyed the town, and when the Croatian National Guard ceded the town, 
tens of thousands of Croats where ethnically cleansed by Serb troops through expulsion 
or targeted killing. The town remained in Serb hands until it was peacefully reintegrated 
as part of Croatian territory in 1998.    
For many Croatians, Vukovar remains a symbol of suffering in the ‘Homeland 
War’ and the foremost example of Serbian aggression toward ethnic Croats. It continues 
to be a flashpoint. In 2013 town officials introduced legislation that would allow for 
signage on public buildings to be displaying in both the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets. For 
months, nationalist-leaning members of the HDZ tried, but failed, to block this from 
happening. On September 2, 2013, riots broke out in the town after the first dual-alphabet 
sign was posted on the town’s Social Welfare Center.195 The issue had been closely 
monitor by the media and support for unilingualism in the town was pervasive around the 
country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
195 HINA, “Mayor Says Croatian Democratic Union Behind Rioting in Eastern Town,” 
(September 3, 2013).  
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                                                                 Figure 57 
 
Image 2: Graffiti in a Zagreb ally stating: “Vukovar is not Vukovar [in 
Cyrillic].” 
Political leadership, including President Josipovic, has urged citizens to respect the law 
and not protest bilingual signs, framing the issue not as a symbol of Serbian war crimes, 
but as an opportunity to display an acceptance of multiculturalism – a hallmark of a 
mature “EU-ready” democracy.   
 
Elite Survey 
 
The backbone of this entire research effort was a series of semi-structured 
interviews conducted during two extended visits to the region. In all, over 50 individuals 
participated in focused discussions on the topic of their country’s EU integration story. 
The subjects were chosen in order to construct a representation of expert opinion. Study 
participants were a diverse group of government officials, civil society leaders, 
academics, public intellectuals, and journalists. Individuals were recruited by referral. 
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Approximately half of the interviews were devoted to Croatia, the other half to 
Serbia/Kosovo.  
Interviews were conducted in Zagreb, Belgrade, Kosovska Mitrovica, Pristina, 
and Brussels between 2012 and 2014. Meetings took place either at cafes or at the 
participant’s place of business. Participants understood that the contents of our discussion 
could be included in this dissertation, but that their identities would remain protected. 
Discussions were typically between 45 to 90 minutes in length, although some lasted as 
long as 3 hours or were as brief as 30 minutes. Interviews involved a set of core questions 
(see Appendix A), which were augmented by a variety of follow-up questions appropriate 
to the direction the discussion took. Each interview was unique in its own way, but 
included a common set of themes dictated by the core set of questions. While the primary 
take-away from the interview set was a deep well of background information, when 
aggregated, one can also describe certain trends that are interesting for this study. Below 
is a summary of some of those findings as well as some particularly poignant quotations 
that illustrate important aspects of the integration process.  
                                                             Figure 58 
What is EU integration about? - Croatia
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These questions were posed to the 26 participants from Croatia. The question of 
what is integration about was asked in order for respondent to outline what they believe 
132 
 
are the main goals, principles, and objectives of EU integration and to identify pros and 
cons. The answers were diverse, but could easily be grouped according to the three broad 
previously established rubrics of politics, economy, and identity. The term (p) denotes a 
reason that is of primary importance; (s) denotes secondary importance. This helps 
account for more complexity. Respondents were not prompted to define this hierarchy. In 
most cases, it occurred naturally when a participant might say: “a and b are important, 
but what is really going on here is c.”  
What we find is that survey takers’ most common response was that EU 
integration is about politics. This is true for both the primary and secondary 
classifications. Integration was thought of as a way for Croatia to develop a set of 
democratic norms – free and fair elections, rule of law, battling corruption, and an 
independent judiciary. Most supporters of this position added that these reforms needed 
to happen regardless of whether or not Croatia joins the EU. They are international 
norms, which citizens believe to be legitimate. Other supporters stated that membership 
in the EU would give Croatia representation and a seat at the table in European 
institutions. This was important, but was typically qualified by a statement of Croatia’s 
“small size” and how it could not make a large impact on the European level.  
The notion of the economy being the primary driver of integration represented the 
second largest group of responses. It was, however, much more frequently identified as 
being of secondary importance.  Participants described how EU integration would 
provide access to markets and the possibility of foreign investment. Some were 
enthusiastic about free markets, while others worried about a slow erosion of the social 
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welfare system. Signs from the EU economy from 2008 forward did not help allay these 
concerns or build confidence that integrating would lead to more prosperity. Generally, 
people felt that things could not get much worse than they already were. Croatia was 
already encircled by EU economies and joining them was probably better than competing 
with them. 
The last category, identity, was highlighted the least, yet it was described more 
often as a primary reason for integration than reasons of economy. Furthermore, it was 
generally the most emphatically stated position. For those indicating this response, the 
EU is about a status. It is about joining a club of advanced democracies and being 
recognized as in league with the countries of western Europe. On one hand it is about 
belonging to that group, but on the other hand, joining the west is about separating itself 
from its recent past. It is about differentiating itself from the “Balkans” and the associated 
stigma. The case of Slovenia was commonly referred to as proof that this could happen. 
Once a part of warring/backward Yugoslavia, after its independence and joining the EU, 
it was deemed a “success story” and it was quickly forgotten that it was ever a part of 
Yugoslavia or associated in any way with the Balkans. Croatians expect the same fate. 
Survey takers were also quick to point out that this viewpoint was a little more “nuanced” 
or “controversial” than others. Thus, people were less likely to talk about it, especially 
political elites. They are supposed to stick to the acceptable scripts about democracy and 
free markets. In essence, this interpretation was expressed as ‘what nobody will say, but 
everyone is thinking.’  
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Figure 59 
Your personal EU attitude? - Croatia
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As experts, the interviewees possessed great knowledge of the Croatian political 
landscape and the EU integration experience. Normally, the preceding question of what 
the EU is about was answered from an analytical standpoint where participants sought to 
distance themselves from their personal opinions. With the exception of one or two 
respondent who had nothing but praise from the EU, most interviewees expressed harsh 
criticisms of the EU process in addition to points of support. Despite the preponderance 
of negativity toward the EU in their statements, the majority of interviewees held the 
personal opinion that the EU would do more good than bad. They tended to think that it 
would probably yield desirable outcomes like a healthier democracy even if the EU was 
going about it the wrong way. They also tended to think that being on the inside was 
better than being on the outside. Conditionality measures may have been harsh or the 
process was unprecedented it its length, but being a member was preferable to not being a 
member. Those who expressed the view that the EU would do more harm than good often 
self-identified as being part of an old socialist guard. They did not advocate for a 
reconstitution of Yugoslavia or the Tito regime, but philosophically socialism was 
preferable to capitalism. In their estimation, the EU represents principles and a movement 
that is dangerous for and antithetical to socialist values.  
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                                                                   Figure 60 
How does government talk about EU? - 
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The question of how government talks about the EU showed that a majority of 
respondents described the government as not talking about it at all while a strong 
minority indicated that government talks about the EU in unequivocally positive terms. 
Those who thought the government does not talk about it were frustrated that something 
that would affect them was happening behind closed doors and without the input of 
citizens. They added that it was ironic that something that was intended to bolster 
democracy was happening with such utter lack of transparency, controlled a small group 
of elites. Those who indicated that the government talks about it positively did not 
commend the political class for this form of communication. Instead, they saw it 
representing either “happy talk” or general incompetence. This is to say that political 
elites were so grossly unaware of how the accession process works or how to implement 
the reforms required by Brussels that they defaulted to empty rhetoric or a predefined 
script depicting the generic merits of EU membership.  
This type of communication was thought of as unhelpful. Citizens wanted to 
know what the true impacts of the reforms would be. Farmers wanted to know if they 
would have to adhere to new regulations or if they might receive EU subsidies. Food 
producers might want to know what labeling requirements would allow them to sell their 
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goods on the EU market. These types of questions were going unaddressed and it was 
leading to frustration.  
Some respondents found the governments empty rhetoric insulting while others 
believed that the citizenry was generally uneducated or uninformed. Some expressed that 
nobody talks about or cares about the EU anyway, it is just something politicians say to 
get elected – politics is an empty game, empty rhetoric is how it is played. Those who 
were insulted by the government’s communication strategy tended to be educated, city-
dwelling, prosperous types. The second class of people, as described by the first, tended 
to be rural, uneducated, and poor.  
                                                       Figure 61 
Public opinion of EU? - Croatia
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Participants were also asked to gauge how they interpreted public opinion, not 
just what the polls say, but also what they hear and experience from the people they come 
across in their daily lives. As we can see, half the respondents characterized public 
opinion as getting worse over time while nobody interpreted it as getting better. A less 
significant portion of individuals felt it was either patently positive or negative. These 
results are consistent with the official opinion polling results described earlier. In general, 
public opinion in support of EU integration waned as Croatia drew nearer to accession.    
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Figure 62 
European identity? - Croatia
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The question of what European identity was often the most difficult for 
respondents to address. The concept was generally considered rather nebulous. Some 
people did have attachment to this idea. The few that did had extensive experience living 
abroad or working as part of a European institution in Brussels. Those who indicated that 
it means a little did not believe that to be the case for themselves. This is to say that the 
concept was something they have heard of, but the described that it probably only means 
something for people in northern European (like Scandinavia or the Netherlands) or 
academics who want it to be something so that they can study it. Respondents generally 
cautioned against supranational identity-building projects, saying that it did not work for 
Yugoslavia and it would not work for Europe either.  
For select quotes from the interviews see Appendix B. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Croatia entered the European Union on July 1, 2013 after a long and arduous 
journey. After the death of Franjo Tudjman, the successive regimes built a firm pro-EU 
platform with eventual membership being the ultimate foreign policy objective. The 
policy had high public support in the early stages, but then began to drop as time went on 
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due to a combination of a changing rule structure, political and economic crises in the 
EU, bilateral vetoes, resistance to additional conditions (ICTY compliance), and a 
protracted negotiation. As support declined, it was not transformed into opposition, 
rather, it turned into indifference and apathy. For the most part, political elites did not see 
the need to change their messaging. The political, economic, and identity 
bearing/associational discursive frames served to sufficiently paint a legitimizing picture 
of its plan to push forward the integration agenda. Although there was an expressed 
policy to enhance communication, communication policy functioned to occasionally 
report information on EU progress or reinforce pro-EU messaging. Responding to citizen 
feedback or engaging debates regarding concerns raised through counter-narrative 
arguments did not figure into the government’s communication strategy. 
Given the establishment of pro-EU consensus early on in the accession journey, 
political elites did not necessarily need to instrumentalize narrative discourse in order to 
gain favor for measures that would lead to radical institutional change. One notable 
exception, however, is that elites did try to package the meaning of European Union 
membership in a way that is satisfying with respect to the identity-bearing associational 
sensibilities of nationalist leaning parties. Surprisingly, this effort has seemed to achieve 
the desired effect. Although the typical argument from nationalist groups is that the EU is 
sovereignty-threatening, in the case of Croatia, EU accession is framed as sovereignty-
confirming. In addition to joining NATO, European Union membership positions Croatia 
to be among a group of like-minded allies that will safeguard its national interests if they 
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come under threat. This aids Croatia to act as a well-functioning and independent state.196 
Moreover, declarations of independence can appear as symbolic in nature even if they are 
supported by international recognition. If there was any doubt as to the legitimacy of 
Croatia’s independent statehood, the process of being vetted by and accepted as a 
member of the EU is thought to be the final word on the matter. The EU’s endorsement 
vindicates the war effort. It firmly plants in the minds of nationalists the idea that the 
conflict was a rightful war of independence, soldiers nobly defended their homeland, and 
the outcome was not only the desired one, but more importantly, it was just. Political 
elites cleverly manipulated the logic of the nationalist narrative by inserting the EU as the 
definitive arbiter of national sovereignty in order for this population to arrive at the 
conclusion above. They may have been too marginal a force to fully derail the integration 
efforts of the elite, yet the elite saw the benefit of utilizing the EU to recast nationalist 
discourse in a way that significantly disarmed the elite’s greatest opposition.  
With the opposition in check and the majority of the population languishing in 
indifference, elites could quite easily march forward toward Croatia’s eventual EU 
membership. The harmonization of laws with the acquis has produced observable 
improvement in the quality of democratic political institutions. While this can be 
construed as a positive development, political elites will be quick to point to this as 
further justification that the accession process was best left in their hands and that citizens 
should blindly trust that EU membership is the best option for Croatia, a fact they will 
soon realize as they ‘learn through experience’ all the benefits membership entails.   
                                                
196 Op. cit. 179, 40. 
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Despite facing some unique factors – post-conflict, Copenhagen-plus, post-big 
bang, post-Constitutional crisis, post-Eurozone - in the end, Croatia’s candidacy was 
quite typical. It was an elite-driven process with a pre-destined outcome. The EU may 
have passively levered Croatia into its gravitational field, yet as it was considered the 
‘only game in town,’ no viable oppositional force could hinder momentum in the EU 
direction. The sense of inevitability tempered citizen’s ambivalence toward the EU. With 
a growing democratic deficit, a historical orientation toward Europe, a flagging economy, 
and distrust of corrupt political leaders, Croatia fits right in with the current realities of 
‘Europe’ and should feel naturally at home. Although this is not the ideal place to be, it is 
deemed significantly preferable to being ‘Balkan.’ The ‘belonging’ or ‘return’ narrative 
about what the EU means is most potently employed as a cloak for the underlying desire 
to ‘escape’ the Balkans at any cost. The power that motivates and best explains political 
behavior is found in this idea. The pro-EU consensus can thus be read as an anti-‘Balkan’ 
consensus, which is why, given the challenges Croatia faced on the route to the EU, there 
was just enough public support to confirm membership through the referendum and 
finalize the escape.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDY #2 – SERBIA/KOSOVO 
 
 
Chapter Synopsis 
 
This chapter will present an in-depth case study of Serbia’s process of EU 
accession. Again using Vachudova’s framework, contrary to the Croatian case, the 
operative form of leverage in Serbia’s accession is active leverage. The formal 
conditioning of the process as it relates to the Kosovo issue explains the speed of 
progress in that it creates a viable nationalist opposition to the integrationist agenda. The 
existence of the nationalist opposition brings the use of discourse into play. Nevertheless, 
political consensus has reigned since 2008 and nationalist groups that use anti-EU 
messages are becoming increasingly marginal. Instead, two separate hegemonic ideas 
reign – join the EU and keep Kosovo. These ideas are not expressed as being in 
competition with one another. Similar to Croatia, political elites do a very poor job of 
communicating its EU-related activity to the public, and yet the possibility that 
harmonization with the acquis will build durable democratic institutions is quite strong. 
The further Serbia progresses down the road toward the EU, the more the issue of 
determining Kosovo’s status will press on the minds of political leaders. As the Belgrade-
Pristina dialogue continues, the EU will have the opportunity to serve as a mediator of 
peace and reconciliation and facilitate resolution to this frozen conflict. Thus far, the 
carrot of membership has worked as an incentive to find diplomatic solutions and 
compromise. This may change as the EU continues to evolve and if the EU forces the two 
parties to determine a status settlement, which will push Serbia finally attaining 
membership to an unknown date, well in the future. Although the EU has helped forge 
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historic agreements, one could contest that it has unlimited power to actively lever Serbia 
to induce reform. Moreover, willingness to agree to reconciliation plans in order to 
progress on the EU path might be indication that the realities of material life in 
Serbia/Kosovo are so dire that they are willing to reform at any cost, even if doing so 
could lead to the loss of an important source of national identification.  
 
History of Accession Process 
 
Serbia signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in 
2008, along with an Interim Agreement that specifically targets trade-related aspects of 
the SAA. On December 22, 2009 Serbia presented its application for membership to the 
EU. Since President Boris Tadic’s Democratic Party (DS) took control of the government 
in parliament in 2008, Serbia has been taking a more aggressive stance in terms of its 
support for integration reform. In general, it is in line with the political and economic 
criteria set forth by the EU, and it is in a favorable position to adapt its policy structure to 
align with the acquis (Commission Opinion, 2011). The major obstacles that have stunted 
progress toward membership up until this point, have been reigning in corruption and 
organized crime, compliance with the ICTY, and the dispute over recognition of Kosovo 
as an independent state. Recently, however, Serbia has instituted a legal framework to 
combat corruption and organized crime. In 2011, it handed accused war criminals Ratko 
Mladic and Goran Hadzic over to the Hague (Commission Opinion). In February 2012, 
Belgrade made progress in its dialogue with Pristina, agreeing to a plan for integrated 
border management and a footnote to UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which states 
that the status of Kosovo as an independent state will not be prejudged as regional talks 
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move forward.197 These agreements were instrumental in securing EU candidacy for 
Serbia, which the European Council decided to grant Serbia on March 2, 2012.  
As for the larger implications of membership, Ristic argues that, despite the 
inherent difficulties of reform and the past, it is only through a mutual commitment on 
the part of Serbia and the EU that lasting peace and cooperation in this region can be 
achieved.198 Conversely, by directly confronting the dispute over the territorial 
sovereignty of Kosovo within the framework of EU accession negotiations, historical 
animosities could reignite division and conflict, as evidence by a recent referendum 
conducted by Serbs in North Kosovo declaring they do not recognize the official 
institutions of Kosovo. (The referendum was deemed illegal, null and void by both 
Belgrade and Pristina) 
Furthermore, progress on the EU path was feared as being potentially halted after 
the May 2012 election of Tomislav Nikolic, a former member of the Serbian Radical 
Party. The type of rhetoric that gives cause for fear to proponents of Serbia’s EU 
integration is demonstrated below. 
Nikolic speaking on behalf of the Radical Party on the occasion of Milosovic’s 
death: 
The Serbian Radicals are noting that the Hague Tribunal has killed Slobodan 
Milosevic with the assistance of domestic traitors, and added that the Office of the 
Prosecutor and Hague Tribunal's bogus judges are the most responsible for his 
death. After Milosevic's murder, nothing will be the same again in Serbia, and the 
party would no longer allow the harassment of families and all Serbian patriots 
carried out so far by Boris Tadic and Vuk Draskovic and leaders of the Serbian 
government and the occupier media offices in our country.199 
 
                                                
197 Tanjug, “Serbia Safe on the Path to Europe, National Interests Preserved,” (February 
25, 2012)  
198 Irena Ristic, “Serbia’s EU Integration Process: The Momentum of 2008,” 
Panoeconomicus no. 1 (2009): 121. 
199 Tanjug, “ICTY to Be Blamed for Milosevic Death, Nikolic,” (March 11, 2006).  
144 
 
From the outset he has stated a commitment to EU integration, despite being seen as 
having strong nationalist leanings. In the early part of his administration, he effectively 
isolated himself from interaction with other regional leaders after recent media statements 
in which he described Vukovar as a Serb city (i.e. not for Croats), and denied that the 
Srebrenica massacre was genocide. Additionally, outgoing president Boris Tadic’s pro-
EU Democratic Party was unable to form a majority coalition in government, threatening 
prospects for his EU-oriented reform measures to continue to take root. 
Nikolic, along with his Prime Minsiter Ivica Dacic (another former member of the 
Serbian Radical Party), have maintained their commitment to pursuing the integration 
agenda. Most notably, they have been constantly engaged in the ongoing Belgrade-
Pristina dialogue to normalize relations between the two territories. The thrust of the 
integration conversation now revolves around the outcome of these talks, which will be 
discussed at length in foregoing passages. First, however, it is important to frame the 
debate with some background on the Kosovo status issue and what is at stake for Serbia, 
Kosovo, and the EU.  
 
Kosovo Status  
 
Indeed, solving the final status question will be required if Kosovo is to join the 
European Union eventually. In the meantime, however, status question has not held the 
accession process hostage as much as one might expect. The real issue for Kosovo is that 
it must work to improve its weak institutions of governance if it is come anywhere close 
to meeting European standards.200 This is commonly referred to as the ‘standards before 
                                                
200 James Ker-Lindsay and Spyros Economides, “Standards Before Status Before 
Accession: Kosovo’s EU Perspective,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies vol. 
14, no. 1 (2012): 77-78. 
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status’ approach. Investing in the development of political and economic institutions is 
seen as a more fruitful use of scarce resources than prioritizing the allocation of such 
resources toward efforts to reach a status solution.  
One can extend this thought and apply it to a question of what the EU’s role in 
Kosovo should be. Should the EU assume a more technical or political role? Although 
the EU is a key actor in the Western Balkan region, the fact that five of its members 
(Spain, Slovakia, Greece, Romania and Cyprus) do not recognize Kosovo undermines its 
abilities to navigate this delicate political situation. Using the carrot of membership to 
induce reform or bring parties close to a settlement is an approach that does not have any 
teeth since any one of the five non-recognizing countries could veto a possible accession 
treaty, thus the EU is much better suited to playing a technocratic role in Kosovo.201 This 
reinforces the ‘standards before status’ approach to the Kosovo question. Although, to 
assume that the nature of what the EU does is only political or technical or that it could 
choose to apply its efforts in an exclusively technical or political way would be 
underestimating the degree to which these two missions are interwoven.  
The technocratic challenges are not small either. The EU has already deployed 
EULEX (the European Union Rule of Law Mission) in Kosovo to police and strengthen 
the rule of law. The real test for the EU and EULEX will be in its ability to combat 
organized crime, rampant drug trafficking, and corruption. In order for these fundamental 
institutions to be forged, it will take a level of political will on the part of those Kosovars 
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Security and Human Rights no. 1 (2011): 34. 
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who wish to work with the international community together as opposed to the state 
falling prey to those Kosovars who will line their pockets with international aid money.202  
Again, with respect to efficacy of EULEX mission, one invokes the ‘standards 
before status’ debate and witnesses the manner in which its political and technical 
objectives are interlaced. The ambiguity of deploying a ‘status neutral’ actor sends an 
unclear message to both ethnically polarized communities as to what is has been sent 
there to achieve. The ‘status-neutral’ ambiguity of EULEX’s presence does not quiet the 
existential discourse of status, but rather awakens it, thus compromising the EULEX’s 
ability to fulfill its technocratic objectives.203 Nowhere is this more visible than in North 
Mitrovica, when EULEX is viewed as having been sent from Brussels to impose 
Kosovo’s independence, forcing Serbs to accept being ruled from Pristina.  
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                                                                  Figure 63 
 
   Figure 64 
 
(Top: graffiti on a building in N. Mitrovica; Bottom: bridge spanning the Ibar River in 
Mitrovica that connects the Serb and Albanian sides of the city.)204  
 
Is the Kosovo situation completely intractable? The future of Kosovo could 
unfold on along the lines of the four following scenarios: 1. A continuation of the status 
quo (divided, internationally maintained, with contested legitimacy); 2. Full 
independence within the current boundaries; 3. A partition (severing the Serb-majority 
                                                
204 The bridge was barricaded by dirt and boulders from the northern (Serbian) side in 
order to keep out EULEX/KFOR tanks, armored vehicles, and personnel carriers. In June 
2014, the barricade was removed. It was replaced by a series of conifers and other plants 
in large concrete pots. The bridge remains impassible. Kosovar Serbs ironically refer to 
this new installation as the “Peace Park.” 
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part of northern Kosovo and incorporating it into Serbia) 4. A well-developed and deeper 
level of autonomy for the Serb-majority areas of Kosovo.205  
The first scenario is unsatisfactory for both Serbia and Kosovar Albanians, and it 
is unacceptable should either side desire to advance toward EU membership. 
Furthermore, it places an onus upon the broader international community to act on behalf 
of Kosovar citizen and work to a resolution. While one reading of the Kosovo War would 
cite the conflict as being driven primarily by ethno-nationalist hatreds, others read it as a 
first test of the newly established post-Cold War international power structure and a 
proxy struggle between the US and Russia for dominance. The US, consolidating its 
hegemony, felt the need to set an example and exercise its normative power to protect the 
Albania population from Milosevic’s expulsions. Russia, on the other hand, seeing its 
position in the world wane vis-à-vis the US and NATO, sought to assert itself through 
multilateral institutions, particularly the UN Security council. Although it did not 
necessarily agree with Milosevic’s methods, Russia defended Serbia’s right to protect 
what it viewed as a fundamental international legal norm – respect for territorial 
sovereignty. In essence, it is argued that Kosovo’s final status has fallen victim to a 
geopolitical jockeying for power between former Cold War rivals and will remain 
unresolved so long as it persists.206 The status quo is also preserved by competing forces 
in the international community because a final status settlement will reflect what were the 
purposes and, ultimately, what was the meaning of international involvement in the 
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Kosovo War. Answers to these questions will shape the future of international order and 
relations among states. If independence is upheld, then Kosovo sets an importance 
precedent in the use of self-determination, and the international community can point to it 
as a key example of its ‘responsibility to protect’ when considering future humanitarian 
interventions.207 Certainly, states with significant separatist pressures strenuously oppose 
this conclusion. 
The second scenario is a reflection of the Ahtisaari Plan in that it envisioned a 
supervised independence for Kosovo whereby the Serbs-majority area would have some 
decentralized powers, but they would still be under the full authority of Pristina. The 
Ahtisaari Plan was supported by the West, but was not endorsed by the UN Security 
Council. Any steps to implement the Ahtisaari Plan are met with significant resistance in 
Belgrade.  
The third scenario, a partition, while it may be seen as an ‘easy way out’ (i.e. if 
northern Kosovo insists it wants to remain part of Serbia, why can’t it?) and is even 
passively supported by current Prime Minister of Serbia, Ivica Dacic. This solution is 
problematic in several ways. The primary reason being that this solution is one that flies 
in the face of the moral consensus of post-conflict state-building in former Yugoslavia – 
that is, the notion that theses states must strive for multi-ethnic pluralism. A partition fails 
to promote reconciliation, as it would be along ethnic lines. Partition likewise serves to 
crystallize the ambitions of those who perpetrated the war with designs of ethnic 
cleansing. Additionally, a partition only helps Serbs in the north. Serbs who live in 
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communities south of the Ibar River, areas that are non-contiguous with central Serbia 
would remain surrounded by Kosovo Albanian lands. In this case, Serbs south of the Ibar 
River would either live with a perpetual sense of fear or they would have to choose 
whether or not to migrate to the north, leaving behind their homeland and, in essence, 
finalizing the cleansing. Further complicating the matter is the issue of what to do with 
the Presevo Valley, the Albanian-majority enclave in Southern Serbia. Citizens in the 
municipalities of the Presevo Valley demand to be incorporated into Kosovo if the Serb-
majority enclave of Northern Kosovo becomes a part of Serbia. This territorial swap is 
intended to ensure that the ‘final distribution’ of ethnic groups to their desired lands is 
right and proper, meaning separate and ‘clean.’  
The final scenario, deeper autonomy for Serb enclaves, is the most popular 
solution and seems to be the solution that is being most aggressively pursued by the 
international community, particularly through EU mediation. The implications of this 
strategy will be discussed in the proceeding sections and again toward the end of the 
chapter when we examine recent developments that pertain to local elections in Kosovo.  
 
Belgrade-Pristina: Normalization of Relations? 
 
For Serbia, solving the issue of the final status of Kosovo has become a de facto 
condition to continue along the path to European membership. This has not been 
formalized, and savvy bureaucrats in Brussels tip-toe around the use of the term 
‘condition’ as not to endanger the fragile process of normalizing relations between 
Belgrade and Pristina. Yet, it is fully understood that the European destiny of both sides 
hinges on this very issue more than anything else.  
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When framed by the logic of rational-choice institutionalism (‘consequence’), the 
material benefits of access to the single-market would significantly outweigh the benefits 
that Serbia could salvage by retaining her ‘southern province.’ Despite possessing modest 
mineral reserves that could be available for future exploitation, Kosovo remains one of 
the poorest and most underdeveloped parts of Europe. Moreover, it would be outlandish 
to suggest that Serbia’s reticence to recognize Kosovo’s independence is based simply on 
mining interests. So, why then is there so much fervor behind the popular Serbian 
political slogan: Kosovo je Srbija (Kosovo is Serbia)?  
This is a well-known story, of course. It is practically impossible to find a piece of 
writing about Serbia and Kosovo that does not make reference to the 1389 Battle of 
Kosovo Polje (this work is no different), where Serbs fought gallantly, but ultimately 
unsuccessfully, to fend off the Ottoman advance. As a consolation, however, in the 
course of the battle, a Serbian nobleman named Milos Obilic pretending to desert to the 
Ottoman side, infiltrated their ranks and killed the Ottoman Sultan Murad and died 
himself. In the historical imagination of Serbs, this event is critical for understanding 
national identity formation, as it represents an idealized image of Serbian bravery, 
courage, and sacrifice.208 In addition to this event, several important Serbian orthodox 
monasteries including Gracanica, established in 1321 and dedicated to the Holy Virgin, 
are located in present-day Kosovo. This is a collapsed and incomplete version of the 
story. The intention here is not to oversimplify the origins of national identity, but what is 
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vital to take away is that within Kosovo there reside cultural, historical, and spiritual 
artifacts of the highest order that constitute ontological meaning for Serbs; or, at least, 
there are artifacts with ontological meaning that political elites can use as currency to 
exploit. A narrative of this would then imply that to part with these artifacts is to part 
with a collective sense of ‘self.’ Whether you believe that the narrative is authentic or 
manufactured, the affective attachment to these constitutive elements of Serbian 
collective identity in concert with the aspirations of self-determination of the government 
of Kosovo animate the political dialogue between the two entities. In the language of 
rational-choice, compromise represents an unbearable cost for both sides – Serbia is not 
Serbia without Kosovo; Kosovo is not Kosovo until Serbia lets her go. The costs in this 
calculation, however, are ideational, not material. This makes it extremely difficult for 
the European Union to exact leverage upon either side using material inducements to 
foster resolution and reconciliation. Nevertheless, from time to time, small strides of 
incremental progress are made through facilitated dialogue.  
What are the discursive expressions of what has just been described and how 
might they relate to European integration? Tomislav Nikolic, newly elected president of 
Serbia and former member of the Serbian Radical Party, who now professes to a pro-EU 
position, said the following: 
Serbia cannot develop good-neighborly relations with part of its own territory. 
The Albanians will govern Kosovo and Metohija, they will have local self-
government, as well as all government institutions, but they should not expect 
anyone here to agree to that and say: Ok, you can also have your own state. […] If 
they set a formal condition: Europe or Kosovo -- we will abandon our path to 
Europe. I said this in the election campaign and the people of my country would 
not be surprised if I proposed it. We have reached such a level of social and state 
organization that we can count on (joining) the EU. They are now keeping us at a 
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distance only because of Kosovo and Metohija. But, they can keep us like that for 
another 100 years; we will not change our view about our southern province. If 
they start to add new rules that did not apply to other countries, then they may as 
well cast us away. In such a case it is better if they tell us: we do not want you.209  
 
Nikolic’s Prime Minister, Ivica Dacic, who met with Kosovo’s Prime Minister 
Hashim Thaci on November 7, 2012 in Brussels as a first step in the dialogue process 
recently had this to say: 
We believe that we have fulfilled the political criteria cited in last December's 
European Council conclusions on Serbia, namely, the 'normalization of relations 
with Pristina' and therefore, we deserve to get a start date for negotiations. 
[…]The process of dialogue has started, moving away from the standstill which 
was to the detriment of Serbia. But the problems should be solved, and we have 
shown a willingness to do it. We believe that the time has come to move forward 
in European integration. […] I believe that Kosovo Albanians will then begin to 
perceive a different potential cooperation with Belgrade and, in time, will show 
willingness for the historic compromise between two nations.210  
 
On the eve of the ICTY’s acquittal of former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
commander and former Prime Minister of Kosovo, Ramush Haradinaj, accused of war 
crimes, one of Nikolic’s presidential advisor’s said this: 
If they let Haradinaj go, it is clear that the negotiations will be jeopardized. Such a 
verdict would put wind in the sails of the Albanian side. The Albanians are 
backed by the strongest western country who also have the most influence on the 
Hague Tribunal. The release of Haradinaj would take us further away from 
reconciliation, and that is probably somebody's goal. Often people do the 
opposition of what they proclaim publicly. Reconciliation does not suit some 
foreign powers; what they want is constant tension since then they have the 
greatest influence.211  
 
Reacting to the verdict of Haradinaj’s acquittal, Kosovo’s Prime Minister released 
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the following statements: 
[I] welcome the decision of the Hague Tribunal to acquit the freedom fighters and 
consider it to be a just decision. This decision is the strongest proof that the 
Kosova Liberation Army has fought a just war for freedom and has not committed 
crimes of which it we have been unjustly accused. […] [I] congratulate all Kosova 
citizens on this much awaited victory and call on the citizens to celebrate this 
moment with dignity and pride. [I] reiterate that our war for freedom and 
independence was just and sacred. This has been confirmed by the Hague 
Tribunal today.212  
 
This is just a small sample of typical statements. We can use discourse analytic 
tools to explain implicit and explicit assumptions within these statements and how the 
statements might manifest themselves in observable action.  
From the Serbian side, the world that the political elite would like to create is one 
in which the Serbs are being punished by powerful Western nations for their role in the 
break-up of Yugoslavia. The West casts them as the aggressors and pressures them to 
hand their war criminals over to the Hague and concede Kosovo’s independence even 
though the Serbs claim that the Kosovo war was fought merely to protect the Kosovar 
Serb minority from KLA ‘terrorism.’ Accordingly, the perception that the West has 
labeled the Serbs as the aggressors in these wars gets re-framed by the political elite as 
the West ignoring history and using its power to write a history whereby they get to 
choose the winners and losers. Even critics from the West have lent some credence to this 
narrative insofar as they indict the Western media for selecting ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’ 
victims in accordance with ally structure and geo-politico-ideological positioning. 
Herman and Chomsky write: 
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Although the facts in the Racak killings, which occurred in the course of fighting 
between the Serbian military and Kosovo Liberation Army insurgents within 
Yugoslavia, were and remain in dispute […] the deaths were immediately 
denounced and featured by U.S. and NATO officials as an intolerable ‘massacre.’ 
The U.S. mainstream media did the same and gave the reported massacre heavy 
and uncritical attention. This helped create the moral basis for the NATO 
bombing of Yugoslavia that began on March 24, 1999.213 
 
The sense that Serbia has been declared the loser is instrumentalized to gain 
electoral support by being turned around into a narrative of collective victimization. A 
continuous barrage of such messages generates a sense of ‘truth’ about them (like 
Foucauldian “truth-effects”). An event such as the acquittal of Ramush Haradinaj is 
viewed as irrefutable evidence of these truths. Moreover, when political actors are elected 
or re-elected on the basis of these truths, their authority to produce truth is reinforced and 
confirmed. The social reality that is constructed by Serbian elites is a painful one, yet 
their material reality is also grim. It is for this that they feel that must make some strides 
toward EU membership in order to gain access to markets and opportunity. This means 
sacrificing their pride and sense of being. On some technical measures, this is acceptable. 
When it comes to Kosovo, the pain and sacrifice is too great. When the demands are too 
high, Serbia recoils from the process and tends to favor a path of non-compliance or look 
for alternatives to the EU, namely Russia.  
As for Kosovo, the world created is one where Serbia is stubbornly blocking what 
it sees as legitimate independence and statehood. It was fought for in a just manner as 
evidenced not only by the acquittal, but also NATO intervention. Kosovo is patiently 
abiding by rules and dictates of international society because it feels as if the main 
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players (US, EU, UN) are on their side. The issue of Serb minorities in North Kosovo is 
thorny and made complicated by Serbia’s insistence to meddle and promote parallel 
institutions. Moreover, the continued presence of international organizations (UNMIK, 
EULEX) frustrates citizens who want resolution to the final status. Elites must use 
messages to remind citizens that the world is on their side and it is just a matter of time 
before Kosovo is fully integrated into any international organization it so chooses (EU, 
UN, NATO). Being tethered to Serbia’s intransigence means remaining outside these 
institutions indefinitely. Material reality is even more grim for Kosovo, thus the incentive 
to join the EU from this vantage point is even greater than for Serbia. Yet, so long as 
Kosovo is not a fully recognized state or all members of the EU recognize her (currently 
only 23 of 28 do), this will be an impossibility. In this sense, it is not only domestic 
political elites that have the power to produce the meaning of social reality; likewise 
international political elites have the power to create social meaning in Kosovo. It is very 
much in the interest of Kosovo to participate in the EU-led Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. 
One can expect nothing but compliance from the Kosovo side, in which case Serbian 
non-compliance only serves to strengthen international society’s support of its 
independence and sovereignty.  
 
Official Narratives 
   
 Again, like in the case study on Croatia, the power of the EU’s passive 
leverage becomes apparent when we look at the manner in which political elites 
characterized the advantages of membership to their public.  The substance of these 
narratives provides a normative basis for the legitimization of policy decisions and gives 
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meaning to material interests that shape political institutions. They become tactics 
through which elites express the power of ideas and work to build support to entrench 
ideas as stable institutions. 
 
Economic 
 
The economic effects of joining the EU are thought to be highly positive. The 
positive consequences of first implementing the SAA and then graduating to full 
membership include long-term access to the EU market, increased foreign direct 
investment, more opportunity to export to the EU market, more employment due to 
privatization, and with downward pressure on prices, domestic consumers will have 
greater choice between domestic and foreign goods.214 
 Agriculture and processing of agro-food products represent the largest single 
contributing industry to Serbia’s economy. 65 percent of the country’s surface is covered 
by farmland and the industry accounts for 10 percent of GDP. It is an important source of 
jobs, especially for those who inhabit rural areas.215 During the global economic crisis, 
reduced demand for agricultural products as well as declining exports led to high 
unemployment (around 20 percent) in this sector and a 3 percent contraction of the entire 
Serbian economy.216 Entry into the European Union would grant access to subsidies and 
other supports for business owners in this industry to help rebound from the crisis and 
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sustain the long-term stability of the sector, spurring overall economic gains for Serbia. 
Currently, the agricultural industry is only producing at between 30 and 50 percent of its 
capacity. With EU membership comes the possibility of more FDI and closer trade 
partnerships between EU members Slovenia and Croatia. With these improvements, the 
agricultural sector could begin to perform at 80 percent capacity and grow rapidly.217  
Another argument in favor of Serbia’s EU membership has to do with the EU’s 
role as a strategic global economic actor. From the domestic vantage point, political elites 
impress upon the public the necessity to join the bloc in order to maintain any shred of 
relevance in the global market. Serbia’s market is small and is intimately tied to Europe’s 
economy anyhow, so the logical extension of this would be to pursue cooperative 
policies, reduce barriers, and ultimately integrate. From the EU’s vantage point, Serbia 
represents another market, which could be absorbed to bolster the overall size and 
prowess of its combined position on the global stage. If the EU wishes to remain 
competitive with rising economies like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa) countries, and counterbalance the US economy, then it should consider the 
level of selectivity and scrutiny to which it subjects its candidates. On one hand, it should 
continue to utilize conditionality instruments to ensure that shared values and standards 
are being met. On the other, strict enforcement of conditions could have the effect of 
pushing candidates away from the Union, possibly toward cooperative arrangements with 
competing actors, such as Russia in Serbia’s case. The EU must strike a delicate balance 
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between these competing objectives in order to retain the prospect of enhancing its global 
economic market share through its enlargement policy.218  
Tourism has been shown to be a major driver of economic development in the 
past in Serbia, improving the direction of the overall economy by producing gains in 
areas such as balance of payments, employment, and regional development. These gains 
have resulted mostly from policies aimed at improving the domestic tourist industry, 
while efforts to improve Serbia’s position in the international tourism marketplace have 
been sparring.219 Integration into the European Union will help increase Serbia’s visibility 
and desirability as a tourist destination for visitors from the continent as well as beyond, 
which should lead to a continuation of the economic gains originating from this industry.    
To give an example of pro-EU elite discourse, Boris Tadic 2006 stated the 
following to a party convention: 
The party's goal [is] for Serbia to join the European Union and to improve the 
citizens' living standards…countries in the region could not properly develop 
without developed Serbia, Serbia in the European Union.220 
 
 
Political 
   
The integration of Serbia into the EU can function to redefine its role and place as 
a geo-political actor. In addition to the economic constellations to which it would become 
a part, one must consider the implications of integration as it pertains to Serbia’s options 
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for strategic military and political alliances. With respect to these alliances, the 
participation in multinational support operations can have the dual effect of accelerating 
the modernization and reform of the security sector, and it can also represent a formative 
step toward consolidating democracy.221 Serbia has a precarious relationship with the pre-
eminent multi-lateral institutions that conduct operations worldwide, NATO in particular. 
It has vowed to abstain from joining any military alliance for the foreseeable future. In 
most of the post-communist states of the eastern enlargement, the discourse surrounding 
integration was two-pronged. The effort was to achieve ‘Euro-Atlantic’ integration by 
becoming a member of both NATO and the EU. For Serbia, the trauma of 1999 NATO-
led bombing of Belgrade during the Kosovo War is still very raw. Moreover, KFOR 
(Kosovo Force), the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo is a UN-mandated, NATO-led 
outfit. Joining NATO is tantamount to national betrayal.  
Serbia has, however, taken part in several UN-led operation as well as some EU-
headed missions such as an operation to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia. 
Although the structure of the EU’s common defense system is not well-articulated, by 
signing on to missions and continuing down the path of political reforms, it can gain 
legitimacy in the eyes of the West without having to betray its position on Kosovo and 
join NATO. If the idea that the West puts the blame for the fallout of Yugoslavia’s 
dissolution squarely on the shoulders of the Serbs is persuasive, then it should follow that 
EU membership offers a pathway for Serbia to disassociate itself from that legacy by 
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joining a community of states that has, in the past, regarded Serbia as a pariah. Those in 
favor of membership will hold that currying favor with the EU is viewed as a preferable 
strategic geo-political position than remaining marginal on the continent and reclusive in 
multinational operations throughout the world.    
With respect to the Kosovo issue, some argue that after the International Court of 
Justice rendered a ruling upholding Kosovo’s unilaterally declared independence, the 
EU’s functional approach to settling the dispute via its enlargement policy has been 
successful.222 This is not to say that the dispute has been settled, but rather that by using 
the EU mediating framework, the two side have come to the table to make progress 
toward a resolution. In addition to peace being maintained, placing the Belgrade-Pristina 
dialogue within the accession process has resulted in Serbia demonstrating greater 
compliance with EU conditions, thus accelerating the march toward membership.223 All 
dialogue and negotiation with respect to normalization of relations or accession criteria is 
conducted under the proviso that Kosovo’s status is not prejudged. For the many Serbs 
who wish to retain Kosovo and keep the territorial integrity of Serbia intact, there is hope 
that EU involvement in the resolution of this conflict is, in fact, an avenue to re-litigate 
the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) opinion on Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of 
independence and find in favor of Serbia’s position. This reading of the situation allows 
for political elite to continue to pursue the integration project while offsetting the concern 
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of those who oppose it on the basis that EU membership will require Serbia to sacrifice 
their territorial claim over Kosovo.  
Moreover, some consider that the EU is the only viable mechanism for peace and 
stability in the region. By withdrawing the EU prospective of potential members such as 
Serbia and Kosovo, a status solution and peaceful reconciliation may go forever 
wanting.224 If the French and Dutch ‘no’ to the referendum on a constitution was, in part, 
a reaction to the fatigue of enlargement, and the mess of the European economy 
preoccupies the continent, then domestic elites must make the normative case that EU 
disengagement could have disastrous consequences if the Serbia-Kosovo conflict 
manages to become ‘unfrozen.’ In other words, domestic elites need to exploit the 
political currency of the Kosovo issue in order to keep Europe interested. Europe failed 
as a moral actor in its response to the wars of dissolution. If further blood were to spill at 
this precarious moment for the EU, the consequences could initiate the Union’s final un-
doing. In return, Serbia’s membership bid is dealt with the same attention as its Central 
and Eastern European predecessors.  
 
Identity-bearing/Associational 
 
As was the case with Croatia, in Serbia, the dominant narrative about EU 
membership as it pertains to identity is one of ‘returning’ and ‘belonging’ – that Europe 
is Serbia’s natural home. And like Croatia, we again see concerted effort on the part of 
the Serbia government with aide from European institutions to reconstitute a vision of 
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Serbia’s past within Europe and re-link it with the continent through its tourist industry. 
The Tourism Ministry put out the following words in its promotional material: 
The Balkans, with roots firmly planted in European culture, is a region of diverse 
history. Though civilizations have perished, their traces have been preserved by 
geography, culture and language. With each new ruler, fragments of history were 
either protected, as embodied by beautifully conserved fortresses, destroyed, as 
evidenced by remnants of pagan temples, churches and monasteries, or left to 
crumble, as reflected by long vanished imperial palaces. Today, you can revisit 
the memories of Serbia’s European past, through these distinct phases, 
discovering their hidden magic. Across serene mountain ranges and at the 
confluence of spectacular rivers and valleys, ancient civilization sought out 
hidden, special places which empowered them to collectively create ideas, build 
settlements and establish the foundation on which modern Serbia rests.225 
 
The phrase in addition to drawing a straight line between Serbia and Europe, the phrase 
‘revisit the memories of Serbia’s European past,’ also carries with it the subtext that there 
a break with the past has occurred, placing Serbia outside of Europe, and now is the time 
to remind us all that Serbia’s deep heritage is strongly rooted and belongs in Europe. 
Referencing Serbia’s deep ‘European’ past in an effort to reconnect with it 
particularly important for the much maligned Serbia, which is viewed as a pariah state by 
much of western Europe and by extension the rest of the world for its role in the wars of 
Yugoslav succession. EU membership is presented as an opportunity to change that 
image and regain favor within the international community. Speaking to the UN general 
assembly in 2012, president Nikolic reaffirm to the world his country’s ambitions and 
built trust within the international community that his country is ‘on the right track’: 
Serbia truly wishes to become a full-fledged member of the European Union and 
is patiently building its relations of confidence and peace in a region which is 
burdened with the heavy legacy of the past. Serbia wishes to head for a better and 
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more prosperous future, on an equal footing with all nations of the world. A lot 
has been achieved so far in the implementation of reforms, the fight against crime 
and corruption, harmonization of laws with the regulations of the European 
Union.226 
 
 
Competing Narratives 
   
Economic 
  
On the negative side of the ledger, implementation of the SAA and subsequent 
membership into the European Union could have destabilizing consequences. Entry into 
the free trade zone will lead to a rise in imports and a possible trade deficit, a decrease in 
fiscal revenues derived from trade tariffs, costs of adaptation such as liquidation or 
restructuring of enterprises, costs to comply with economic standards, and costs to cover 
social programs that are directed at overcoming high rates of unemployment in the early 
stages of implementation. These effects are thought to be felt most acutely in the short-
term, and it is thought that they can be solved in the medium and long-term.227 This 
argument rests, however, on the assumption that the European and global economies will 
rebound to pre-crisis performance levels.  
 While international financial institutions have played an important role in spurring 
economic growth and bringing industries to a point of convergences with European 
standards in the period between 2008 and 2010, the rapid growth of available foreign 
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credit has produced debts that may not be serviceable in the long term.228 Over-
indebtedness coupled with further penetration of international financial actors into the 
Serbian economy is likely to lead to dependence, vulnerability, and stagnation.  
 
Political 
 
In a post-conflict state, it is crucial to have in place mechanisms that promote 
transitional justice. The ICTY is intended to be an external agent of such justice, holding 
individuals to account for the crimes of the wars of the 1990s. The expectation of the 
international community is that in addition to handing down individuals punishments to 
war criminals, the ICTY will propel domestic political actors to undertake progressive 
liberal democratic reform. Unfortunately, however, the ICTY has remained a highly 
sensitive political issue, the consequences of which challenge the international 
community’s expectation that the tribunal will create an atmosphere for domestic 
political reform. Reticence on the part of political leaders, parties, institutions, or society 
in general, is thought to stem from a sense that the tribunal does not, in fact, produce a 
sense of justice for Serbs. Controversial rulings such as the decision to acquit Croatian 
Generals Gotovina and Markac, are seen as partial and intended to perpetual a mood 
within the West that Serbs were the aggressors, and therefore, ultimately to blame for all 
the horrors that accompanied the dissolution of Yugoslavia. This infuriates Serbian 
political elites and contributes to the staying power of traditional Serbian nationalism, 
giving rhetorical weight to the characterization that Serbs are ‘outsiders,’ or ‘victims,’ of 
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the international system of justice, which in turn, foments anti-EU sentiment in a very 
tangible manner.229  
Complicating this matter is the idea that ‘facing the past’ is not merely 
uncomfortable due the fact that it is being externally forced. The issues at hand are 
unsavory and involve some of the grossest violations of human dignity imaginable. It is 
extraordinarily challenging for a nation to confront this or take the initiative to deal with 
the past through domestic dialogue. Throughout the mid-2000s, there were several 
unsuccessful attempts to bring a formal declaration on Srebrenica up for debate in the 
Serbian parliament. It was not until 2010 that President Tadic was able to do so. The 
issue polarizes the Serbian public. Tadic was only able to get it to the floor of parliament 
because he argued that a declaration would be a formal commitment required of the EU 
anyhow, so he was taking proactive measures as a show of good faith. Those who 
opposed the declaration saw it as a ploy of the international community to reinforce a 
hegemonic narrative about Srebrenica, forcing Serbs to declare their guilt and take 
responsibility for it. Those resisting the declaration do not challenge the idea that terrible 
events occurred, but they mounted a challenge to the ‘West’s’ account on a basis of 
‘facts’ – numbers of dead, numbers killed by bullets, definitions of genocide, 
qualification of the dead as civilians or combatants. After four months of debate between 
the various political parties, parliament promulgated a weak declaration of condemnation 
for the Srebrenica massacre. Though the issue was raised and debated within Serbian 
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parliament and society, ‘normative gaps’ in the acceptance and internalization of its 
outcome exist and present an obstacle for durable transitional justice.230  
The international community has not developed a potent enough strategy for 
cultivating transitional justice. The EU process is supposed to satisfy this objective, yet 
its main instrument is the highly contested ICTY. Some argue that “dealing with the past” 
should be included as a special chapter of the acquis in order to address the associated 
issues in a more meaningful way.  
International mission in post-Yugoslav countries lack specialized units or section 
which would deal with transitional justice in a comprehensive way. In that sense, 
monitoring the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the international community 
focused on the reform of institution rather than on a change in the system of 
values, cultural models and the creation of a common narrative on the causes of 
the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the character or nature of the way. 
[…] Reforming institutions and creating a historical narrative on the causes of 
Yugoslavia’s bloody dissolution are two inseperable aspects of post-conflict 
justice in the region. The insistence on only one aspect and not the other does not 
automatically lead to stable peace and reconciliation in the region.231  
 
It is perhaps unfair to analyze compliance with EU standards as merely a matter of 
willingness on the part of the target state. Western Balkan candidates such as Serbia are 
subject to a largely recalcitrant group of member states that find themselves preoccupied 
addressing the fallout of the Eurozone crisis and increasingly fatigued by previous 
enlargements, particularly that of Croatia, which was excessively complex and 
prolonged. The result is an uneven articulation and application of conditionality demands 
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to new candidates, which seriously calls into question the commitment of the EU as it 
pertains to following through with the accession program for candidates like Serbia.232 In 
this sense, the EU is perfectly content to allow intransigent nationalist entities to tread 
water on the Kosovo question as it removes part of the responsibility from Brussels to 
proactively hasten the integration of a new member and allows member states to catch 
their breath. If Serbia pauses for too long, however, it is uncertain what it will take for 
member states to become actively interested and engaged in this region in the future.  
The notion that the EU’s approach to Serbia (as well as the other Yugoslav 
successors) is similar to the other post-communist states that joined in the 2004/07 wave 
of enlargement is misleading. Although the EU will impose greater demands on Serbia 
than it did on the states of the previous enlargements (as was the case with Croatia), the 
EU will continue to apply the same generic methods of enticement that it did with states 
like Hungary or Poland. Although Yugoslavia was a socialist state and Serbia is in a 
period of transition, Serbia finds itself having an important qualitative point of distinction 
that makes it different from the aforementioned post-communist predecessors – its 
relationship with Russia. The EU knew that it could offer a powerful and welcome 
alternative to Russia in the case of these other Central and Eastern European countries. 
Serbia, however, has a strong relationship with Russia. This relationship is so strong that 
some might even consider Serbia a Russian client state. By taking adopting some of the 
same methods for its relations with Serbia as it did with the Central and Eastern European 
countries, the EU demonstrates a lack of understanding of Serbia’s problems. Failing to 
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recognize the extent to which Serbian society has been divided and traumatized by the 
events of the recent past, and the use of excessive conditionality to spur reform, 
contribute to a deep distrust of the EU. Continuing to employ these methods is not likely 
to yield the results the EU desires and will only exacerbate the problem.233  
Furthermore, as it pertains to the inconsistent policy of the EU, there is a danger 
that the EU might fail to broker solutions to long-standing problems by allowing partial 
compliance of conditions in order to keep Belgrade interested in continued progress and 
orientation toward Europe. Serbia’s hope of a European perspective was rekindled in 
2008 when it signed the SAA agreement with the EU despite it not fulfilling its 
obligation to the ICTY.234 Serbia has since complied, handing Ratko Mladic and Goran 
Hadzic over to the Hague. Nevertheless, if the EU rewards Serbia for partial compliance, 
that will likely become the standard to which Serbia assumes it is held. When it comes to 
the normalization of relations with Kosovo, the necessity to find resolution to the conflict 
extends well beyond it being a means to the EU as an end, working toward a lasting 
peace is of the utmost importance for the stability of these two nations and of the region. 
If the EU honors half-commitments made on behalf of either side, it is likely that the 
conflict will remain unresolved and ignored for the foreseeable future if the ‘solution’ has 
received the EU stamp of approval.  
The EU’s approach to the implementation of the acquis in the Western Balkans 
and Serbia has been described as a ‘do no harm’ approach. This is to say that it has been 
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extremely mindful of the sensitivities of ethnic groups, cautiously formulating policies 
that would not re-ignite conflict and forge divisions. Upholding strong minority rights 
and favoring consociationalist or power-sharing frameworks for problem solving has 
devalued civic rights and reifyed ethnic divides by treating individuals as their ethnicity 
or ethnic groups as ethnic groups. The consequence is that ethnic rhetoric and segregation 
continue to stymie democratic consolidation. Although power-sharing arrangements are 
intended to provide access for all groups, in practice the result is that ethnic loyalties 
reinforce engrained clientelistic practices and offers little incentive for parties to work 
collectively across group lines.235 As Petricusic and Blondel put it: 
Post-conflict integrative normative solutions, such as assurance of minority 
participation in public life and power-sharing mechanisms, have contributed to 
the re-emergence of cooperation and, to a certain degree, to the normalization of 
relations between different ethnic communities across the region. However, the 
guarantee of minority rights means little for interethnic rapprochement and the 
reduction of the social distance between formerly warring communities if policy 
makers hold that minority legislation should merely allow for the preservation of 
minority identities and assure proportional political participation in decision-
making processes.236  
 
One can also criticize the EU’s external approach to governance in the Western 
Balkans. The criticism is that, in the case of post-conflict states, particularly Bosnia and 
Kosovo, the export of external governance under EU auspices, not only undermines the 
sovereignty of these fragile states, but it challenges liberal democratic ideals by creating 
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‘ready-made’ or ‘member-state built’ democracies.237 This is to say that the assumption of 
lack of capacity circumvents the aspiration of the people to build endogenous political 
institutions in the manner they see fit. The EU is quick to swoop in and provide the 
capacity by filling the vacuum with its technocratic, administrative, and regulatory 
expertise. States are therefore manufactured by ‘experts’ as opposed to being forged by 
the choices of the people. More particularly, in the case of Kosovo, outfits such as the 
United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the European Union Special 
Representative (EUSR) form a cohort of international administrators that wield an 
unusual amount authority due to their ability to veto reforms that emanate from local 
decision-making bodies. Although these entities may serve to block undemocratic 
reforms or those that might favor one ethnic group over another, the exercise of this 
authority does not allow for local authorities to organically develop legitimacy, nor will it 
foster a sense of local commitment to these reforms once the international community has 
left.238 The outcome is a more fragile transition, a prolonged transition, shallower 
democratic institutions, and an over-reliance and dependence on the international 
community to tackle problems over which local authorities should claim responsibility. 
Furthermore, one should be mindful of inherited legacies of illiberal practices 
held over from the history of the Yugoslav and Milosevic regimes such as patronage, 
clientelism, customary law, and informal regulation. These practices can stunt 
meaningful democratization by remaining disguised behind legitimate democratic 
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procedures or fulfillment of technocratic criteria. As the EU works through the acquis 
with the Serbian negotiating team, it must recognize that on one hand by setting the terms 
of reform it could help produce democratic consolidation, but on the other hand, it may 
consolidate the aforementioned illiberal behaviors, anointing them with legitimacy and 
endowing a well-connected elite with unchecked power.239 
 
Identity-bearing/Associational 
 
Some argue that the motive for allowing partial compliance has its root in identity 
conflicts. Two centuries of external and internal wars and revolutions has seen Serbia 
ping-pong between various associations of states, which has produced hardened 
nationalist identities in response to previously unstable, contested, or shifting identities. 
Stahl contends that Serbia is undergoing a ‘strategic accession’ whereby the rigors of 
compliance are relaxed in order to ‘Europeanize’ Serbia and make them ‘like us.’240 In the 
case of a ‘strategic accession’ such as this, the EU will accept declaratory or good-faith 
policy adaptation on the part of the candidate and simply trust that in the long-run this 
strategy will lead to the internalization of liberal democratic or ‘European’ norms. In 
addition to it being misguided to place faith in the long-run internalization of ‘European’ 
norms, this strategy has the effect of making the Serbian public believe that they do, in 
fact, deserve membership because they are already like members of the ‘club,’ but at the 
same time the insiders seems to be conspiring to keep them on the outside by introducing 
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new hoops to jump through.241 This can be infuriating for the Serbian public as it does not 
solve any underlying identity conflict, but merely adds fuel to the fire.  
The EU’s occasional attempts to propel Serbia’s absorption into the ‘West’ only 
leads to further confusing over identity and orientation. While it may be regarded as 
desirable to some to become part of the ‘West,’ if incorporation does not proceed on its 
own terms or the label is externally endowed, euro-skepticism will grow among the 
Serbian public.242 When Tomislav Nikolic was vice president of the Serbia Progressive 
Party he said the following of European integration: 
Europe wants Serbia within its borders. It is impossible that Serbia will stay an 
isolated island. However, the EU uses a pliant attitude of the Serbian leadership to 
blackmail us constantly with the accession in order to accomplish other goals. It 
will take us between two and three years to get each new paper. We are looking 
forward to something that will bring us into the European Union in fifteen years 
[…] Above all, they [the Serbia government] are trying to ingratiate themselves 
with the West. I have nothing against the West, but there are three more sides of 
the world. I only request from the West to accept Serbia and us as decent people 
and to put us in the same position as others.243  
 
In this instance, Nikolic clearly defines Serbia as not belonging to the West. He does not, 
however, draw the link between becoming a member of the European Union and 
becoming part of the ‘West.’ This statement was taken when his party was in the 
opposition, and he is frustrated that members of the Serbian government are ingratiating 
themselves with the West. The subtext here is that these leaders have drawn the link 
between cozying up to Brussels and becoming part of the ‘West,’ and, whatever the 
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outcome, it will not be on Serbia’s terms, perpetuating a historical cycle of external actors 
determining the nation’s fate. 
It is not only the efforts of the EU to “Europeanize” Serbia that lead to confusion 
and orientation of identity in the 21st century. Domestic political elites, confronting the 
historical legacy of the tumultuous 20th century, have begun to look back to the 19th 
century as a source of symbolic meaning in the post-Milosevic era. This period is 
associated with the founding of the modern Serbian nation-state, when Serbia gained 
independent statehood from the Ottoman Empire. Unlike the 20th century, symbols of the 
19th century are considered unproblematic or appropriate for contemporary national 
imagery.244 The quest to re-traditionalize Serbian national imagery to orient it with 19th 
century symbols is evidenced by the adoption of February 15th as Statehood Day, which 
replaced March 28th as the previous Statehood Day, and which had been establish by 
Milosevic to commemorate Serbia retaining its integrity by abolishing the autonomy that 
was given to Vojvodina and Kosovo in the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution. The February 
15th date references the beginning of the uprising of the Serbs against the Ottomans in 
1804 as well as the signing of the 1835 Constitution.  
On one hand these symbolic events serve to unify Serbs by referencing 
unambiguously proud moments of shared history. On the other hand, the use of these 
images produces two divergent discourses about Serbian identity – pitting 
warrior/revolutionary/traditionalist against modernist/civic/parliamentarian visions of 
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collective identity.245 The warrior/revolutionary/traditionalist vision is sustenance for 
nationalists who interpret 1804 as when Serbia began to shake the Turkish or Ottoman 
‘yolk,’ and who see integration as a quest for Serbia to reattach an unwanted yolk, this 
time at the hands of the EU. The modernist/civic/parliamentarian vision is fuel for the 
Europeanists, who cite the 1835 Constitutional moment as being the ultimate exemplar of 
its European past. Not only had it shucked Ottoman imperial control, but it acted to 
establish an independent state on the principles of human rights, democracy, and citizen-
oriented legislative organization. Elites promote this vision as justification for Serbia’s 
belonging in the EU. The history of the 20th century, while part of European history, is 
not the record of the past to which EU member states should look. Fascism, socialism, 
and ethno-nationalism infiltrated the Serbian state and dislodged the ambitions of its 19th 
century, democratic, republican, and European ideals. These divergent discourses 
compete, and because they are rooted in an acceptable and unifying image of the past, it 
serves to complicate national identity with respect to the future and whether or not 
European Union membership should be a part of that future.246 
One would be remiss to not mention the significance of religion as a source of 
identification and meaning in Serbia. The warrior/revolutionary/traditionalist reading of 
19th century history is buttressed by strong religious identification with the Orthodox 
Church. Administratively, the Ottoman Empire was organized according to the Millet 
system, which devolved the authority to handle social and legal affairs to local religious 
communities. In the case of the 19th century uprisings, battle lines were drawn not only 
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along national lines, but religious lines as well.247 Independence was gained not only for 
the Serbian nation, but also for the Orthodox Church. This adds potency to the narrative 
of the 19th century as the repository from which notions of contemporary national identity 
are drawn. In the 21st century, after the socialist period which de-emphasized religion, 
and after the fall of Milosevic, there has been a rapid convergence of secular and 
religious politics. Nationalism has been a convenient meeting point for secular and 
religious political actors. Political leaders use religion and identification with the 
Orthodox Church to legitimize their claims to authority, and religious communities use 
nationalism as a mean of rehabilitating and reaffirming itself in the wake of the socialist 
era.248 The fusion of these two systems leads to an introduction of religious normative 
values into the policy-making processes that occur in secular deliberative bodies. 
Religious authorities hold enormous sway. European Union membership represents a 
threat to the church in that it would demand reforms, which would lead to a de-coupling 
of secular and religious politics in Serbian society. Conservative church leaders believe 
that European integration will bring with it an incursion of amoral ‘European’ values 
through policies pertaining to women’s reproductive rights, religious education in public 
schools, and LGBT rights in particular.  
 In general, competing narratives offer an alternative idea to the dominant idea that 
political elites disseminate in their official discourse. Power expressed through these 
ideas does not attain such a level as to displace the dominant idea of EU integration. 
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These rival narratives, however, can have more power and resonance within the Serbian 
public than the rival narrative we examined in the Croatian case. This can be attributed to 
the notion that Serbians feel marginalized by the international community, which is 
closely associated with Western values. This sentiment animates the idea that Russia is a 
viable alternative to the EU. Furthermore, the Orthodox Church represents an important 
discourse coalition that wields significant power over the meaning structure of ideas 
integral to Serbian national identity and collective values. Accordingly, this endows 
actors from discourse coalition with ability to express greater power through their ideas 
when in opposition to the dominant idea. 
 
Public Opinion Data – Serbia  
 
As was the case in the chapter on Croatia, the extent to which the above images result 
in internalized notions of what European Union membership will mean for Serbia can be 
put to the test by looking at public opinion data. Data is derived from the same sources as 
was the data on Croatia - Gallup Balkan Monitor, Eurobarometer, and a generational 
survey conducted by the European Fund for the Balkans. The following are the responses 
offered by the Serbian cohort to the same polling questions.  
 
Implications for Official Narratives 
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                                       Figure 65                                     Figure 66 
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Figure 67 
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                                        Figure 68                                    Figure 69 
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yes
25%
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62%
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know
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(Source: Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2011)249 
 
These polls reflect an overall positive vision of how EU accession will affect the 
economy. Large majorities of respondents agree that accession will result in more 
employment, more development and more competition for national business. Again, in 
the framework of a liberal market economy, the notion of increased competition for 
national business is seen as a positive attribute of the economy. Yet, competition can be 
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perceived as a negative threat to industries that are sheltered by protective state policies. 
If this is construed as a negative, the magnitude of those feeling the strain of external 
competitive pressure is greater in Serbia (72 percent) than it was in Croatia (62 percent), 
suggesting that Serbs might feel that their national industries are more vulnerable and 
their economy less nimble than their Croatian counterparts. If so, integration represents a 
greater threat and more resistance should follow. If viewed as a positive attribute of the 
economy, however, then integration is a step forward and one should expect less 
resistance.  
A majority of respondents also expressed that they did not expect to see lower 
wages after EU accession. This could, however, be an issue that cuts both ways. On one 
hand, there is not fear that the introduction of more foreign competition on the Serbian 
market will lead to downward pressure on wages. On the other hand, this could indicate 
that Serbs believe that their wages are already so low that they have nowhere to go but 
up.  
As to the question of who benefits most from EU accession, the answer 
“everybody” received a plurality of support from survey respondents (36 percent). The 
answer “already well-off” was a close second at 33 percent. This is the reverse situation 
compared to what we saw with the Croatian cohort where 39 percent believed EU 
accession benefits those “already well-off” and 28 percent said “everybody.” This 
suggests that Serbs believe that the benefits of EU membership will be more evenly 
distributed across the entire population than do Croats. This is good news for political 
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elites who would like to impress upon the population that the EU will bring prosperity to 
all – not simply the well-connected, and well to do.  
                                      Figure 70                                    Figure 71 
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Rule of law strengthened after 
EU accession?
yes
57%
no
33%
don't 
know
10%
  
Figure 72 
More political stability after EU 
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yes
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(Source: Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2011)250 
 
These polls show that a majority of respondents believe that the political benefits 
of EU membership will include freer travel, stronger rule of law, and more political 
stability. The ability to travel more freely received an overwhelmingly positive response, 
with 93 percent of individuals answering ‘yes’ to freer travel. The poll was conducted in 
2011. The extremely positive response might be influenced by a wave of enthusiasm 
stemming from a European Commission decision to over Serbian citizens the ability to 
travel visa-free throughout the Schengen area beginning in 2010. This is one of the first 
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tangible benefits tied to the EU accession process that ordinary Serbian citizens have 
experienced and it is highly popular. 
                                       Figure 73                                     Figure 74 
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Figure 75 
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(Source: Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2011)251 
 
The above responses about self-identification illustrate that Serbs are quite 
comfortable holding multiple overlapping identities. When combining all respondents 
that answered ‘strongly’ (either extremely, very, or moderately), 50 percent or more 
identified strongly with all three descriptors – Europe, Balkans, and Serbia. Identification 
was strongest with Serbia, followed by Balkans, and then Europe. This suggests that, for 
most Serbs, identity is less of dichotomous phenomenon and more of a fluid aspect of an 
individual’s character. Being ‘European’ does not necessarily mean renouncing one’s 
‘Balkan-ness’ or ‘Serb-ness’ or vice versa. These can be described as individual aspects 
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of a more complex composite identity. This suggests that, for elites promoting 
integration, they have done a good job of promoting a message about Europe that is 
acceptable to the public and that does not necessarily threaten identification with the 
nation-state. Moreover, identification with the Balkans is quite strong. In the Croatian 
case, it was argued that Balkan identification carried a negative stigma and that ‘Europe’ 
was the antidote, which absolved Croatia from this association. It is not clear from these 
results whether or not the term ‘Balkan’ has a negative attachment to it, it is possible that 
individual simply ‘own it’ because there is no escaping the label. Pro-EU elites will argue 
convincingly, however, that unequivocally Serbia is Balkan and the Balkans are Europe, 
and therefore Serbia belongs.  
 
Implications for Competing Narratives 
  
                                     Figure 76                                      Figure 77 
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(Source: Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2011)252 
 
In a previous survey question, respondents showed that they did not believe that 
EU accession would lead to lower wages. This result somewhat contradicts the finding 
that 72 percent of individuals fear more competition for national business after EU 
accession. On one hand, external pressures might put downward pressure on wages, but 
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on the other it could lead to more choices for where workers sell their labor. If we believe 
that Serbs are fearful that their industries will face more competition from outside, but do 
not believe that it will have an effect on wages, then perhaps we can accept the assertion 
that the economic situation in Serbia is so dire that workers do not think there is any more 
room for wages to fall.  
Additionally, a majority of individuals believe that national resources will be 
exploited after EU accession. Attitudes on this subject as likely tempered by the 2008 
takeover of the Zastava (formerly Yugo) car manufacturing plant in Kragujevac by the 
Italian motor company Fiat. The purchase was an enormous investment on the part of the 
Italians, and Serbian factory workers were, by and large, able to keep their jobs. Despite 
the success of the factory, with the Italians holding 70 percent stake in the factory and the 
Serbs holding 30 percent, the takeover is viewed as a hit to national pride. What was once 
a successful state company is now controlled by foreign elements. Not only does this 
sting in terms of the perception that the Serbian government cannot manage a state-run 
company or provide its people with jobs, Serbs must sit by as the capital generated from 
the sales of these vehicles flows out of Serbia and into Italy. It is episodes of this nature 
that many Serbs who are skeptical about European integration believe will be repeated if 
Serbia continues down the current road toward the EU. It is a cautionary tale of things to 
come.  
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                                      Figure 78                                    Figure 79 
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Loss of sovereignty after EU accession?
yes
42%
no
47%
don't 
know
11%
 
(Source: Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2011)253 
 
In terms of political considerations, nearly half of respondents (a plurality) believe 
that there will be less corruption in Serbia after EU accession. At 41 percent, a significant 
portion of the respondent pool believed the opposite to be true. Nevertheless, corruption 
is a very serious problem of Serbian politics, and the view that more people see EU 
accession as leading to improvements in corruption rather than exacerbating the problem 
is a positive development and represent a strong argument in favor of membership from 
the perspective of political elites. Additionally, a plurality of respondents did not see EU 
accession as leading to a loss of sovereignty. This question is somewhat challenging to 
parse, however, because it is not qualified by indicating to the respondent what the 
ultimate determination on the status of Kosovo might be. For instance, if the question was 
prefaced by a statement indicating that Serbia’s membership would be conditioned upon 
recognition of Kosovo’s independence, then it is likely that this would represent an 
incursion on Serbia’s sovereignty and respondents might answer differently. The question 
presumes that the current understanding of Serbia’s territory claim would remain intact. 
The larger point that can be taken away from this survey question is that more people do 
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not see the pooling of sovereignty that is required of EU membership as being 
problematic for national sovereignty than those would do. The real threat to sovereignty 
in the Serbian case is not the sovereignty that is given up as a member, but rather the 
sovereignty it must concede in order to become a member.   
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(Source: Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2011)254 
 
On the question of whether or not EU accession is in the interest of leaders, 
survey-takers overwhelmingly believe that ‘yes’ accession is in their interest (78 percent). 
It would then follow that if leaders saw EU accession as being in their self-interest, then 
they would do all that they can to advance toward accession. 62 percent of respondents 
believed that to be the case. This begs the question of whether or not Serbs believe that 
leaders view EU accession to be in public interest. Certainly, these categories do not have 
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to be mutually exclusive, but the survey question is framed in such a way that it only 
takes into account leaders’ interest. What is curious, however, is the picture that emerges 
when one juxtaposes the result of the ‘leaders doing all they can to advance EU 
accession’ survey with the results of the two ‘progress’ surveys. Pluralities of 
respondents feel that leaders are not doing well when it comes to progress settling 
disputes with neighbors and in adopting EU laws and regulations. These two marks of 
progress are integral to advancing along the EU path. Either these ‘progress’ surveys 
contradict the ‘leaders doing all they can to advance EU accession’ result or they reveal 
other underlying challenges. In the case of progress adopting laws, perhaps it is the case 
that leaders are doing all they can to advance, but they are not doing well in term of 
progress because of limits to their capacity to reform (lack of funds, political culture, lack 
of political will). In the case of progress settling disputes, lack of progress could be 
indicative of Serbs reacting to the intransigence on the part of the neighbors with which 
they have the disputes. In other words, Serbian leaders have done all they can, up to the 
point at which they might be forced to cross a red line (i.e. recognition of Kosovo), but 
progress has not been made because the other side will not bend from their own 
entrenched position, and impasse is the only possible result. Lack of progress is not for a 
lack of leaders trying. EU accession is in leaders’ interest, but crossing red lines on key 
issues such as Kosovo is not, even if it would result in progress toward membership.  
 
Vs. EU  
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                                        Figure 92                                   Figure 93 
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(Source: Eurobarometer, 2013)255 
 
This Eurobarometer Survey reveals that Serbs have similar attitudes toward 
economic issues as do respondents from the 27 EU countries that were polled. The 
general picture is that the economic situation in both the EU and Serbia is poor and that 
there is little hope that an improvement is likely in the near future. Serbs are slightly 
more optimistic about improvements, but only marginally so. 23 percent of Serbian 
respondents believe that the domestic economy will improve in the next twelve months 
and 26 percent think the EU economy will turn around in that period. This is compared to 
the 18 percent of EU27 respondents who believe that their country’s economy will 
improve and 18 percent who think the same for the EU economy. There are two key 
differences between these two populations as it pertains to attitudes on the economy. The 
first is that a majority of Serbs (69 percent) believe that their own personal financial 
situation is bad (i.e. that of their household) where as 63 percent of individuals from 
EU27 countries described their own financial situation as ‘good.’ The result on the EU27 
side somewhat contradicts the previous finding that a majority of EU27 respondents 
believe that the economic situation of their country and of the EU is bad. This is to say 
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that worry over these economies is abstract in that it is an issue that does not hit home. 
For the Serbian respondents, however, the results seem to reflect that the poor performing 
economy is something that is truly felt at home and at the individual level. This finding 
feeds into the second key difference between these two populations that emerges from 
this survey. A majority of Serbs (53 percent) say that the economic situation is the most 
important issue facing the country whereas only 33 percent of individuals from the EU27 
cohort believe this to be the case. The 33 percent figure is indeed a significant amount 
and certainly reflects the idea that the economic situation is of concern to individuals, yet 
the issue does not command priority status as it does in the case of Serbia. If individuals 
from the EU27 were feeling the same economic pinch at the household or individual 
level, then it is conceivable that they would place the economic situation higher up on the 
priority list of problems that need to be addressed.  
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(Source: Eurobarometer, 2013)256 
 
Trust in institutions is in short supply at both the EU and domestic level. This 
observation is true for the Serbian group of respondents as well as the EU27 group. There 
is marginally more trust in EU institutions than domestic institutions between these 
groups. 33 percent of Serbs tend to trust EU institutions as opposed 27 percent who tend 
to trust their country’s institutions. For the EU27 cohort, 31 percent of respondents tend 
to trust EU institutions while only 25 percent tend to trust their country’s institutions. 
This shows that Serbs tend to have slightly more trust in institutions generally, but the 
overall picture is a very negative view of institutions.  
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When asked what the EU means to you, the most common response given by 
Serbian survey-takers was ‘economic prosperity.’ At 38 percent, Serbian respondents 
answered in much greater proportion to their EU27 counterparts, to whom 11 percent 
agreed that the EU means ‘economic prosperity.’ Although this does not suggests a great 
deal of enthusiasm with respect to the economic prospects, it does imply that the 
expectation of prosperity is greater in this particular candidate state than it is in states that 
have experience in the EU’s integrated economy.  
Given the low response rate, 16 percent and 11 percent between the Serbian and 
EU27 groups respectively, for most individuals, the EU does not threaten cultural 
identity. A slightly higher rate of Serbs believe that it will lead to a loss of cultural 
identity than do EU27 respondents. Conversely, for a slightly higher margin of EU27 
respondents, 19 percent to 17 percent, the EU means democracy.  
Beyond attitudes about ‘economic prosperity,’ the greatest difference between 
these two groups pertain to ‘freedom of movement.’ 42 percent of EU27 respondents 
compared to 35 percent of Serbian respondents said that the EU means ‘freedom of 
movement.’ This received the greatest response among EU27 survey-takers as being the 
most important meaning of the EU. The 35 percent of Serbian respondents is a somewhat 
low rate given the previous survey where 93 percent of individuals answered that they 
believed that there would be freer travel after EU accession. On one hand, when 
comparing the two rates one might infer that this could be a reflection that although 
individuals do benefit from freedom of movement, this is simply a nice perk of EU 
accession. It does not penetrate deeper into the realm of meaning. On the other hand, it 
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could be a reflection of the timing of the surveys. As was mentioned above, the first 
survey was conducted in 2011 shortly after Serbia was granted visa-free travel in the 
Schengen Zone. The Eurobarometer survey was conducted in 2013, two years after Serbs 
had been able to enjoy these benefits. In this sense, freer travel does not necessarily 
equate to having had to attain EU membership. Furthermore, after having experienced the 
ability to travel more freely over the course of the two years, the initial enthusiasm over 
this benefit may have begun to wear off in the Serbian public.  
 
Generational 
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(Source: European Fund for the Balkans, 2011)258 
 
The above surveys intend to highlight generational differences in attitudes on 
various questions related to EU accession. For the most part, there are not dramatic 
differences between the 1971 and 1991 cohort of respondents. Majorities from both 
groups indicated that they support EU membership, that EU membership will be 
economically beneficial, that the EU will likely disintegrate, and that EU membership 
will have no influence on national identity. The younger generation tends to have slightly 
stronger positive attitudes toward the EU, but only marginally so. The most noteworthy 
implication of this survey has to do with the question about whether he EU will dissolve 
like Yugoslavia. First, the older generation believes more strongly than the younger 
generation that the EU will dissolve with 73 percent to 54 percent of individuals 
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answering that dissolution is either likely or very likely, respectively. Second, it is 
somewhat paradoxical to consider that majorities of the two groups responded that they 
both favor membership and believe that the EU will dissolve. Granted, the question about 
dissolution does not define the parameters of how, when, and why the dissolution of the 
EU might unfold. Nevertheless, if respondents still believe that EU membership is a 
worthwhile pursuit despite while concurrently holding that if will not survive, then we 
can assume that either the short-run benefits of membership are enough to motivate 
political elite or that the consequences of EU dissolution are null. This is to say that the 
status of a state like Serbia in a post-EU Europe is likely considered no different than its 
current pre-accession. The idea of no longer being ‘in Europe’ is non-threatening when 
considered from the position of already being ‘outside’ Europe. 
 
General Change Over time 
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(Source: Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2011)259 
 
The trend of support for EU membership is clearly on the decline. In 2006, 65 
percent of respondents answered that membership was “good.” The percentage of people 
who think that EU membership is “good” decreased in each subsequent iteration of the 
survey. By 2011, the percentage of support was down to 36 percent. In the treatment of 
the Croatian case, it was found that during the same time range, support for membership 
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remained stable but those replying “neither” or “don’t know” increased, thus implying a 
rising tide of indifference. In the case of Serbia, the opposite is true. Support declines 
while the “neither” and “don’t know” responses remain relatively stable. The decline in 
support coincides with a trend toward proximity and engagement with the EU. It also 
encompasses the period when the European and global economies went into a tailspin. 
This suggests that, for the public, the positive images of the EU as being synonymous 
with economic prosperity, peaceful stability, and democracy begin to erode as the 
realities of the economy grow more dire and the more closely that Serbia interacts with 
the EU and the closer it becomes involved with its institutions. 
 
Public Opinion Data - Kosovo 
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(Source: Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2011)260 
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(Source: Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2011)263 
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(Source: Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2011)267 
 
If we take all of the surveys on Kosovo together, a clear and pointed picture of 
support for EU membership and euro-enthusiasm comes to the fore. Overwhelming 
majorities of respondents indicate that the EU will mean more employment opportunities, 
economic development, freer travel, stronger rule of law, higher wages, and less 
                                                
267 Op. Cit. 249. 
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corruption. Additionally, the benefits of EU accession will be distributed to everyone and 
EU membership will not amount to a loss of sovereignty.  
Support is equally enjoyed between the younger and older generations. Also, 
unlike respondents from Serbia, both generations of respondents from Kosovo did not 
believe that the EU would disintegrate like Yugoslavia and that EU membership would, 
in fact, strengthen national identity. Furthermore, support for EU membership is 
extremely high over time.  
On the other hand, like the Serbian respondents, Kosovar respondents believe that 
EU accession will lead to more competition for national businesses and national 
resources will be exploited. Both population indicated that in the interest of leaders and 
that leaders are doing all they can to advance accession, yet leaders are performing poorly 
in terms of settling disputes with neighboring countries and making progress 
implementing EU reforms/adopting EU laws. Moreover, as it pertains to identification 
Kosovar survey-takers, like their Serb counterparts, show that they are able to hold 
affinities for multiple identities – Europe, the Balkans, and Kosovo. The level of 
identification with Europe was stronger in the case of Kosovo with 81 percent identifying 
“moderately,” “very,” or “extremely” strongly with Europe as compared to 50 percent 
among Serbs. 
The general view from Kosovar public opinion is that the EU is an extremely 
positive and desirable destination. This is not surprising when considering the extent to 
which the international community and the EU are present and involved in Kosovo, both 
protecting and supporting their claims to an independent and peaceful existence. The 
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institutional infrastructure of the state of Kosovo is deeply entangled with the institutions 
of the countries and international organizations that support the peacekeeping efforts 
there. For political elites in Kosovo, the challenge of EU accession will not be a matter of 
convincing the public of its merits, but rather to have the political courage to disentangle 
themselves from their protectors and create thriving independent institutions. So long as 
Serbia holds the line of non-recognition, Kosovar Albanians will feel threatened and the 
need for support from strong allies within the international community, most notably the 
United States.  
 
Impact of Accession Process on Political Institutions 
 
Serbia 
 
Figure 147 
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(Source: Freedom House, 2013)268 
                                                        Figure 148 
NIT 2013, Insitutional Data (Serbia)
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268 Freedom House, Freedom in the World, Country Status and Ratings 1973-2013 
(Washington, 2013). 
269 Freedom House, Nations in Transit (Washington, 2013). 
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                                                               Figure 149 
 
(Source: Freedom House, 2013)270 
             
                                                                Figure 150 
 
((Source: Freedom House, 2013)271 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
270 Ibid. 
271 Ibid. 
206 
 
Figure 151 
State Fragility Index - Serbia (Polity IV)
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272 Polity IV Project, State Fragility Index and Matrix (2012), 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/SFImatrix2012c.pdf. 
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                                                               Figure 152 
Polity Score - Serbia (Polity IV)
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(Source: Polity IV, 2012)273 
 
The above graphs demonstrate a general pattern of improvement of democratic 
quality and of democratic institutions. These results are similar to what was witnessed in 
the Croatian case. The most recent measures taken place Serbia just slightly behind 
Croatia in some areas of democratic performance and stability, but the differences are not 
great enough that it would warrant putting Serbia in a different category of ‘freedom’ or 
‘stability.’274 These indices show that since the fall of the Milosevic regime, Serbia has 
worked steadily to become a stable and free democracy. Certainly, more work can be 
                                                
273 Polity IV Project, Polity IV Annual Time-Series 1800-2012 (2012), 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2012.pdf. 
274 For instance, Croatia scored a 1 for political rights in the most recent Freedom House 
Survey, whereas Serbia scored a 2. Croatia’s most recent Polity Score is a 9 whereas 
Serbia’ in an 8. Croatia’s fragility index was a 2 while Serbia’s was a 5 (on a scale of 0 to 
25).  
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done to improve and consolidate this position, but these figures speak to the progress that 
has been made. Like Croatia, Serbia performed most poorly in the areas of corruption and 
independence of the media while showing strength in terms of its civil society sector.  
The state fragility and polity scores experienced a brief period of weakening 
performance around 2003-2005. This can be attributed to uncertainty in the outcome of 
the debate over whether or not Serbia and Montenegro would remain in union with one 
another and the degree to which government authorities would allow the potential 
separation to take place through democratic channels (i.e. through referendum).  
In the chapter on Croatia, it was argued that actively negotiating the chapters of 
the acquis lead to real gains in terms of the democratic quality of institutions and the 
prospect of such institutions surviving. Serbia is close to beginning its own accession 
negotiation, but given that the general trends we see here match what was experience in 
Croatia, one can suggest that Serbia has been undergoing democratic reforms not only to 
get up to speed in order to sign an SAA and achieve candidacy, but also in anticipation of 
a strict and challenging negotiation process. In this sense, Serbia is responding positively 
from the passive pressures of the EU presence and her hope to join one day.  
Finally, Serbia and Croatia’s Democracy Scores and Corruption Scores were 
compared to those of Romania and Bulgaria. We observe that between 2007-2013, with 
both the Democracy Score and Corruption Score indicators, candidates showed a 
downward trend (suggesting improvement) while members experienced an upward trend 
(suggesting retrogression). This provides further evidence to support the claim that active 
involvement of the EU during the accession process leads to positive institutional 
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outcomes while lack of post-accession oversight in these cases may contribute to 
institutional backsliding. 
 
Kosovo 
                                                           Figure 153 
NIT 2013, Institutional Data (Kosovo)
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(Source: Freedom House, 2013)275 276 
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State Fragility Index - Kosovo (Polity 
IV)
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                                                                 Figure 155 
Polity Score - Kosovo (Polity IV)
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(Source: Polity IV, 2012)278 
 
The data on Kosovo only goes back to 2008 when it declared independence from 
Serbia. In that time, the indices provided by Polity  - the Polity Score and the State 
Fragility Index show that Kosovo has become relatively stable democracy. These results 
are debatable especially when one looks how poorly Kosovo rated in practically every 
area of the Nations in Transit study on democratic institutions. Local democratic 
institutions and civil society were the only elements of Kosovar democracy that scored 
under 5 (the scale is 1 = best and 7 = worst). In many ways, given its disputed status and 
the embeddedness of the international community into its institutional infrastructure, it is 
                                                
278 Op. Cit. 273. 
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not surprising that Kosovo performed so poorly in these areas. Likewise, it is not highly 
probable that Kosovo will witness improvement unless solutions to these impediments 
begin to be forged, starting with local elections that encompass both the Serb and 
Albanian population, an issue that will be discussed at length in the next section.  
 
Recent Developments 
 
Elections for Autonomous Association of Serb Municipalities in Kosovo  
 
Decentralization is one model for post-conflict transformation that has been tried 
in Kosovo. Municipalities have a fair amount of decision-making authority as exercised 
through the municipal assembly. This model has not been as successful as observers 
would hope, especially in homogeneous municipalities where one ethnic group is 
dominant. Here, the salience of ethnicity continues to stoke tension and animosity, 
particularly between communities that have either homogeneous Serb or Albanian 
populations. In heterogeneous communities that have significant numbers of other 
minority groups such as Bosniaks, Turks, Roma, and Gorani, greater inter-ethnic 
cooperation has resulted from decentralization mechanisms, leading to a greater sense of 
unity in Kosovar society.279 While this is a positive development, it does not seem to 
resolve the conflict between Serbs and Albanians, the country’s main ethnic cleavage. 
The extent of difficulty in bridging this gap is well-known. The most recent and boldest 
attempt to address the conflict transpired in Brussels after a series of talks in early 2013. 
                                                
279 David Loew, “Decentralization as a Model for Conflict Transformation: The Case of 
Kosovo,” Center for Conflict Studies, Working paper no. 16 (2013): 20-22. 
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On April 19, 2013 a landmark deal was struck between Belgrade and Pristina. 
After months of intense negotiations between the two governments, mediated by EU 
special representative Catherine Ashton, the two sides agreed to work toward establishing 
an autonomous Association of Serb Municipalities in Kosovo. The deal is intended to 
give greater representation to the Serb minorities living in Kosovo. The problem of lack 
of representation has been particularly acute for the Serb population living north of the 
Ibar River. The deal that was agreed to would establish a separate judicial branch for 
cases involving Serb defendants and give greater weight to Serb municipalities to 
determine the leadership of local police forces patrolling in the north. The negotiations 
between Belgrade and Pristina were being conducting under the auspices of EU oversight 
with the understanding that cooperation to normalize relations between the two 
governments would be rewarded by both sides being allowed to take steps that would 
advance their prospects of EU membership. For Belgrade, it was the hope of being green-
lighted to begin the accession negotiation. For Pristina, it was the hope of starting the 
Stabilization and Association Process.   
In early December 2013, local elections in Kosovo were held, marking the most 
significant step toward implementing the April 19th Brussels Agreement. It was also the 
first time since 1999 that elections in the Serb-majority northern part of the territory were 
conducted under the laws of the Republic of Kosovo. The elections were by no means a 
success. Serbs in northern Kosovo held numerous protests in the months leading up to the 
election and threatened to boycott them. During the first round, numerous violent 
incidents occurred including an attack on the eventual mayor-elect of Mitrovica, Krstimir 
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Pantic’s home was invaded and he was hospitalized. Several polling stations were 
vandalized by hard-line Serbian nationalists who smashed windows, threw tear gas, and 
destroyed ballot boxes. Voter turnout in the north was low – approximately 22 percent. 
Despite the violence, low turnout, and irregularities, leaders in Belgrade and Pristina 
hailed the elections as a historic first step. Serbs were able to win mayorships all the 
municipalities with a Serb-majority population.  
Now that elections have been conducted and certified, organizing and integrating 
these representative bodies into the overall institutional infrastructure of the Republic of 
Kosovo will be the next big challenge. Already, mayors representing Serb-majority 
municipalities have refused to take part in meetings of the national council of mayors 
because invitations to these events where delivered on official state letterhead with the 
seal of the Republic of Kosovo. Next on the agenda for implementing the Brussels 
agreement will be for the mayors of the Serb municipalities to convene and draw up a 
charter incorporating the Autonomous Association of Serb Municipalities. When that is 
complete, then individual municipalities can elect whether or not they wish to join. Talks 
on this issue are slated to begin in late January or early February 2014.  
 
Elite Survey 
 
Serbia 
 
Again, the following is derived from a set of expert interviews I conducted during 
trips to the region between 2012 and 2014. Participants’ identities were protected, so no 
direct attribution is given for the quotations.  
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By and large, the Serbian experts responses mirrored the trends that we saw 
emerge in the Croatian segment of the survey. There were, however, a few notable 
differences. To the question of what EU integration is about, in addition to free markets, 
individuals answered that freedom of movement/labor mobility was a key feature of the 
economic narrative. For many, this feature was one that drives a great deal of support for 
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the project. Many people, especially younger people, “can’t wait to leave” in search of 
greener pastures in the more developed economies of Germany, Britain, or France.  
In terms of differences in the responses highlighting integration as political, the 
underlying reasons were the same, but framed differently. Serbian participants repeatedly 
understood and described EU integration as a process of becoming a “normal” country. 
When asked to further define what a “normal” country is, respondents described the main 
attributes of liberal democracy – free elections, rule of law, etc. Naturally, this connects 
well with the answers of those who pointed to EU integration as being about identity. 
Unlike the Croatians, who thought of integration a subtle means of disassociating from 
Balkans, Serbian participants hoped EU integration would soften the Balkan stigma or re-
brand its image. The idea of shucking off or supplanting the Balkan identity was never 
expressed. The notion of becoming a “normal” country connotes that Serbia desires to be 
like the “West,” but not necessarily be part the “West.” Also, it is clear that citizens feel 
their country is abnormal. This feeling is, in part, a response to external perception, both 
of how it is perceived from the outside and how it perceives normalcy when looking 
outward. The feeling is reinforced when, looking inward, people see corrupt politicians, 
poor social service provision, and languishing public infrastructure projects. Integration 
becomes a means to achieve what is understood as normalcy, even if normalcy is 
externally defined.  
On the question of survey-takers’ personal opinions, like the Croatian 
participants, despite articulating incisive critiques of the EU, most believed that it would 
do more good than bad for Serbia. In the Serbian case, people expressed that even if the 
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EU was not going about reform the right way, they highly doubted that the political class 
would have the motivation to initiate reforms on their own. In this sense, slow or partial 
reform is thought to be better than the status quo.  
In terms of how the government talks about the EU, unlike Croatia, a majority of 
respondents felt that the government did talk about the EU. In fact, many expressed that 
the talk about it too much or that they do not talk about anything else. They think that 
people are sick of hearing about it. Like Croatia, what is said about the EU is almost 
uniformly positive. Some believe that the reason government only talks about the EU is 
in order to mask the fact that it is inept and cannot tackle the challenges of governing, so 
it distracts the public with a positive story of the future prosperity that awaits the country 
once it is a member of the EU.  
As for public opinion, support is perceived as diminishing over time. This was the 
case for Croatia. Serbia has been reaching milestones on its EU journey and as it gets 
closer to integration, the demands are more real and conditions harder to accept. In 
addition to support for the EU decreasing over time, survey participants described public 
opinion going in waves where opposition would spike when fulfillment of specific 
conditions were demanded. These included anything to do with Kosovo or the ICTY. 
When the EU is not asking Serbia to hand over an alleged war criminal or recognize 
Kosovo, citizens generally support EU integration. 
Serbian experts reasoned the question of European identity very much in the same 
way that the Croatian experts did. This is to say that people generally see European 
identity as having no meaningful content. Although, most say that there is a little 
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something to it. Whether it be a context specific understanding (like if a French person 
and Serb were both in the United States, they might identify more with one another than 
with an American), or understanding it as something that maybe northern Europeans feel. 
Respondents expressed that it still is a long way from being a full-fledged identity 
construct. Although, one skeptical individual stated that there is something magical or to 
be desired about the red passport – it makes you become part of a world, a class, and a 
culture. 
For select quotes from the interviews see Appendix B. 
 
 
Kosovo 
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The above results include participant living north and south of the Ibar River, the 
de facto dividing line between the Serb and Albanian communities of Kosovo. I was able 
to recruit more participants in the north, and these charts are likely biased accordingly. 
Nevertheless, even if this does not meet the rigors of quantitative scientific inquiry, it is 
important to listen to the voices of those living in contested space and try to make sense 
of it.  
There are a few notable differences between this case and the first two. First, it 
was clear to respondents that the EU was mostly about politics and not about identity. 
When people spoke of politics, they referred primarily to the political status of Kosovo 
and less to the development of political institutions. Institutions are desired, but status 
must come first. Identity, which seemed so starkly on display in Mitrovica, a city fully-
divided between ethnic Serbs and Albanians, was surprisingly de-emphasized in 
participants narratives. Those who did include that EU integration had something to do 
with identity were Albanian and expressed that it would make Kosovo more like Europe. 
Second, these were the same people that indicated that EU identity is a strong concept, 
and one for which they have significant attachment. Otherwise, EU identity was seen as 
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meaningless. Finally, an overwhelming majority of individuals said that their government 
speaks positively about the EU. This cuts across ethnic lines, whether you regard 
Belgrade or Pristina as housing the legitimate government of Kosovo, you will find a 
very pro-EU government in power.   
For select quotes from the interviews see Appendix B. 
 
 
Content Analysis  
 
The following is an attempt to use the techniques of content analysis to identify 
trends in the discourse employed by political elites of Serbia between the years 2006-
2012. The individuals chosen held the post of President or Prime Minister during the 
years in question, with the exception of Aleksander Vucic who is the current Prime 
Minister. Sampled were all media statements reported in Tanjug, the state-sponsored 
media company, during the aforementioned years. Translation was provided by World 
News Connection, a US government operated service that monitors foreign media.280  
While the expert survey helped decode subtextual aspects of elite discourse, the 
content analysis was intended to examine text at face value to discover trends and 
correspondences. Using Dedoose, a web app designed for qualitative research, over four 
thousand public statements made by figures serving as President and Prime Minister of 
Serbia between 2006-2012 and reported by the nation’s largest media outfit were coded 
and analyzed. Specifically, this effort was aimed at generating data to help us understand 
the volume and frequency of discourse Serbian elites were producing about Europe or 
                                                
280 Complete sample material is only available through 2012. World News Connection, 
operated through the Department of Commerce was defunded in 2013 amidst battles over 
the budget in the US Congress.  
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about issues of national concern, such as the status of Kosovo. In addition to the volume 
of discourse, the analysis examined if these messages were framed in terms of politics, 
economy, or identity. Results were compiled and visually represented below by three-
factor co-occurrence graphs, code frequency tables, or a code ratio table. Political elites 
whose statements were selected for examination are among the most prominent political 
figures to occupy the Serbian political landscape in the post-Milosevic era. Likewise, 
they control the levers of power, and have the authority to steward their state toward the 
European Union or away from it.  Coding rules and brief biographical synopses of the 
each of the figures examined is provided prior to the results of the content analysis. 
Results are followed by focused, re-contextualized discussion of their implications.  
 
Coding was simple and straightforward as to hone in on subjects of interest to this 
research. Coding rules are as follows:  
 
Excerpted statements were compiled for five political elites: Ivica Dacic, 
Tomislav Nikolic, Aleksander Vucic, Vojislav Kostunica, and Boris Tadic. In total, 4451 
statements were examined. To learn more about these individuals, a brief biographical 
sketch is provided below:  
 
Ivica Dacic- Ivica Dacic has been the leader of the left-wing Serbian Socialist 
Party (SPS) since 2000. Dacic took over party leadership after Slobodan Milosevic was 
ousted from power and transferred to the Hague. Prior to assuming leadership of the SPS, 
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Dacic served as its spokesperson from 1992-2000. It was for this high profile role and his 
close relationship with Milosevic that he earning the nickname “Little Sloba” (little 
Slobodan). Dacic served as Minister of Internal Affairs from 2008-2014 and Prime 
Minister from 2012-2014. He is currently the Minister of Foreign Affairs and First 
Deputy Prime Minister.  
Tomislav Nikolic- Tomislav Nikolic is a right-wing conservative politician. He 
began his political career as the vice president of the People’s Radical Party. He initiated 
the merger of the People’s Radical Party with Hague-indictee Vojislav Seselj’s Serbian 
National Renewal party, forming the Serbian Radical Party (SRS). In 2008, Nikolic split 
with Seselj to create the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). He served as an MP beginning 
1991, and was speaker of the National Assembly in 2007. In 2012, Nikolic was elected 
President of Serbia after defeating Boris Tadic in a runoff. He currently holds that 
position.  
Aleksander Vucic- Aleksander Vucic is also a right-wing conservative politician 
and current leader of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). He was a longtime MP and 
influential member of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), serving as the Minister of 
Information of Serbia from 1998-2000. Vucic followed Nikolic when the SNS split from 
Seselj’s SRS. Vucic became SNS party leader in 2012 after Nikolic stepped down when 
assuming the Presidency. From 2012-2013, Vucic served as the Minister of Defense. In 
March 2014 he was elected Prime Minister of Serbia and has held that post since April 
2014.  
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Vojislav Kostunica- Vojislav Kostunica was a founding member of the center-left 
Democratic Party (DS), but later formed the right-wing conservative Democratic Party of 
Serbia (DSS). He was the last President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ousting 
Slobodan Milosevic in the 2000 election. Kostunica served two terms as Prime Minister, 
first between 2004-2007, then again between 2007-2008. An outspoken anti-communist 
and harsh critic of Tito, Milosevic, and the West, Kostunica was once thought of as a 
great reformer. His political fortunes have faded, however, as his DSS failed to reach the 
5 percent threshold to gain parliamentary representation after elections in March 2014. 
This result prompted Kostunica to retire from active politics. 
Boris Tadic- Boris Tadic was the long-time leader of the center-left Democratic 
Party (DS). He became a member soon after its founding in 1990. He became the party 
leader in 2003 after the assassination of then Prime Minister and DS President Zoran 
Dindic. Tadic served two terms President of Serbia between 2004 and 2012. He stepped 
down  in 2012 in order to spark early elections, which led to his defeat by Tomislav 
Nikolic. In 2014, Tadic left the DS to form the New Democratic Party (NDS), now 
known as the Social Democratic Party (SDS). The move was made to enable Tadic to 
stand in the 2014 parliamentary election, where the SDS won 9 seats.  
  
To each individual’s set of excerpted statements, codes were applied following these 
rules: 
 
1. Time: a year code was applied to indicate when the statement was made (2006-
2012). 
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2. Characterization of Europe: 
a. Positive – mentions the EU or “Europe” (meaning EU) in a favorable way, 
either as a generality or in response to a specific policy or program; 
overtly states an intention to pursue policies, reforms or treaties that will 
lead to EU membership; expresses general support or orientation toward 
the EU. 
  
Sub-codes – statements describe a specific rationale for positive 
support.281  
   
i. economy – mentions general economic benefits such as trade or 
job opportunities; expresses support for a specific economic policy or 
describes the positive outcomes of such a policy  
 ii. identity – affirms a historic, present or future sense of belonging 
to “Europe” or the EU; describes policies or programs as “European” in 
character, value or spirit  
 iii. politics – mentions the importance of political alliance with 
EU; explains how EU will spur positive institutional reform in areas such 
as rule of law, corruption, or judicial affairs; generally describes the EU as 
being important for improving the quality of democracy 
 
b. Neutral – statement contains no apparent value judgment, but the EU is 
the subject; normally, this involves statements describing events that have 
occurred or will occur in the future. (“I plan to meet with EU officials on 
Monday”)  
 
c. Negative – mentions the EU or “Europe” (meaning EU) in an unfavorable 
way, either as a generality or in response to a specific policy or program; 
overtly warns of the danger of pursuing policies, reforms or treaties that 
will lead to EU membership; expresses general disdain, dissatisfaction 
toward the EU or those who support an EU orientation. 
  
Sub-codes – statements describe a specific rationale for negative 
standpoint.  
   
i. economy – mentions general economic harms such as threats to 
trade or job opportunities; expresses opposition to specific economic 
policy or describes the negative outcomes of such a policy  
 ii. identity – might affirm historic, present or future sense of 
belonging to “Europe” but not the EU; mentions how the demands of EU 
membership threaten national cultural heritage, values, lands, peoples, or 
traditions 
                                                
281 Sub-codes represent the three major narrative frames established earlier in this work. 
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 iii. politics – mentions the detriments of political alliance with EU; 
explains how EU will not spur positive institutional reform in areas such 
as rule of law, corruption, or judicial affairs; generally describes the EU 
having a democratic deficit; warns of being ruled from Brussels 
 
3. Mention of Kosovo – leaders unequivocally support the position that Kosovo 
remains part of Serbia. They reject the unilaterally declared independence of 
Kosovo. Any statement on Kosovo should be recorded and understood as 
reinforcement of this policy. This includes statements of policies, missions, 
history, negotiations, reports of violence, commemorations of past atrocities, or 
blanket statements such as “Kosovo is Serbia.” 
 
4. Other – this includes subjects that do not fit into the above categories such as 
discussion of electoral results, political coalition formation, third country trade or 
political events, or miscellaneous events such as holiday celebrations, etc. 
 
Frequency counts are the basic building block of this analysis. Dedoose has several tools 
that display data in a way that helps illustrate relationships among data from which we 
can draw meaningful conclusions. This exercise is not intended to be a highly 
sophisticated quantitative analysis. It is intended rather to offer some basic quantification 
that will fortify the merit of the research’s qualitative assertions.  
 What is the overall picture of official discourse among the highest echelon of the 
Serbian political elite?                       
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                                                                Figure 166 
 
Above is a code co-occurrence table and it is displayed as a heat map – the closer in color 
to blue the less frequent two codes occur in tandem, the closer to red the more frequent. 
This represents all codes from all political elites samples over all time periods. In other 
words this is a complete picture of all data compiled. 
 
Some observations: 
 
• Greatest number of mentions= Kosovo (1826) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 europe-(negative)-economy -identity -politics europe-(neutral)europe-(positive)-economy -identity -politics kosovo other Totals
2006 9 5 4 2 83 9 5 8 172 102 399
2007 28 3 11 3 48 4 3 2 232 75 409
2008 75 1 4 23 20 90 21 8 14 192 155 603
2009 21 1 3 6 1 39 3 11 4 70 77 236
2010 13 1 1 1 10 80 12 11 13 110 77 329
2011 22 2 2 6 93 14 4 8 160 84 395
2012 46 7 6 5 8 178 46 13 28 270 245 852
europe-(negative) 9 28 75 21 13 22 46 10 24 51 3 1 2 154 459
-economy 1 1 1 7 10 1 1 4 26
-identity 5 3 4 3 1 2 6 24 1 5 8 62
-politics 4 11 23 6 1 2 5 51 1 5 1 1 27 138
europe-(neutral) 2 3 20 1 10 6 8 33 83
europe-(positive) 83 48 90 39 80 93 178 3 1 108 53 76 295 1 1148
-economy 9 4 21 3 12 14 46 1 1 108 8 26 39 292
-identity 5 3 8 11 11 4 13 2 53 8 13 24 155
-politics 8 2 14 4 13 8 28 76 26 13 36 228
kosovo 172 232 192 70 110 160 270 154 4 8 27 33 295 39 24 36 1826
other 102 75 155 77 77 84 245 1 816
Totals 399 409 603 236 329 395 852 459 26 62 138 83 1148 292 155 228 1826 816
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• Positive depictions of Europe= 1148; 675 of which were subcoded to reflect the 
specific rationale for positive support: Economic=292/675 (43.3 percent), Identity 
155/675 (22.9 percent), Politics 228/675 (33.7 percent)  
• Negative depictions of Europe= 459; 226 of which were subcoded to reflect the 
specific rationale for positive support: Economic=26/226 (11.5 percent), Identity 
62/226 (27.4 percent), Politics 138/226 (61.1 percent)  
• Co-occurrence of Europe (pos) and Kosovo=295 
• Co-occurrence of Europe (neg) and Kosovo=154 
• Greatest spike in Europe (neg) = 2008 (75) 
• Greatest spike in Europe (pos) = 2012 (178) 
• 2008 and 2012 also received the greatest mentions of Kosovo 
• Ratio of Europe(pos):Europe(neg) consistently favors (pos) 
 
Do trends in discourse differ among different elite figures? 
 
Europe (neg) by Europe (neg) by Kosovo: 
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                                                          Figure 167 
 
 
This could be put on just one axis, there is no linear relationship, it is simply set up to 
give a better visual representation of the data. The higher the individual is on the axis, the 
more negative depictions of Europe they have presented. The size of the bubble 
represents mentions of Kosovo. The goal is to see who spoke negatively most frequently 
about Europe and to relate that to how frequently they spoke of Kosovo. 
 
• Nikolic speaks most frequently in the negative about Europe, but mentions 
Kosovo the fourth most.  
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• Kostunica speaks second most frequently in the negative about Europe and 
mentions Kosovo the second most. 
• Tadic speaks the second least frequently in the negative about Europe and 
mentions Kosovo the most. 
 
Europe (pos) by Europe (pos) by Kosovo: 
                                                     Figure 168 
 
 
Here we are looking at it from the opposite standpoint, in terms of the positive. 
Dacic expresses positivity the second most frequently and mentions Kosovo the third 
most. Kostunica is second least positive about Europe and, again, mentions Kosovo the 
second most. Tadic is the most positive about Europe and mentions Kosovo the most. 
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Europe (pos) by Europe (neg) by Kosovo: 
 
                                                      Figure 169 
 
 
This shows positive vs. negative and Kosovo mentions. We see that although 
Nikolic was the most negative of the bunch, overall he expresses more positive than 
negative, but the ratio is nearly even. Dacic is distinctly more positive than negative. 
Kostunica is slightly more negative then positive, but like Nikolic, the ratio is relatively 
even. Tadic is strongly more positive than negative. This naturally leads to a question of 
variation. Are the elites consistently talking out of both sides of their mouth or is there a 
shift in rhetoric? When? Why? 
 
Does elite discourse vary over time? How does it vary as a general pattern of all elites? 
How does it vary for particular individual figures? 
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Nikolic code frequency table: 
 
                                                              Figure 170 
 
 
Dacic code frequency table: 
 
                                                              Figure 171 
 
 
Kostunica code frequency table: 
 
                                                                Figure 172 
 
 
Tadic code frequency table: 
 
                                                                 Figure 173 
 
 
 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 europe-(negative)-economy -identity -politics europe-(neutral)europe-(positive)-economy -identity -politics kosovo other
Dacic:-2012 444 15 2 5 2 6 61 12 7 8 101 99
Dacic:-2009 85 3 2 1 1 15 1 6 2 11 42
Dacic:-2010 82 3 12 6 5 18 22
Dacic:-2008 109 2 2 5 17 4 4 23 32
Dacic:-2011 149 13 2 1 2 20 1 58 30
Dacic:-2007 21 1 1 1 11 7
Dacic:-2006 9 1 3 4
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 europe-(negative) -economy -identity -politics europe-(neutral) europe-(positive) -economy -identity -politics kosovo other
Nikolic:-2011 67 1 11 2 4 13 12
Nikolic:-2008 126 28 1 2 21 9 10 2 1 4 36 60
Nikolic:-2010 33 2 1 1 2 6 1 2 12 7
Nikolic:-2009 26 1 1 2 1 1 5 11
Nikolic:-2006 52 8 5 4 19 21
Nikolic:-2007 72 15 2 10 1 28 29
Nikolic:-2012 1 419 14 1 3 1 53 17 1 14 90 60
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 europe-(negative) -economy -identity -politics europe-(neutral) europe-(positive) -economy -identity -politics kosovo other
Kostunica:-2009 10 4 6 3
Kostunica:-2007 267 5 1 12 2 108 15
Kostunica:-2008 205 40 2 3 13 2 2 2 63 23
Kostunica:-2006 287 1 34 1 5 3 84 38
Kostunica:-2010 24 9 1 8 6
Kostunica:-2011 15 3 1 1 7 3
Kostunica:-2012 44 14 2 1 14 3
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 europe-(negative)-economy -identity -politics europe-(neutral)europe-(positive)-economy -identity -politics kosovo other
tadic:-2009 198 13 1 1 4 22 1 4 2 47 21
tadic:-2007 268 35 4 1 2 73 21
tadic:-2008 342 5 2 49 12 5 4 68 28
tadic:-2006 255 1 49 8 5 62 35
tadic:-2010 260 2 4 60 9 5 6 70 37
tadic:-2011 211 4 4 60 10 4 4 77 31
tadic:-2012 85 37 14 3 2 33 23
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Vucic code frequency table: 
 
                                                                 Figure 174 
 
 
 
Table 1: Ratio of Europe (pos):(neg) 
 
Year Dacic Kostunica Nikolic Tadic Vucic 
2006 0:1 34:0 0:8 49:1 0:0 
2007 1:1 12:5 0:15 35:0 0:1 
2008 17:2 13:40 10:28 49:2 1:1 
2009 15:3 0:4 2:1 22:0 0:0 
2010 12:0 0:9 6:2 60:4 2:1 
2011 20:13 1:3 11:1 60:4 1:0 
2012 61:15 0:14 53:14 37:0 27:1 
(Red=negative ratio; Green=positive ratio; Black=neutral) 
 
Dacic maintains positive ratio more or less throughout the time scope. Kostunica 
begins positive, then becomes negative in 2008 and continues negative trend. Nikolic is 
the opposite. He is negative in up until 2008 and then becomes positive beyond 2008 and 
beyond. Tadic is overwhelmingly positive throughout the entire time frame examined 
here. Vucic has very few data points from 2006-2011. Once he assumes SNS party 
leadership after Nikolic’s election to the presidency, however, his media presence 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 europe-(negative)-economy -identity -politics europe-(neutral)europe-(positive)-economy -identity -politics kosovo other
Vucic:-2006 10 4 4
Vucic:-2012 191 3 2 1 27 3 2 4 31 60
Vucic:-2007 19 7 1 1 12 3
Vucic:-2008 28 1 1 1 2 13
Vucic:-2009 1 1
Vucic:-2010 10 1 2 2 2 3
Vucic:-2011 16 1 1 1 5 8
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significantly increases. We find that his ratio of positive to negative statements regarding 
Europe is pointedly positive. 
When we look closer at Vojislav Kostunica’s set of statements, the change in 
rhetoric can be easily traced back to the initialing of the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement with the EU in 2008. The agreement came amidst the backdrop of Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence and talks to find a status solution to the conflict.  
 
It would be really too much if they sold us 'a pig in a poke' and claimed that by 
signing the Stabilization and Association Agreement, Serbia had in fact 
recognized Kosovo's independence. [It is] of crucial importance for the signing of 
any document whether it is the interests of Serbia or the interests of Belgrade for 
that matter. There is no doubt that Brussels has its own interests, and their present, 
if not permanent, interest is that Serbia recognizes, directly or indirectly, the 
independence of Kosovo, the first NATO state. The first step the new government 
will have to make is to file lawsuits against the countries that unlawfully 
recognized the unilateral independence. […] This is the best message we can send 
to over 150 countries that recognize Serbia in its legitimate international borders. 
Our strongest weapon is international law and we have to use it in defending 
Serbia. Serbia's place is in the EU not because the Union is paradise on earth, 
which is complete nonsense. Serbia's place is in the EU because Serbia is an old 
European country. Of course, its place is in the EU only if it is regarded as one 
whole and as an equal state.282  
 
As is stated, Kostunica considered the action of signing the SAA as being tantamount to a 
formal recognition of Kosovo.  He was deeply skeptical of the agreement’s language and 
believed that Brussels, acting on behalf of the NATO alliance, was seeking to 
surreptitiously settle the status question by tricking Serbian representative into signing 
the document. In so doing, NATO would be completing the mission it began in 1999 with 
the launch its air campaign, for which the ultimate outcome was to create the independent 
                                                
282 Tanjug, “Serbia’s Kostunica Calls For Serious Talks with EU to Clarify Every SAA 
Article,” (April 23, 2008). 
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state of Kosovo. On the 9th anniversary of the beginning of that campaign, just days after 
the signing of the SAA Kostunica remarked: 
 
Now it is more than clear that the brutal destruction of Serbia in the NATO 
bombing had only one true goal and that was a transformation of the province of 
Kosovo-Metohija into the first NATO country in the world. The illegal building 
of the huge US military base Bondsteel and Annex 11 of the Ahtisaari Plan, 
which define NATO as the final authority in Kosovo, reveal the real goal of the 
brutal destruction of Serbia and of the illegal declaration of the NATO state on 
February 17.283 
 
Here, Kostunica alludes to the Ahtisaari Plan, which was the status solution for Kosovo 
that former Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari proposed to the United Nations in early 
2007. The Ahtisaari Plan envisioned a “supervised independence” of Kosovo. The 
proposal was negotiated through a series of high-level talks in Vienna knows as the 
Vienna Process. Talks broke down in late 2007 when it was clear that no progress could 
be made. One issue, detailed in Kostunica’s statement, was Annex 11, calling for the 
continued presence of an international peace keeping force – KFOR (Kosovo Force) – 
which operates under NATO auspices. Annex 10 of the Ahtisaari Plan calls for the 
implementation of a European Union Rule of Law mission (EULEX). EULEX was 
intended to serve as a policing force and aid in technical matters related to the 
administration of justice. Initially, EULEX was to function independently, but through 
strenuous opposition of the Serbia government, an agreement was reached to allow 
EULEX to operate under the umbrella of the UN and its mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).  
                                                
283 Tanjug, “Serbia’s Kostunica: Aim of NATO 1999 FRY Bombing Creation of First 
NATO State,” (March 24, 2008). 
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It is this series of events that form the basis of Kostunica’s statements. The fact 
that a majority of EU members were generally supportive of the Ahtisaari Plan, that the 
EU was advancing a mission congruent with the Ahtisaari Plan, and that NATO forces 
would remain in Kosovo was interpreted as a clear violation of territorial sovereignty and 
an attempt to sever Kosovo from Serbia.  Thus, the EU was creating a situation where 
Serbia was not “as one whole.”  
Boris Tadic, the president at the time and signatory to the SAA, described the 
agreement as simply a “trade agreement.” Kostunica strongly rebuked Tadic for putting 
his signature on the deal, claiming that the act was illegal, anti-state, and anti-
constitutional. Kosunica expresses this action as betrayal, saying that Tadic was, in fact, 
“putting a seal of Judas of his party coalition to the Solana Agreement.” 284 After the SAA 
was signed in March 2008, Kostunica dissolved parliament and called for elections to 
take place in 2008. 285 
In the election Boris Tadic’s Democratic Party (DS) won big, posting a net gain 
of 38 seats in the 250 seat assembly. Kostunica’s party, the Democratic Party of Serbia 
(DSS) lost a net total of 17 seats and finished third. Tadic’s DS party was part of the 
broader “For a European Serbia” coalition, which was given a mandate to form a 
government. Tadic chose coalition partner Mirko Cvetokovic, an independent, as 
                                                
284 B92, “DSS: EU Deal Signature, Seal of Judas,” (April 29, 2008). 
285 Kostunica refers to the SAA as the “Solana Agreement” because he believed the 
agreement was crafted in the interest of Solana, not Serbia nor the five member states of 
the EU that do not recognize Kosovo. Aside from being the Secretary-General of the 
Council of the European Union at the time of the agreement, Solana had been the 
Secretary-General of NATO who oversaw the intervention in Kosovo and the bombing 
campaign against former Yugoslavia in 1999. Kostunica thought the agreement was 
Solana’s way of concluding unfinished business in Kosovo.   
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Kostunica’s replacement for Prime Minister. Considering the result in view of these 
parties’ campaign slogans, the significance of the choice becomes evident – Kostunica’s 
podrzi srbiju! (support Serbia!) was defeated by Tadic’s za evropsku srbiju! (for a 
European Serbia!). 
2008 is generally regarded as the point at which a pro-EU consensus was 
established in Serbia. Kostunica’s anti-Europe discourse has continued since this turning 
point in 2008. He has continued to be outspoken on the issue of Kosovo and frequently 
blames the ruling parties for trading Kosovo for the EU or for being lapdogs for Brussels 
while mistakenly believing that Serbia’s accession is an important agenda item for the 
EU. For example, in late 2010 Kostunica made the following statement: 
The government's policy has become a delusion, one of its greatest deceits being 
the imposition of the topic of Serbia's accession to the EU. What constitutes the 
deceit is that, presently, EU accession is not the topic for Serbia at all, because it 
will take ten, fifteen, or maybe even twenty years before the issue of whether or 
not Serbia will join the EU will be discussed. The real topic and the true problem 
is the fact that the EU supports ethic Albanian secessionists in their efforts to 
constitute the state of Kosovo. The government is hiding this problem as if it did 
not exist and are trying to delude us by imposing the issue of Serbia's EU 
accession.286  
 
Consequently, his party has become increasingly marginal over time. The DSS suffered a 
net loss of 9 seats in the 2012 parliamentary elections. In the 2014 election, the DSS 
failed to reach the 5 percent threshold to earn one seat and currently has no representation 
in the National Assembly.  
 The most surprising and curious aspect of Serbian elite discourse is Tomislav 
Nikolic’s change of heart. It is difficult to explain how and why this once staunch 
                                                
286 Tanjug, “Serbia’s Kostunica: Government ‘Ready To Sacrifice Everything’ to EU 
‘Delusion’,” (September 24, 2010). 
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nationalist became an ardent supporter of Serbia’s path to EU membership. His change of 
heart propelled him to the presidency, defeating long-time EU proponent Boris Tadic in 
the 2012 election. During his political career, Nikolic has advocated several controversial 
positions including calls for a Greater Serbia (reclaiming territories in Croatia, Bosnia, 
and Montenegro), the incorporation of Serbia into a Belarus-Russia super-state, and anti-
western messages challenging the so-call hegemony of the United States and European 
Union.287 In 2008, when he split from the Radical Party, he began to promote a pro-EU 
discourse, baffling close observers of Serbian politics. It is perhaps at this juncture that 
the idea of “both Europe and Kosovo” becomes the dominant idea of Serbia politics and 
EU consensus is established. 
 Early adopters of a pro-EU stance like Boris Tadic proved that they could achieve 
electoral success through the propagation of the EU idea, persuading the public of its 
merits. In time, this leads to control over the idea as the government becomes 
increasingly comprised of members who favor an integrationist stance. Nikolic’s change 
of heart could be explained as a recognition of the power in the EU idea. By 2008, it has 
become untenable to try to mount a challenge to the idea because the tools of persuasion 
and control over the idea are no longer useful.  
 While this may help explain Nikolic’s change of heart, it does not help us fully 
understand his victory in the 2012 election. As we can see from the coding charts above, 
Tadic is a clear and consistent promoter of the “both Europe and Kosovo” idea 
throughout the time period in question, which includes his presidency. It is critical then, 
                                                
287 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Serbian Parliament Speaker Calls For Closer 
Russia Ties,” (May 9, 2007), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1076353.html.  
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to split the “both Europe and Kosovo” idea into two separate ideas and examine the 
extent to which the candidates are loyal to each of those ideas uniquely through their 
actions.  
 While Tadic could claim credit for the signing of the SAA and firmly planting 
Serbia on the EU path, Kosovo declared its independence and Ratko Mladic was handed 
over to the ICTY during his term. Tadic vehemently opposed Kosovo’s independence for 
sure and relations between the Serbian and Albania communities have been broken for 
decades. Nevertheless, independence came under his watch. Moreover, Mladic’s 
extradition was viewed in conservative circles as an act of bowing to EU pressure. In this 
sense, although Tadic’s discourse demonstrates support for territorial integrity these two 
events work to discredit his commitment to the Kosovo idea and show a skewing of favor 
toward the Europe idea among the Serbian public.  
 Nikolic, on the other hand, does not have as much of a record to stand on with 
respect to the Europe idea, but he has an immense amount of credibility for being a 
strong defender of the Serbian nation, culture and traditions and is a viewed as a more 
qualified guardian of the Kosovo idea. In the end, the election is close. Tadic bests 
Nikolic in the first round  25.31 percent to 25.05 percent, respectively. In the runoff, 
however, Nikolic comes out on top earning 49.54 percent of the vote to Tadic’s 47.31 
percent. This suggests that the Serbian public felt that, perhaps based on a perception that 
Tadic’s actions were skewing him toward the Europe idea, Nikolic would be a better 
defender of both the Europe and Kosovo ideas.  
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The notion that electoral success can be understood as a composite score based on 
your allegiance to both the Europe and Kosovo ideas also explains Ivica Dacic’s rise to 
Prime Minister. Dacic’s nationalist pedigree and reformed view of Europe has proved to 
be a winning combination. In essence, with the elections of Nikolic, Dacic, and then 
Vucic in 2014, we are not witnessing a challenged to the hegemony of the ideas of 
Kosovo or Europe. The power in these ideas is as potent as ever. The difference is that, 
on paper, those with control over these ideas appear less likely to make middle ground 
policy decisions, which will stall the enlargement proceedings. In deed, however, these 
individuals have made strides to move the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue and the accession 
negotiations forward. The true test of the power of the two ideas will come when 
concessions become much more onerous and a final status solution must be achieved. 
 
Conclusions 
 
A recent editorial written on Dacic describing his EU-pivot and role in the 
Belgrade-Pristina dialogue had this to say: 
…unofficial leaders of the Serbian civic movement […] all believe that the 
Serbian state representative is a great statesman, and he deserves praise because 
of his involvement in the Kosovo negotiation process. How did Dacic evolve 
from ‘Little Sloba (Slobodan Milosevic)’…into Churchill and de Gaulle? Has the 
civic Serbia, which is in favor of Kosovo's independence, uttered words of praise 
for the Serbian Prime Minister precisely because it seems to it that the negotiating 
process is moving in this direction?, Dacic should be given support in the 
negotiations on Kosovo. Serious progress in improving relations have been made 
for the first time.288 
 
                                                
288 B92, “How Dacic Evolved from Little Sloba to Churchill,” (February 25, 2013). 
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In addition, based on his involvement in the dialogue and his work to broker the April 
19th Brussels agreement, Dacic, along with his negotiating counterpart Kosovo Prime 
Minister, Hashim Thaci, is starting to receive ‘buzz’ for being a potential recipient of the 
Nobel Peace Prize. Although Dacic downplays his odds of winning, his response to a 
question on the subject is emblematic of the general air of absurdity that has surrounded 
Serbia’s journey toward integration and tells you all that you need to know about the state 
of relations between the two camps; he says: 
Should Thaci receive it or not is not something that we can be deciding about, and 
the chances of my getting it are a thousand to one so the issue should be put aside. 
The only good thing here is that somebody said something nice about us, and 
whether I like the company – well, I did not like the company even when I first 
sat down to negotiate. If I get it, I will think seriously about whether it should be 
received in such company at all.289  
 
No doubt, the EU mediated talks, which are anchored by the carrot of future 
membership have forged extremely important first steps. Yet, there remains a vast chasm 
between the Serbs and Albanians when it comes to meaningful reconciliation. The EU 
has heretofore used the membership prospect as an effective tool to actively lever the 
government of Serbia to pursue a path of reform based upon terms set for it by the EU. 
With the opening of the accession negotiation beginning in January 2014, it seems that 
progress will continue. There will be bumps in the road and difficulties closing chapters. 
The lion share of these difficulties will be technocratic or capacity related. Whether or 
                                                
289 B92, “PM Discusses Elections, Crime Cases, Nobel,” (December 31, 2013). 
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not Serbia will become a member rests on how Chapter 35 on Kosovo is handled. For 
now, the status question is being pushed as far into the future as possible.290  
As it stands, it is unclear which side’s bargaining strategy is creating a better 
illusion. By proceeding with Serbia’s accession with Kosovo being treated under UN 
resolution 1244 (status neutral), the EU is luring Serbia to continue to advance toward 
membership while holding the belief that they will never have to sacrifice her ‘southern 
province.’ According to this strategy, the EU hopes that by keeping that belief alive, 
Serbia will time and time again return to the negotiating table and eventually surrender to 
the reality of Kosovo’s independence while simultaneously building durable democratic 
institutions through adherence to the accession criteria prescribed by the aquis. Serbia, on 
the other hand, would like show that it is a willing reformer; that it is open to small, 
incremental changes. Behind this strategy is the idea that they can advance so far along 
EU path without having to recognize Kosovo that the EU will either have to let them in 
or force the issue before it is too late. The problem is that both sides are probably 
delusional or, at best, cannot foresee their own endgame or that of the other side. The EU 
does not want another Cyprus and Serbia does not want to lose Kosovo. If Serbia is 
forced to choose Europe or Kosovo, at this moment in time, it is hard to envision the 
political elite class doing anything but walking away from Europe. The symbolic value of 
what Kosovo means to national identity far outweighs the potential political or economic 
benefits of membership. For the time being, however, the Serbs are not being forced to 
choose between the two hegemonic ideas. The dream of both Europe and Kosovo (I 
                                                
290 Chapter 35 of accession treaty is normally reserved to treat ‘Other Issues.’ That is, any 
miscellaneous issue or issue that is specific to the candidate country in question. 
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Kosova i Evropa) remains alive, and the Kosovo’s final status remains in limbo until 
further notice.   
243 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the beginning it was noted that much of the scholarship on Europeanization has 
explained eastern enlargement according to the logics of materialism or constructivism.  
Materialists argue that candidates’ compliance with conditionality demands is rooted in 
strong external material incentives and a credible shot at membership, while 
constructivists point to shared identities, norms and values. This work addressed a critical 
element that is missing from the insights of materialism and constructivism. In particular, 
this study looked at how the dispersion of ideas influences institutional outcomes in 
candidate states. The research demonstrated that in order for the EU to have a 
transformative impact on the political institutions of the states of former Yugoslavia, 
national political leaders needed to communicate a convincing narrative of EU legitimacy 
that resonates with national narratives of legitimacy when justifying policy choices. The 
project went beyond an analysis of compliant/non-compliant behavior to unearth a 
greater understanding of how elite discourse operates as an agent to reshape histories, 
form new identities, and mold preferences. These processes have profound policy 
implications for the new regimes and influence decision-making behavior that affects 
institutional development at both the EU and state level.  
Using a combination of content analysis and an original elite survey, this research 
found that elites’ ability to express power through ideas and over ideas can transform 
power in ideas for the cases of Croatia and Serbia/Kosovo. For Croatia, this entailed 
elites creating conditions whereby the public believes in the idea that EU membership 
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represents an ‘escape’ from the Balkans as opposed to a ‘return’ to Europe. For 
Serbia/Kosovo, elites strive to convince citizens that EU membership signifies a ‘re-
branding’ of the Balkan image rather than an escape. The Serbia-Kosovo territorial 
dispute figured prominently in the picture as it pits new ideas – a re-branded ‘European’ 
Serbia – against old ideas wherein the Kosovo narrative is essential to Serbian national 
identity. Serbian elites continue to work to persuade EU and national publics that these 
ideas are not in tension and promise to deliver on both – attain EU membership and keep 
Kosovo. 
 
Revisiting Discourse, Leverage, and Change 
 
In the broadest sense, this work aims to understand how transitional states can 
improve and develop their democratic political institutions in order to create an 
institutional environment that benefits citizens in terms of prosperity, security, and rights. 
For transitioning states within Europe, how do the pursuit of membership and the 
concomitant fulfillment of reform conditions lead to improvements in institutional 
quality? Is the EU a legitimate, effective, and desirable broker of institutional change? 
What are the most crucial factors that animate the decision for states to either actively 
seek membership or to refuse or postpone it? What role do ideas play in the decision? 
In the course of this work, we delineated three primary strands of narrative 
framing that are offered as legitimate justification for or against membership – material 
(economic), political, and identity-bearing/associational. In each category, official and 
competing narratives were presented. Public opinion data was then used to determine the 
extent to which the elite presentation of the EU coincides with popular opinion to show 
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how responsive political elites were to their constituents’ opinions and if they choose to 
change their rhetoric or change their action and supported this with a content analysis of 
Serbian/Kosovar elite ideas.   
Much of the scholarship on Europeanization has explained eastern enlargement 
according to the logics of materialism or constructivism. Materialists argue that 
candidates’ compliance with conditionality demands is rooted in strong external material 
incentives and a credible shot at membership, while constructivists point to shared 
identities, norms and values. These are valuable insights, yet they do not address a critical 
missing element – how the dispersion of ideas influences institutional outcomes in 
candidate states. This work is grounded in various efforts in the literature to understand 
the EU’s role as an agent of institutional change – as a democratic reformer. It taps into 
the theory of leverage, describing how rewards and punishments for compliant or non-
compliant behavior drive levering tactics. Furthermore, one can attempt to understand 
this topic using the language of the ‘new insitutionalisms’: rational-choice, sociological, 
historical, and discursive.  
Rational-choice institutionalism explains change according to a cost benefit 
analysis of material incentives performed by elites who then decide whether or not to 
comply. This school of thought would demonstrate how political elites draw heavily upon 
political and economic narrative frames for evidence to support decisions. Using this 
logic, political elites argue that the EU will enhance material prosperity and political 
clout or, conversely, it will limit economic and political opportunities.    
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Sociological institutionalism looks at the situation in terms of culture, values, and 
identities. This thinking would show how political elites utilize the identity-
bearing/associational narrative from to garner support for change. This is the notion that 
EU enlargement is about escaping the Balkans and that non-compliance occurs when 
conditions infringe upon notions of national identity as in the cases of the ICTY or 
Kosovo.  
Historical institutionalism would describe the move toward the EU as part of an 
evolution of complex historical processes. Path-dependence and the weight of history 
make it extraordinary difficult to mount a challenge to a particular reform trajectory. 
Change may occur at critical junctures – wars, new regimes, or major crises. This form of 
analysis can enter all of the narrative framing categories previously defined. It is the story 
that explains the EU as inevitable. One can make the case for several points of critical 
juncture – the formation of Tadic’s EU-consensus government in 2008 in Serbia, the 
2004/7 Eastern Enlargements, the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003, the fall of Milosevic in 
2000, the death of Tudjman in 1999, or the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. All these 
moments can be seen as putting these states on a course toward Europe.  
Discursive institutionalism encompasses the first three institutionalisms, using 
them as background conditions, but goes further to examines how discourse, language 
and the communication of ideas a play a casual role in explaining institutional reform. 
This is the narrative framing itself. The other institutionalisms provide the content for the 
frames while political elites manage this content, choosing to employ narratives that best 
suits their reform agenda in an attempt to either appeal to constituents for support or 
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provide a legitimizing script for actions already taken. Elites ability to control messaging 
and justify their actions with an appropriate discourse can help ensure that the reform 
trajectory they have chosen is strictly followed.  
While this work challenges the materialist account, the intent is not to be purely 
constructivist. Its aim is to balance competing rationales for why states pursue EU 
membership and to understand why elites choose to instrumentalize one form of logic 
over another through discourse and messaging. Ultimately, this research finds that elites’ 
ability to express power through ideas and over ideas can transform power in ideas for 
the cases of Croatia and Serbia/Kosovo. Like Vachudova’s theory of leverage, the 
journey to consolidate power in ideas is an iterated game. Initially, the 
instrumentalization of discourse is a persuasion tactic to win power over ideas. This is the 
period when ideas are most dynamic and elites can pit competing ideas against one 
another. As time goes by, the number of competing ideas begins to decrease if a critical 
mass of political elites effectively controls power over a dominant idea and is able to 
reinforce it. Eventually, without strong alternative ideas, the dominant idea becomes 
hegemonic and a stable consensus is set in place.  
In former Yugoslavia, the idea of joining the EU became powerful after the fall of 
Tudjman in Croatia and Milosevic in Serbia. Part of the power of the idea of the EU is 
derived from the corrupt and moribund alternative, the idea of ethno-nationalist states, 
which typified the preceding decade. With this backdrop, it was easy for elites to exploit 
the power of the EU idea to gain political office and establish consensus. This happens in 
Croatia earlier than it does in Serbia, yet in both cases the EU idea has been consolidated. 
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In Serbia, in addition to the EU, the primary motivating political idea is Kosovo. Elites 
maintain their power over ideas by framing the EU and Kosovo ideas as not in direct 
competition with one another. Rather, they are two hegemonic ideas that are projected by 
elites as equally attainable and equally desirable. There is debate, however, over their 
comparable value. As is stands now, the ideas do not need to compete with one another. 
As the integration process advances, the stable consensus of these two ideas will break 
down and be put in flux. Elites will be forced to again use the tools of discourse to 
express power through ideas and convince the public of the relative merits of the EU idea 
vs. the Kosovo idea. It is hard to imagine this debate as being anything but vigorous. By 
not forcing any immediate concessions, EU elites hope to maintain power over the EU 
idea and slowly habituate Serbs to the idea through experience. If successful, it will 
neutralize the power of the Kosovo idea, rendering any debate moot.291  
*** 
Elite discourse takes many shapes and serves to convey messages across 
numerous actors. Elite discourse contains substantive content, the meaning of which can 
be propagated through frames, narratives, collective memories, and discursive struggles. 
Leaders may attempt to appeal to their audience through either cognitive or normative 
argumentation. Likewise, depending on the target audience messages may be handled 
                                                
291 It is worth noting that the Croatian and Serbian cases are not perfectly analogous. The 
Kosovo question necessarily colors the calculation of elite behavior vis-à-vis Europe in 
Serbia. If we take the counterfactual proposition that, in the aftermath of the dissolution 
of Yugoslavia, Croatia was pressured to concede areas of the self-proclaimed Republic of 
Serbian Krajina, then would we still witness hegemony in the Europe idea during the 
early push toward integration? Counterfactuals may mislead us, but we should also not be 
misled by assuming exact symmetry between these cases. 
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differently according to the interactions of the actors and if their purpose is to coordinate 
with the policy community or communicate with the public.  
The tables that follow help organize discourse among Croatian, Serbian, and 
Kosovar political elite as it pertains to European integration. In addition, they serve to 
recap and summarize the empirical content that was discussed in the case study chapters.  
Please see pp. 45-48 (Chapter 2) as a refresher for some of the terminology contained in 
the tables. See also Schmidt 2008; Schmidt 2014; Haas 1992; Hajer 1993; or Campbell 
and Pedersen 2008 for more detailed reading.  
 
Table 2: Ideas in Integration Discourse – Croatia 
 
 Ideas in 
Discourse 
Empirical Examples 
Form of Ideas Frames Economic- access to markets, labor mobility, 
foreign investment vs. price shocks, foreign 
ownership of resources, adaptation costs 
Political- strengthens democracy, gives a seat at 
the table, strengthens alliances vs. democratic 
deficit, seat at table is insignificant given 
country’s size, threatens sovereignty, opens the 
door to external pressures  
Identity-makes us ‘like’ other EU 
countries/reasserts that we are ‘European’ after 
90s conflicts, legitimizes our sovereignty vs. 
threatens national culture and tradition, won’t 
accept us for who we are rather we must 
become like them to join 
 Narratives No alternative to EU, Western Balkans belong 
in the EU, need to be a ‘normal’ country, latest 
iteration of external control, getting on a 
sinking ship, EU makes no difference/nothing 
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will change 
 Stories Effects of Eurozone Crisis, Croatia already 
more developed ready than Romania/Bulgaria, 
decreasing living standards in Slovenia after the 
adoption of the Euro. 
 Collective 
Memories 
Feeling more “European”/being able to travel 
everywhere when part of Yugoslavia (“Yugo-
nostalgia”), belonging based on historic ties to 
W. Europe (were part of Hapsburg and Roman 
Empires), Europe’s inaction during 90s conflict. 
 Discursive 
Struggles 
Interpretations of ICTY compliance – need to 
adhere to international principles of justice to 
prove EU readiness vs. coerced demonization 
of national heroes. 
Implications of economic transformation – full 
embrace of market capitalism vs. threat to pre-
established welfare state 
Types of 
Arguments 
Cognitive references macro-economic theories, cites 
international laws or accords, cites historical 
events   
 Normative Makes the appeal that international practices are 
better than current national practices, status is 
elevated through association regardless of 
reform, Croatia needs to reform whether or not 
it results in EU membership 
 
 
Table 3: Discursive Interactions in Coordinative Sphere – Croatia 
 
Discursive 
Sphere 
Discursive 
Actors 
Discursive 
Interlocutors 
Supranational 
Interactions 
National 
Interactions 
Coordinative Policy-
Makers 
Policy-
Makers 
Integration process 
is long and drawn 
out – French/Dutch 
‘no’, benchmarking, 
ICTY compliance, 
Romania/Bulgaria, 
Slovenian border 
Pro-EU 
government 
coalitions 
continue to 
form and 
pursue EU 
agenda. 
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dispute all retard the 
process. Croatia 
leaders persist, 
though frustrated 
with all the 
additional 
conditions, continue 
to comply with 
Brussels until 
membership granted.  
Referendum 
on 
membership 
is organized 
and 
succeeds. 
 Advocacy or 
Discourse 
Coalitions; 
Epistemic 
Communities 
 European Movement 
and other Europe-
wide NGOs 
establish presence 
and devote work to 
integration projects 
NGOs 
advocate and 
advise 
government 
on niche 
issues, aid 
with EU 
preparations 
 Knowledge 
Regimes 
 Academics/public 
intellectual attend 
conferences and give 
advice to EU from 
‘local’ perspective. 
Croatian linguists 
work furiously to 
translate the acquis 
in the later stages of 
the negotiation 
Academics/p
ublic 
intellectuals 
offer 
technocratic 
advice 
and/or 
philosophic 
rhetoric 
either to aid 
the 
integration 
process or 
oppose it. 
 
 
Table 4: Discursive Interactions in Communicative Sphere - Croatia 
 
Discursive 
Sphere 
Discursive 
Actors 
Discursive 
Interlocutors 
Supranational 
Interactions 
National 
Interactions 
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Communicative Political 
Leaders 
Citizens Together with 
partners from EU 
institutions launch 
educational 
campaigns and 
awareness programs. 
Develop a 
formal 
communicati
on strategy, 
media blitz 
prior to 
referendum 
  Media Continuous 
affirmation of pro-EU 
commitment 
Affirms pro-
EU 
orientation 
but offers 
rebuke when 
demands 
concern 
ICTY, 
Announce 
when 
chapters of 
the 
negotiation 
open/close 
     
 
 
Table 5: Ideas in Integration Discourse – Serbia/Kosovo 
 
 Ideas in 
Discourse 
Empirical Examples 
Form of Ideas Frames Economic- access to markets, labor mobility, 
foreign investment vs. price shocks, foreign 
ownership of resources, adaptation costs 
Political- strengthens democracy, gives a seat at 
the table, strengthens alliances vs. democratic 
deficit, seat at table is insignificant given 
country’s size, threatens sovereignty, opens the 
door to external pressures  
Identity-makes us ‘like’ other EU 
countries/reasserts that we are ‘European’ after 
90s conflicts vs. threatens national culture and 
tradition, won’t accept us for who we are rather 
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we must become like them to join, must abandon 
Kosovo 
 Narratives No alternative to EU, Western Balkans belong in 
the EU, need to be a ‘normal’ country, latest 
iteration of external control, getting on a sinking 
ship, EU makes no difference/nothing will 
change, “Both Europe and Kosovo” vs. “they’re 
asking us to trade Kosovo for Europe”  
 Stories Effects of Eurozone Crisis, Serbia already more 
developed ready than Romania/Bulgaria, Fiat 
takeover of Zastava auto plant (privatization), 
Hashim Thaci’s organ trafficking allegations 
 Collective 
Memories 
Feeling more “European”/being able to travel 
everywhere when part of Yugoslavia (“Yugo-
nostalgia”), belonging based on historic ties to 
Europe, 1389 Battle of Kosovo Polje, 1999 
NATO bombing campaign  
 Discursive 
Struggles 
Interpretations of ICTY compliance – need to 
adhere to international principles of justice to 
prove EU readiness vs. international 
community’s need to assigning guilt to Serbia 
for the wars of the 90s 
Implications of economic transformation – full 
embrace of market capitalism vs. threat to pre-
established welfare state 
Relations with Russia – Allies with both Russia 
and EU causing conflicting stands as relates to 
annexation of Crimea, fighting in E. Ukraine, 
and joining EU sanctions leaving Serbia in 
“neutrality” limbo.   
Types of 
Arguments 
Cognitive references macro-economic theories, cites 
international laws or accords, cites historical 
events 
 Normative Makes the appeal that international practices are 
better than current national practices, Serbia 
needs to reform whether or not it results in EU 
membership, Serbia should never compromise 
its territorial integrity for EU membership 
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Table 6: Discursive Interactions in Coordinative Sphere – Serbia/Kosovo 
 
Discursive 
Sphere 
Discursive 
Actors 
Discursive 
Interlocutors 
Supranational 
Interactions 
National 
Interactions 
Coordinative Policy-Makers Policy-Makers Integration 
process is drawn 
out and stalls 
when Serbia 
refuses to comply 
with ICTY. 
Complications 
continue with 
respect to the 
Kosovo issue. 
Belgrade-Pristina 
dialogue achieves 
some 
compromise, the 
process moves 
forward. Further 
progress depends 
on 
implementation 
benchmarks of 
Brussels 
Agreement 
(2013)  
Pro-EU 
government 
coalitions 
continue to 
form and 
pursue EU 
agenda. 
Heated 
debates in the 
National 
Assembly stall 
ratification of 
SAA, dispute 
over who 
should 
represent 
Belgrade in 
the Brussels 
talk, how to 
implement 
Brussels 
Agreement. 
Stops 
supporting 
“parallel 
institutions” in 
N. Kosovo. 
 Advocacy or 
Discourse 
Coalitions; 
Epistemic 
Communities 
 European 
Movement and 
other Europe-
wide NGOs 
establish 
presence and 
devote work to 
integration 
projects 
NGOs 
advocate and 
advise 
government 
on niche 
issues, aid 
with EU 
preparations; 
Orthodox 
Church gives 
spiritual 
guidance/advi
ce/ warning 
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regarding the 
effects of 
Europeanizati
on 
 Knowledge 
Regimes 
 Academics/public 
intellectual attend 
conferences and 
give advice to EU 
from ‘local’ 
perspective. 
Croatian experts 
are supposed to 
use their 
integration 
experiences to 
provide advice 
and support to 
Serbia   
Academics/pu
blic 
intellectuals 
offer 
technocratic 
advice and/or 
philosophic 
rhetoric either 
to aid the 
integration 
process or 
oppose it. 
 
 
Table 7: Discursive Interactions in Communicative Sphere – Serbia/Kosovo 
 
Discursive 
Sphere 
Discursive 
Actors 
Discursive 
Interlocutors 
Supranational 
Interactions 
National 
Interactions 
Communicative Political 
Leaders 
Citizens Together with 
partners from EU 
institutions launch 
educational 
campaigns and 
awareness 
programs. 
Consensus 
of Pro-EU 
messages 
after 2008, 
always a 
“both 
Kosovo and 
Europe” 
platform, 
dramatic 
shifts in 
rhetoric 
from former 
radical 
nationalists 
(Nikolic, 
Dacic, 
Vucic); 
citizens 
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claim 
leaders 
“don’t tell 
us anything 
about the 
EU” yet, 
they are sick 
of hearing 
about it  
  Media Continuous 
affirmation of 
pro-EU 
commitment, but 
will not bow to 
foreign pressure 
on Kosovo; More 
neutral on Russia 
Affirms pro-
EU 
orientation 
but offers 
rebuke when 
demands 
concerning 
ICTY or 
Kosovo 
seem 
excessive; 
stronger pro-
Russia 
messaging   
 
 
 
Revisiting the Research Question and Hypothesis 
 
In the beginning, we asked about the relationship between EU membership and 
democratic institution building in these states and thought to consider what forces might 
hinder or accelerate progress toward membership. In response, it was hypothesized that 
elites can utilize the tools of discourse to shape narratives in a manner that suits their 
platform. In particular, narratives that appeal to ideas about collective identity will be 
very effective in motivating action for or against integration. 
 
257 
 
To further address this hypothesis, one can perform a comparative analysis of the 
cases using distinct examples of how national identity and reputation have posed a 
challenge to or endangered compliance with Europe-oriented reform agendas in these 
states. In the following section, we look at how certain critical issues function as proxy 
indicators of national identity that illustrate the degree to which these states are resistant 
to or accepting of Europeanization and the relative amount of leverage Europe can exact 
upon these states in light of resistance or acceptance of its conditions. This is revealed in 
the elite discourse that surrounds the following topics: high-profile ICTY fugitives, visa 
liberalization (i.e. Schenghen ‘Black List’ v. ‘White List’), LGBT pride parades, relations 
with co-national populations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the current war in Ukraine.     
 
Table 8: Theories and Explanations 
 
Issue What 
Vachudova/materialis
ts explain 
What I explain What isn’t 
explained 
Kosovo Territory is material, 
No one would 
rationally give up 
land, never mind how 
underdeveloped it is. 
Necessary but not 
sufficient explanation 
Symbolic importance. 
Perpetuation of 
symbology, propagation of 
idea as electoral strategy. 
Explanation both 
necessary and sufficient. 
Why some 
Serbs will say 
Kosovo doesn’t 
matter/it’s gone, 
but won’t give 
up on it. 
ICTY Eventual compliance Why elites express desire 
to comply, yet willfully 
harbor fugitives 
 
Pride Eventual compliance role of church, societal 
values 
 
Schengen 
Black List 
Material advantages 
of visa liberalization 
Symbolic meaning of visa 
liberalization 
 
War in 
Ukraine 
Desire to have 
relations with all 
parties – material and 
Irony/ambiguity/hypocriti
cal attitude toward 
Crimean annexation. 
Neutrality is 
explained by 
Serbia’s 
258 
 
political stakes 
involved 
Importance of relationship 
with Russia is also about 
Russia protecting Serbia’s 
stance on Kosovo, which 
as per above has symbolic 
meaning. 
relationship 
with Russia and 
its own desire to 
join EU, 
uncertain how 
much the 
position 
considers Serbia 
support of 
Ukraine’s EU 
ambitions 
Co-
Nationals in 
BiH 
Does not explain Why/how leaders use their 
messages among co-
nationals abroad to 
support agenda at home 
 
Copenhage
n Plus 
Theory should work 
no matter how many 
conditions are 
imposed 
Why additional conditions 
are perceived as (us/them) 
border forming, how elites 
present this to public 
If each 
subsequent 
enlargement 
will have 
further 
conditions as a 
matter of 
learning from 
past 
experiences/evo
lution 
 
capacity to 
comply 
EU 
inevitability
? 
Does not explain Does not explain EU inevitability 
 
 
 
ICTY Fugitives 
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As has been noted by other scholars, ICTY compliance served as a major hurdle 
for Croatia to clear in the early stages of its journey to the EU.292 Collective remembrance 
of the war produced strong images of the war’s principle Croatian actors as ‘heroes’ and 
‘liberators.’ Through their actions, these standard bearers help to define citizens’ sense of 
‘Croatian-ness.’ The Homeland War functioned to grant the state of Croatia its 
independence, but it also relieved Croatians from continuing to have to wear the unsavory 
‘Yugoslav’ mantel – unsavory mostly because the label’s inclusion of Serbs, which 
unnaturally likened Croatians to their natural ‘other.’293 Public debate in Croatia over its 
EU destiny was always most polarizing when ICTY compliance was at issue. In 2011, for 
instance, popular support for the ICTY among the Croatian public was 11 percent.294 At 
the core, following the EU path through ICTY compliance meant pressing for a re-
articulation of sovereignty.295 On a political level, nationalist groups were not keen on 
forfeiting their jurisdictional authority and allowing the international community to 
decide the fate of their ‘heroes,’ and possibly revise what they had come to interpret as 
historical truth. On an ideational level, national groups had been enjoying Croatia’s apart-
ness from Yugoslavia and were not necessarily ready to give that up. Pro-EU groups, 
however, were cautious but ready to share a piece of that newly won sovereignty because 
                                                
292 Tina Freyburg, and Solveig Richter, “National Identity Matters: The Limited Impact of 
EU Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans,” National Centre of Competence in 
Research, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, working paper no. 19 (2008): 2. 
293 Natasa Zambelli, “East of Eden: A Poststructuralist Analysis of Croatia’s Identity in 
the Context of EU Accession,” (PhD diss., University of Edinburgh, 2011), 147. 
294 Boris Pavelic, “Croatian Support for Hague Triples After Generals Freed,” Balkan 
Transitional Justice (February 18, 2013), 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/support-to-icty-tripled-in-croatia.  
295 Ibid. 
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it meant belonging to a group of western democracies and following international norms 
and customs. This would, in turn, bring about a reorientation of ‘Croatian-ness,’ pointing 
it to the west, setting it apart from Serbia and the Balkans.  
Public debate reached a fever pitch in 2005 over the issue of whether or not 
General Ante Gotovina should be handed over to the Hague for his involvement in 
Operation Storm in exchange for a date to begin the accession negotiation. By this point, 
Gotovina had been transformed into a political symbol. Domestic groups invoked his 
record as a way of challenging pro-EU political parties. International groups, on the other 
hand, claimed that Croatian government officials had been safeguarding him, meaning 
that Croatia was not ready to comply with international norms; and ipso facto Croatia was 
not ready to take the next steps toward the EU.296 
On December 7, 2005, Gotovina was captured in the Canary Islands following an 
intelligence lead supplied by the Croatian government led by Prime Minister Ivo Sanader. 
Gotovina’s arrest spurred an outpouring of protest by nationalist group throughout 
Croatia. The statement that Sanader and his government released read as follows: 
Anyone who is charged must face the charges, appear before a court and answer 
the charges. Presumption of innocence, meaning that everyone is innocent until 
proven otherwise, applies to any case, including this one, the statement said. The 
full truth is in the interests of all people in Croatia. The Homeland War was a 
defensive, just and legitimate war of liberation. Croatia was the victim of 
aggression and had the right to self-defense and to liberate its territories that had 
been occupied. Croatia will follow further developments in this case with the 
greatest attention and will continue fully cooperating with the Hague tribunal in 
all cases against citizens of Croatia, using amici curiae as a legal instrument. 
Gotovina's arrest proved the veracity of Croatia's statements that the fugitive 
                                                
296 Vjeran Pavlakovic, “Croatia, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, and General Gotovina as a Political Symbol,” Europe-Asia Studies vol. 62, 
no. 10 (2010): 1707. 
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General was not within reach of Croatian authorities and that he was hiding 
outside the country. It confirmed the credibility of the Republic of Croatia and all 
government institutions, and its full cooperation with the Hague tribunal. It also 
proved right all those who trusted us and supported us at times when Croatia's 
efforts to cooperate with the tribunal were doubted. It has turned out now that 
such doubts were unwarranted. No one can be above or beyond the law. The rule 
of law is one of the fundamental principles on which Croatia is based, including 
both domestic laws and the country's international obligations. In any way it 
includes the Constitutional Law on Cooperation with the International Criminal 
Tribunal in The Hague, which the Sabor adopted in April 1996.297 
 
This marked a notable evolution of rhetoric and action as compared to Sanader’s 
reaction to the 2001 arrest of General Mirko Norac, accused of rounding up and 
executing Croatian Serbs in the town of Gospic. At a rally to support Norac in the coastal 
city of Split, Sanader pushed to “end the prosecution of the General, end cooperation with 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, and call for early elections” 
because: “We will not allow the authorities to identify with the state, and Mirko Norac is 
the symbol of the defense and victory and a relationship toward him is a relationship 
toward the values on which this country was founded.” 298 At the time of the arrest and 
rally, Sanader’s HDZ party was in the opposition and he believed that the majority 
coalition’s cooperation with the ICTY was tantamount to high treason.  
In 2005, following Gotovina’s arrest, demonstrations began to get contentious and 
Sanader’s government decided to pass a bill banning public assembly. He brushed off his 
detractors and expressed a great deal of self-confidence, if not arrogance, in saying: 
Those people do not care about Gotovina, but are doing it for other reasons, 
possibly only out of self-promotion. The Croatian government knows what is the 
best for Croatia, and I appeal to everyone to keep their cool and their presence of 
                                                
297 HINA, “Government Issues Statement on Gotovina’s Arrest,” (December 8, 2005). 
298 HINA, “Protesters in Croatia Demand End of Cooperation With ICTY, Early 
Election,” (February 11, 2001).  
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mind and to have confidence in the government. The Croatian government knows 
what to do and how to defend the truth about the Homeland War. The Ministry of 
Justice had been preparing for that for years. The truth is that Croatia was 
attacked and that it was the victim of aggression. We had the right to defend 
ourselves and liberate the country. If someone dared do it again, Croatia would 
again defend and liberate itself. That is the only truth.299  
 
In some respects, Sanader is speaking out of both sides of his mouth in the 2005 
statements. He appeals to the need to respect international conventions and participate 
accordingly, showing that Croatia did its part. He also attempts to address how the 
symbolic implications of the Gotovina with respect to national identity and historical 
truth. He presents both an integrationist and nationalist discourse at the same time. The 
public, however, is outraged, seeing authenticity only in the integrationist discourse 
because that is the discourse that matches his actions. Furthermore, Sanader’s about face 
on ICTY compliance discredits his earlier nationalist discourse. His reaction to protests 
also represents a harbinger of how the rest of the accession process was to unfurl – with 
government elites in full command because they “know what is the best for Croatia.” 
This is precisely what comes to pass. Whether or not Croatians assented to placing trust 
in the government or whether or not the government cared to gain assent does not change 
the fact that Croatians ultimately received two desirable outcomes, satisfying both 
discourses – attaining EU membership and the acquittal of General Gotovina.300 Both 
serve to construct a de-Balkanized, post-war, sovereign Croatia. Gotovina’s Operation 
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Government,” (December 9, 2005).  
300 Public support for the ICTY tripled after the acquittal of Generals Gotovina and 
Markac. See note 283.  
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Storm liberates the state from Serbia and Yugoslavia while membership liberates the state 
from its geography.  
In Serbia, ICTY compliance was a similar challenge. Popular support for the 
tribunal has hovered between 8 and 13 percent over the past decade.301 Like Croatia, 
Serbia’s relationship with the ICTY had a token figure. It was the Bosnian Serb war 
commander, Ratko Mladic, who was wanted for his role in the Srebrenica Massacre and 
the nearly four-year Siege of Sarajevo. Serbia had begun to negotiate a Stabilization and 
Association Agreement with the EU in November 2005. At that time, ICTY Prosecutor, 
Carla Del Ponte, gave the Serbian government until May 1, 2006 to hand Mladic over to 
the Hague. When Serbia failed to produce Mladic, SAA negotiations were suspended on 
May 3, 2006.  
On the occasion of SAA talk being suspended, the Prime Minister at the time, 
Vojislav Kostunica (DSS) reacted this was: 
…the postponement of the talks has inflicted great harm on Serbia and that it is 
necessary to step up efforts to send Mladic to the Hague as soon as possible. The 
act of hiding of Mladic is unworthy of the patriotic tradition and of the officers' 
code of honor and it directly threatens the existential interests of the people and 
the state.302 
 
President Boris Tadic echoed this sentiment in saying: 
 
The suspension of negotiations with the European Union, which is due to the fact 
that the Serbian government failed to fulfill the promise that it would realize its 
obligations towards The Hague Tribunal by early May this year, worries me 
deeply because of the very bad consequences (this may have) in the state of 
Serbia and for its inhabitants. Any falling behind on the road of European 
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integrations or compromitation of our European path orientation gives raise to 
concern since this directly affects the people who crave for European prospects. 
The government's failure to fulfill its obligations weakens our negotiating position 
in talks about the future status of Kosovo-Metohija. Bilateral relations with EU 
members and other countries will come to a halt. The government's failure to 
arrest (Ratko) Mladic, in spite of the promises it has given, disrupts Serbia's 
credibility in international relations.303  
 
In November 2007, the EU decided to go forward with its relationship with Serbia 
allowing for the two parties to initial the SAA under the proviso that the agreement 
would not receive the final signature until Mladic was captured. On May 26, 2011 Mladic 
was finally arrested in Zrenjanin, northern Serbia. Current President Nikolic, but at the 
time the leader of opposition SNS party, said upon Mladic’s arrest: 
Mladic's arrest comes as a complete surprise. This is a man wanted for war crimes 
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, yet in Serbia he 
has never been painted as a criminal and evildoer. [I] believe the operation had 
been planned for a long time, and that the Serbian president wanted to ‘make the 
nation happy’ that another job [for the EU] has been completed. We will see... 
there are many questions to be asked... who saw this man yesterday and 
recognized him? Did Serbia perhaps know all along where Mladic was, what 
made them decide to arrest him today? The Serbian president owes many answers 
and it is not enough for him to simply say that the job is done.304 
 
Reacting to Nikolic’s statement, the deputy leader of the governing Democratic Party 
(DS) Dragan Sutanovac said:  
Today, when Serbia has demonstrated that its commitment to European values is 
not merely declarative but is also substantial, we stand witnesses to the fact that 
the so-called strike of Mr. Nikolic was not just a moment in which he showed 
what he is prepared to do to assume power and his current 'surprise' clearly 
indicates that he never abandoned the ideology of SRS and his mentor (SRS 
leader) Vojislav Seselj.305 Serbia needs prosperity. This can be achieved only by 
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those who see Mladic as a part of the past and the EU as the country's future. Now 
is the right time for everyone to take their stand both regarding the past and the 
future.306 
 
The people would have their opportunity to take that approximately one year later in 
2012 when Serbia held its presidential contest, electing Tomislav Nikolic as president.  
The Mladic case is somewhat different than the Gotovina case. Mladic was a 
symbol, an embodiment of a national warrior whose ‘bravery,’ ‘cunning,’ and 
unwillingness to bow down to foreign pressure are regarded as highly valued cultural 
traits.307 When he was arrested, however, there was not the same outpouring of support as 
there was for Gotovina. There were demonstrations for sure, but they were organized by 
radical nationalist groups, and they were not well attended. This is not to say that there 
was no outrage over the arrest, as a 2011 OSCE survey indicated that over 50 percent of 
the Serbian public believe that Mladic is a national hero.308 The outrage simply did not 
manifest itself in the form of public protests. Obradovic-Wochnik explains that this 
reaction is part of a larger struggle for Serbs to confront its past. Attitudes toward the 
wars of the 90s are frequently held as feelings of indifference or ambivalence and 
sometimes denial. These feelings are either repressed or dealt with silently.309 For those 
who do not deny that crimes were committed, internal outrage stems from a relativist 
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reading of the war that pervades Serbia society, which says that all parties involved 
committed crimes and that guilt should be distributed equally among the culpable.310 To 
many Serbs, the ICTY challenges the relativist account and places a disproportionate 
amount of guilt on Serbs, eroding their claims to victimhood.  
Nikolic’s nationalist discourse does not celebrate or sensationalize Mladic’s 
deeds, nor does it condemn them. It is ambivalent. His concern is less with Mladic and 
more with Boris Tadic’s actions to comply with EU demands by organizing the capture. 
Nikolic’s attitude of ambivalence, which is expressed through his discourse, resonates 
with the public and translates into electoral success. The public does not necessarily want 
to see Mladic at the Hague, but they understand why he is there. Opposition to his capture 
and extradition is less about keeping intact the image of Mladic as a political symbol, but 
more so about keeping the relativist account of the past alive. This explains low public 
demonstrations at the time of the arrest. It also explains the subsequent support for 
Nikolic, who, at a time when EU demands are becoming more frequent and more difficult 
to digest, is seen as a figure that will reclaim and protect the past when it is under the 
threat of an external assault. Voters are keying into an important, recurring meta-narrative 
of Serbia history – the quest to protect itself from the outside – and at the hour of 
accession, Nikolic is the person tapped to become the latest incarnation of Milos 
Obilic.311   
                                                
310 Op. Cit. 307, 2. 
311 The medieval Serbian night who died while assassinating the Ottoman Sultan Murad 
at the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389. 
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The EU employed active levering strategies in both the Serbian and Croatian 
ICTY cases highlighted above. The outcome in both instances was nearly identical with 
respect to achieving major milestones of EU progress. Soon after Gotovina was in 
custody, Croatia began to negotiate the acquis. Soon after Mladic arrived in the Hague, 
Serbia was granted candidacy status.  
The electoral outcomes that followed these events offers a window into the way in 
which discourse operates to either stymie or propel EU developmental trajectories. In 
Croatia, Ivo Sanader had softened his previously hard-lined nationalist tone and adopted 
a reluctantly Europeanist one, which he backed with action. In the next election following 
the arrest of Gotovina, the 2007 parliamentary election, Sanader and his party won. 
Public outcry over the Gotovina arrest and the accompanying demonstrations seemed to 
have been forgotten.  
In Serbia, President Tadic along with the governing party put forth a consistent 
Europeanist discourse with respect to ICTY compliance, which it backed with action. 
While there were no large demonstrations throughout the country after Mladic’s 2011 
arrest, the event was not forgotten. Nikolic conveyed a nationalist tone in the wake of the 
arrest, and voters made the clear choice of Nikolic over Tadic in the 2012 presidential 
election.  
Both elections take place at very comparable places in the EU path. In 2007, 
Croatia had just begun the accession negotiation. In 2012, Serbia had been granted 
candidacy and was preparing to begin the accession negotiation. In both cases, ‘in the 
initial stages of the accession negotiation’ could describe the step they were on. Yet the 
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two publics choose to support differing discourses, which presumably would lead to a 
suite of differing actions on the part of the political elite. These responses make sense in 
light of the above analysis. Although Gotovina’s arrest caused upheaval, the Croatian 
public appeared comfortable enough to trust the government to do “what was best for 
Croatia,” i.e. comply with EU conditions. If letting go meant following a course of de-
Balkanization, the public was certainly ready to comply with that mission, sensing that its 
Balkan escape was near. Citizens’ votes are a reaction to who they could become in the 
future, rather than who they see themselves as now. 
In Serbia, ICTY compliance meant public officials were giving in to external 
pressures. While in Croatia those pressures were interpreted as an escape valve; in Serbia, 
the agents exerting the pressure is read by citizens as an attempt to re-Balkanize the state, 
forcing them to accept responsibility for all atrocities of the 90s, condemning them to 
forever wear a scarlet ‘B’ emblazoned upon their chest. Nationalist messaging brings 
with it the comfort of home when the assaults from the outside grow harsher and more 
frequent. Nikolic’s words offer some protection or at least comfort at a time when 
ambiguity over the nation’s identity is particularly acute - partly European, mostly 
Balkan, but totally Serb. Nikolic’s words serve as a reminder of the one certainty among 
those options at a time when the other two continue to be litigated. People’s votes are a 
reaction to who they see themselves as now, rather than whom they could become in the 
future. 
The irony, of course, is that during Nikolic’s tenure, Serbia has continued to move 
in the direction of Europe and has been confronted with progressively more challenging 
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questions about the past. The external assault on national identity has only intensified 
with the April 19 Brussels agreement, and Nikolic has been fully complicit. In January 
2014, as the accession negotiations began in earnest, political leaders will also decide 
whether or not early parliamentary elections are to be held. Nikolic is not the hard-line 
nationalist he once was, but rather, a ‘both Kosovo and Europe’ proponent. It will be 
interesting to see how elections play out and whether or not the population will endorse a 
continuation of that stance, favor a more Europeanist path, or as has been the case at 
certain critical junctures in the past, strengthen the political fortunes of nationalists at the 
peril of moderates and progressives by clamping down and taking a maximalist stance 
with respect to the Kosovo question.312 
  
 
Visa Liberalization and the Schengen ‘Black List’ 
 
In the wake of the Berlin Wall coming down, Europe was in the midst of radical 
transformation and reunification. Former members of the Soviet block, in particular those 
from Central Europe were democratizing and transitioning to the market-based economy 
of their Western neighbors. Political and economic rapprochement paved the way for the 
liberalization of visa regimes for people in the East and, consequently, the creation of the 
Schengen Area. In the Balkans, however, the 90s were a period of great tumult. War, 
instability, organized crime, and rampant smuggling prompted the EU to impose harsh 
visa restrictions on citizens of the region. From the outside, people from the Balkans 
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became were seen as ‘refugees’ and ‘criminals.’313 European Council Regulation EC no. 
539/2001, which entered into force on March 15, 2001, articulates a list of countries 
whose citizens may travel to the Schengen Area visa-free, and those who may not. It 
creates the so-called Schengen ‘white list’ and ‘black list.’314   
The lists provide a clear message from the EU about how Europe is delineated – 
the ‘good’ guys vs. the ‘bad,’ one of ‘us’ vs. one of ‘them.’ The 2001 regulation puts 
Croatia on the ‘white list’ and Serbia315 on the ‘black list.’ The Schengen lists function as 
a powerful demonstration of the nesting orientalisms phenomenon. Croatia is joined on 
the 2001 white list by Switzerland and the countries set to join the EU in 2004. Serbia 
shares the black list with the likes of Bosnia, Macedonia, Albania, and Turkey. Croatia is 
among the Western insiders and Serbia is among the Eastern outsiders.  
No doubt, the Balkan escape narrative remains operative in the both cases, but for 
Croatia, the point did not always have to be made as forcefully because Europe treated 
Croatia as if it were more like one of ‘them.’ Croatia was not welcomed with open arms 
by any stretch of the imagination. But, when the EU put Serbia on the Schengen black 
list, never was a signal so strong that that it was an outsider, Europe’s ‘other.’  
On December 19, 2009, visa restrictions were removed for Serbia and it was 
finally placed on the white list. This was met as an affirmation that Serbia did, in fact, 
‘belong’ in Europe. Likewise, it would be the first tangible benefit that citizens would 
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enjoy that offered a taste of what EU membership might bring. Leaders expressed joy and 
used the opportunity to reinforce the notion of Serbia as part of Europe:  
Visa liberalization is one of those moments when dreams come true. It was so 
hard during the last 18 years, we might have forgotten to receive great news in a 
normal way. We will prove to citizens that this is for real. Our fellow nationals 
[…] will travel to Europe.316  
 
These are the words of Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration, Bozidar Djelic. 
Prime Minsiter Ivica Dacic, Interior Minister at the time, said that “visa liberalization for 
the Serbian citizens does not represent only a visa-free crossing of borders but also a 
feeling that that they are an equal part of Europe.”317 Justice Minister Snezana Malovic 
added that “Europe is a system of values that the Serbian government tends to reach 
being in the interest of the Serbian citizens.”318  
In keeping up with the momentum of visa liberalization, the Serbian government 
backed up its Europeanist discourse with action, officially applying for membership three 
days later on December 22, 2009. If Europe said that Serbia belonged to Europe, then 
Serbia was not going to refute that claim. Serbia affirmed its belonging with both words 
and deeds. In this respect one might have predicted that Serbia’s EU path might be filled 
with more internal and external resistance than Croatia. Croatia did not have as much of 
an uphill climb with respect being externally labeled as the ‘other.’ The difference being 
that the attitude toward Croatians was that they had always belonged to Europe, but had 
just fallen out of favor, whereas it is more uncertain whether or not Serbia ever belonged. 
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For Croatians the choice to fulfill EU conditionality criteria is then a choice to regain 
favor, whereas for Serbia it is a choice to belong. Nationalist resistance is certain to play 
a stronger role in Serbia if this is the case because there is much more at stake in terms of 
the existential implications of choosing one institutional trajectory over another. It 
become a choice over what type of identity those set of institutional circumstances will 
produce – something resembling a generic ‘European’ construct or something more 
particularly ‘Serbian.’ When the stakes are framed in those terms, it is incumbent upon 
political elites who make policy choices that affect institutional development to justify 
the ideational ramifications of their choice through discourse. The above foregoing case 
bears witness to that trend.   
 The visa liberalization saga, however, may not have concluded for Serbia. The 
freeing of movement has created a glut of Serbians seeking asylum in EU countries. In 
2011, Serbians ranked fifth among all countries in terms of asylum claims finishing just 
behind Afghanistan, Russia, Pakistan and Iraq.319 The number of asylum seekers from 
Serbia has continued to mount year after year prompting EU policy makers to consider 
action including possibly retracting visa-free travel. The EU has not taken this measure, 
but in December 2013, it adopted an intermediate step – a ‘suspension clause,’ which 
would allow the EU to suspend visa-free travel in third countries through a fast-track 
procedure if it is witnessing an uptick of unfounded asylum claims.320 The EU 
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understands that this measure is not positive for relations with western Balkans 
candidates like Serbia as it is aware that it is interpreted as a step backward, a relegation 
back to outsider status. Conversely, however, the EU has declared that Serbia is a “safe 
country of origin,” meaning that asylum claims are bogus based on the fact that Serbia is 
a safe, democratic country. While the threat of losing the visa-free regime looms, the 
declaration of its “safe country of origin” status can be seen as an affirmation of having 
achieved an acceptable level of democratic credibility by European standards, thus 
allowing political leaders to maintain a claim to insider status.  
 
LGBT Pride Parades 
 
To examine another proxy indicator of how Croatian and Serbian political elites 
have responded to Europeanisation pressures testing traditional national values, we turn 
to how each country has handled its recent Pride Parades. In both Croatia and Serbia, 
religion is an important aspect of national identity and it is something that creates 
differentiation between the ethnic groups of former Yugoslavia. It forms a critical 
component of the ethnicity-cum-nationality-cum-religion complex that is often invoked 
when explaining the violent break-up of Yugoslavia. Citizens in both countries tend to 
respect the authority and the word of the church. What the Catholic Church and the 
Orthodox Church share is a common moral disapproval for members of the LGBT 
community. Accordingly, the citizens of Croatia and Serbia do not welcome members of 
this community into society with warmth and openness. As is the case in most parts of 
the world, this is a controversial issue and Pride Parades are seen as inviting 
confrontation.  
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In Croatia and Serbia, the issue has been deliberately linked to European 
integration effort. The ability to hold a Pride Parade despite public condemnation is 
viewed an indicator of a state’s commitment to upholding democratic principle of free 
assembly, and to protect minorities’ rights of speech and expression – values that are 
deemed ‘European.’ Throughout the 2000s, we see two different responses to Pride 
Parades in Croatia and Serbia, particularly when violent incidents threaten the security of 
the participants. The accompanying discourses reveal the extent to which 
Europeanization represent an incursion upon traditional values.  
In Croatia, the first Pride Parade was held in Zagreb in 2002. Despite opposition, 
rallies have been held in Zagreb subsequently each year without major incident. In 2011, 
a parade was organized in Croatia’s second largest city, the coastal city of Split. Angry 
protesters began to throw rocks, tear gas and glass bottles at parade participants, and the 
event eventually broke down.  
The Catholic Church did not support the parade to begin with and it claimed to 
disapprove of violence. However, a prominent church figure, Dr. Aldelbert Rebic, a 
seminary lecturer, stated that those injured in the violence “got what they asked for.”321 In 
response, there was an outpouring of support from the political community and a call for 
all to march in the upcoming Zagreb Pride Parade being held one week later. President 
Josipovic described the violence at the Split parade as a “disgrace” and what happened 
“did not represent the true face of Croatia.”322 Prime Minister Jadranka Kosar condemned 
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the violence adding that “the Constitution and the law on the suppression of 
discrimination prevent discrimination against anybody.” Furthermore, the attack “showed 
where violence and hatred could lead,” and that “cannot be tolerated in Croatia.”323  
Police assured participants that they would be safe and secure during the Zagreb 
parade a week later. Many prominent politicians expressed support for the parade and 
Vesna Pusic, now the Minister for Foreign Affairs and European Integration, even 
personally marched in the parade. Organizers of the event pledged that the “fight against 
fascism, nationalism, racism, machismo, heterosexism, and violence” was not over.324 
Pride Parades have continued to take place in both Zagreb and Split, each year growing in 
size and popularity, and often attended by celebrities and politicians. This dynamic 
continues to agitate the Catholic Church whose officials complain that more government 
ministers attend the Pride Parade than the annual Statehood Day mass.325 
In Serbia, on the other hand, the story is much different. The first attempt to 
organize a Pride Parade was in 2001. Shortly after the event began, violence erupted and 
the march was stopped. In 2004 and 2009, the LGBT community tried to organize a 
second rally, but the events were called off due to violent threats from right wing extreme 
groups. In 2010, however, the event was green lighted. In anticipation of the 2010 event, 
Ivica Dacic, Minister of the Interior at the time, conveyed the following sentiment with a 
reluctant, but progressive tone: 
                                                
323 HINA, “Croatian Premier Deplores Violence at Gay Parade, Attack on Journalists,” 
(June 12, 2011). 
324 HINA, “Croatian Police Ready for Zagreb Gay Parade on 18 June,” (June 17, 2011). 
325 Croatian Times, “Church: More Ministers at Gay Pride than at Statehood Day Mass,” 
croatiantimes.com (June 26, 2012). 
276 
 
Whether they support the event or not, I would not like to have the police get into 
a conflict with the people. [The Pride Parade] will be a test, which will show 
whether the country is ready to organize an event most citizens disapprove of. Our 
job is to observe the law, and if someone has the legal and constitutional right to 
hold an event, our obligation is to secure it.326  
 
Riots broke out on the streets of Belgrade and over 150 police and civilians were injured. 
Soon after the event, Serbian Defense Minister, Dragan Sutanovac, attended meetings 
with European officials in Brussels in which the riots were discussed. When he returned 
to Belgrade he brought with him the message from Brussels: 
The European institutions understand that hooliganism exists everywhere in the 
world, but expect Serbia to punish in an adequate, democratic and principled 
manner all persons who are in this way endangering Serbia’s endeavors for 
European integration and for assimilation of European values.327  
 
Despite this message and numerous others linking Serbia’s EU future, in part, to how it 
would handle the Pride Parade going forward, the Serbian government has decided each 
year to ban the parade. In 2012, the event was banned just days before it was set to take 
place. A concurrent exhibition by a Swedish photographer, which showed images of 
Jesus dressed in women’s clothing also drew public outrage. In response to these 
proposed events, Patriarch Irinej of the Serbian Orthodox Church urged Prime Minister 
Dacic to ban both events, stating in an open letter that: 
The tragicomic parade of shame casts a heavy moral shadow on Belgrade, on 
Serbia’s longstanding Christian culture and the dignity of the family, as the basic 
unit of humanity. I had not expected that this year I would again be forced to turn 
to you on behalf of the Serbian Orthodox Church, its members, who are the 
dominant majority in Serbia, and on behalf of numerous members of other 
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religions, with the plea and demand that, by your authority as prime minister, you 
prevent the scandalous exhibit of photographs.328  
 
In the aftermath of events being banned, Dacic offered this explanation: 
 
The decision was made in order to protect the lives of citizens, including members 
of the police. [The exhibition] causes great distress to the public because in it 
Jesus Christ is mentioned in a provocative context. It is very important for the 
credibility of Serbia to show the strength of the state. And this does not amount to 
any kind of capitulation before some who think they can use their paramilitary or 
any other threats to endanger the holding of public gatherings – it means that it 
has been assessed that, at this time, serious violation of public peace and order 
could occur, which would seriously jeopardize interests of the citizens and the 
state as a whole.329  
 
When Dacic, using the same justification, decided to cancel the 2013 parade, his decision 
was strongly condemned by European officials. Most notably, Council of Europe 
Secretary General, Thorbjorn Jagland stated he was: 
…very disappointed by the Serbian government’s decision to ban the Belgrade 
Pride once again. The fundamental rights of the Europeans to freedom of 
assembly and freedom of expression must be effectively guaranteed. Lesbian, 
gay, bisexual and transgender minorities “must not be discriminated in the 
exercise of their fundamental rights. The case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights is clear in this regard.330  
 
In Serbia, LGBT issues shed light on a deep divide between traditionalist and 
modernist social forces. The Orthodox Church remains an important identification 
marker. The Church is said to deal with homosexuality with three types of response – 
silence, ambivalence, or hostility. It responds with the latter when it feels that 
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homosexuality is a provocation from the West.331 Patriarch Irinej’s open letter to Prime 
Minister Dacic demonstrates this form of hostility and is a signal that, through the 
external leverage of the integration process, the Church feels threatened that modernist 
social forces are gaining ground on traditionalist forces. Hitting back, the Church reminds 
Dacic of its immense sway and symbolic power. His compliance with the Church’s 
request suggests that Dacic buys into the notion that LGBT rights represent an assault on 
national belonging – where the collective body is a form of ethno-nationalism that is 
equated with Serbian Orthodoxy and heteronormative masculinity.332  
Although the move to ban Pride Parades is framed as the state’s responsibility to 
maintain public order, it fundamentally represents a reassertion of nationalist values. The 
government’s actions fly in the face of Europe’s calls to allow minority communities the 
protection of basic human rights. Nevertheless, aside from some harsh words, Serbia has 
faced no formal sanctioning or punishment from the European Union as a result of the 
bans. Quite the opposite really, in the time since the 2010 rally, Serbia reached two major 
accession milestones – gaining official candidate status in 2011 and being green-lighted 
to open negotiation of the acquis in 2013. Without any serious resistance from Brussels, 
Dacic appears more than comfortable taking cues from the Orthodox Church and 
bolstering his credibility among those who espouse nationalist or traditional values. 
In 2014, however, with the beginning of accession negotiations and a change in 
leadership, Serbia had moderated its stance on the Pride parade, allowing it to take place 
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in September 2014. It was highly controversial and not fully embraced by the new Prime 
Minister, Aleksander Vucic. Although Vucic let the event go forth, he did not attend, 
saying that “my obligation is to guarantee safety to my people. However, it is my 
democratic choice not to take part in the Parade and it doesn’t come to my mind to go 
there.”333 To further highlight the moderation of the Serbian government, the Church 
again put out statements like those above condemning the Parade for its immorality. 
Vucic responded to the statements noting that “we respect [the statements]…but in this 
country the policies are run by the government of Serbia in line with the constitution.”334 
It is worth noting that while Serbia witnessed a retrenchment toward nationalist 
values in response to this issue (which is beginning to change), Croatia’s commitment to 
upholding minority rights through the constitution and the law should not be read as an 
overwhelming victory for the LGBT community, nor can it be seen as a virtuous social 
transformation catalyzed by a desire to assert ‘European’ values. Croatia enforces a body 
of laws that protects these rights, which is compliant with the acquis and European law, 
political elites propagated a discourse that was compatible with European values, and 
their deeds are consistent with what they say. Yet, discrimination against LGBT 
individuals is endemic and the very public influence of Catholic value on private life 
works to perpetuate a high level of homophobia and transphobia in Croatian society.335 In 
December 2013, Croatians held a referendum on same sex marriage, voting 
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overwhelmingly to ban it and define marriage as being between one man and one woman. 
Croatia political leaders can be credited for aligning legislation with European standards 
on this issue and properly enforcing it, but to pursue deeper reforms on the matter would 
be highly unpopular. Serbian political leaders, on the other hand, will likely brazenly 
disregard any demands to align with European standards until stronger sanctions induce a 
change in behavior. The EU will likely remain passive on this issue as not to scare Serbia 
away from the table where the larger, thornier issue is up for discussion – Kosovo.  
 
Relations with Co-nationals in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 
Another strategy to examine the implications of Europeanization on Croatian and 
Serbian conceptions of national identity would be to look at the relationship of these 
states with their co-national counterparts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the manner in 
which political leader frame the question of Europe. Although one cannot assume that 
groups of co-national (Croats/Bosnian Croats and Serbs/Bosnian Serbs) form a 
homogeneous block, it is fair to treat them as share strong affinities or feeling 
emotionally connected to an overarching Croatian or Serbian demos. The existence of a 
demos with a shared identity promotes an obligation to accept collective decisions and 
builds a basis of legitimacy in liberal-democratic societies.336 Understanding reactions 
from these co-national communities to the introduction of European norms can offer 
insight into the degree to which such norms are accepted or our perceived as a threat to 
ethnic identity.  
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From the Croatian side, Bosnian Croats who can make any claim to residency in 
Croatia, no matter how tenuous, are given the right to vote in Croatian elections. Over 
400,000 Bosnian Croats are eligible to vote in Croatia. With a population of 4.4 million, 
that figure represents an important segment of the Croatian electorate. Extending voting 
rights to members of the Croatian diaspora is thought to strengthen and secure Croatia’s 
newly acquired statehood by increasing its national population and by mobilizing 
communities residing outside its borders to achieve national political goals.337 This issue 
has been somewhat controversial over the years because Bosnian Croats tend to vote 
overwhelming for the nationalist HDZ party. Opposition parties claim that it is unjust to 
have individuals from outside the state of Croatia influencing its national policy. In 
addition, they claim that the HDZ simply uses this population to consolidate and maintain 
its power. Nevertheless, politicians are compelled to campaign for votes in Bosnia if they 
are to be successful in elections. In the 2007 election Ivo Sanader, campaigning in 
Mostar, linked Bosnian Croats to Croatia, linked the future of Croatia to the EU, and 
depicted the opposition SDP as anti-catholic, pro-Yugoslavia, pro-dictatorship. The SDP 
was an anti-Croatia party who was bent on taking away Bosnian Croats right to have a 
say in the future of their familial community. Sanader says: 
This is a crucial election for Croatia because in the next four years Croatia had to 
become a member of the European Union and NATO, and complete its transition. 
The policy of the SDP is very dangerous. It offers decriminalization of soft drugs, 
new taxes and proposes to kick religious teaching out of schools. Religious 
teaching was kicked out of schools during the Comintern in 1948 and under Tito’s 
dictatorship. The HDZ won’t allow it again. Croatia and Europe rest on a 
Christian civilization, which we won’t and mustn’t renounce. Bishops didn’t keep 
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quiet during communism so they won’t during democracy either. The SDP 
advocates depriving Croats in Bosnia of the right to vote in Croatian election 
despite the fact that they helped Croatian during the 1990s war of independence. 
There is no future for Bosnia and Herzegovina unless the equality and sovereignty 
of the Croat people is preserved.338  
 
Although there was already a pro-EU consensus among political parties at the 
time, Sanader choose to use his campaigning in Bosnia to present an image of the SDP as 
a party of the past – communism, atheism, dictatorship; and the HDZ as the party of the 
future where Croatia belongs to a democratic, Christian, and European civilization. 
Furthermore, as accession approached, Croatian ambassador to BiH explained that 
Croatian membership in the EU is very much in the interest of this population because 
Croatian would be an official language of the EU and Bosnian Croats with Croatian 
citizenship would be able to enjoy all the benefits of European citizenship that 
membership entails.339 If that was not enough, Zaljana Zovko, a Bosnian Croat who is an 
advisor to Bosnia’s Prime Minister Vjekoslav Bevanda, stood for election as an HDZ 
candidate in Croatia’s first vote to seat members in the European Parliament. 
Commenting on her candidacy before the election she said that “if enough Bosnians and 
Herzegovinians elect me, Bosnia’s voice will be heard in the heart of the EU,” and that “I 
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think I can help Bosnian Croats and the whole of Bosnia more than any other European 
MEP from some other country.”340  
Zovko did not win, but her candidacy demonstrates how Croatia’s European 
Union membership can pay dividends for Bosnian Croats. Accordingly, this creates a 
point of leverage that Europe holds over the more traditionalist HDZ party. By aligning 
itself with European, it holds a carrot with which it can garner votes from portion of the 
electorate that is important for maintaining a grip on domestic power. Rejecting the offer 
of Europe to Bosnian Croats would act against the self-interest of the HDZ, and it has 
adjusted its discourse accordingly.   
The relationship between Serbia and Bosnian Serbs (residing primarily in the 
Republika Srpska (RS)), on the other hand, is ambiguous and, at times, difficult to 
comprehend. Unlike Bosnian Croats, only Bosnian Serbs with full dual citizenship are 
able to vote in Serbian elections. In the 2012 parliamentary election, this amounted to 
negligible total of 250 individuals.341 The Dayton Agreements make it possible to for 
Serbia to enjoy Special Parallel Relations with the Republika Srpska, which allows for 
close ties in areas of mutual economic, political or cultural interest. Special Parallel 
Relations have been used most frequently to promote cross-border trade and investment. 
Politically, the two appear to simultaneously accept and oppose the international legal 
regimes that configure territory that is considered “Serb” homeland. Political elites from 
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Serbia and the RS are not particularly content with the Dayton Constitution, but they vow 
to respect it. At the same time, the two vehemently oppose Kosovo’s 2008 unilateral 
declaration of independence. This declaration, however, put the RS in a very curious 
position. It categorically rejects it as it represents an affront to the homeland, yet if the 
independence in upheld, President of the RS Milorad Dodik threatens to use the 
precedent as justification to succeed from Bosnia. Dodik, a strident nationalist, sees the 
constitutional makeup of BiH and the construction of Bosniak identity as a significant 
threat to Serbian identity. Ask about whether the RS should “follow its own path,” Dodik 
says: 
[This] does not depend only on us. We politicians must respect reality and that 
reality is international agreements and the arrangement of forces on the 
international stage. Their constant arrogance and accusation directed at the 
Republika Srpska has created sufficient energy so that now 88 percent desire to 
live outside Bosnia-Herzegovina. Our Serbs are unhappy about the collapse of 
Yugoslavia. We were against it, but the Bosniaks and Croats were for division. 
But, what about the future? Are Serbs supposed to throw off their national identity 
in order to build a new one? I speak Serbia, but in Sarajevo they say that they 
speak Bosnian. But there is no Bosnian language. If we call the language Bosnian 
then they have to ask me, as a resident of Bosnia, if I agree to have my language 
identified as Bosnian, but I do not agree! For every ethnic group, language is an 
important symbol of one’s identity. And I speak Serbian. But we Serbs are always 
described at the international conferences as speaking in Bosnian. And it is clear 
that part of the international community, either through ignorance or willfully, is 
inciting the Bosniaks to fight for their national identity. That is why we are a 
failed society.342  
 
Dodik’s relationship with the international community is decidedly antagonistic. 
While the EU by no means prohibits relations between Serbia and the RS, the hope from 
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the European side is that Serbia will help promote regional cooperation in BiH through 
Europeanization. When Serbian politicians sidle up to characters like Dodik, it can be 
interpreted as a rejection of the West by association. It is not appreciated when leaders 
make symbolic appearances such as the 20th anniversary of the creation of the RS when 
President Nikolic affirmed a mutual commitment to one another: 
Republika Srpska was made with much difficulty and great struggle of the 
Serbian people, and for that reason I want to congratulate RS citizens on their 
perseverance and commitment to Republika Srpska's progress and development as 
a well-ordered and stable society. Strengthening of trust and even closer relations 
between Serbia and RS will continue to develop successfully in all segments, and 
that together with Serbia it will preserve and promote their political, economic, 
cultural and spiritual relations.343  
 
Bosniak groups of the Sandzak (region that straddles Serbia, Bosnia, and Montenegro), 
responded to the presence of Serbian authorities at the celebration with condemnation and 
remembrance of the past: 
This behavior of state and church authorities in Serbia offends and disturbs 
Bosniaks, as well as historic truth recognized by international courts regarding 
tragic events in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995, and at the same time distances Serbia 
from the EU integration process and its membership in the society of civilized 
nation. This was glorification of a para-state entity, the so-called Republika 
Srpska, which was created on the policy of ethnic cleansing, and the most 
dreadful war crimes and genocide against Bosniak people in the Republic of 
Bosnia.344  
 
Serbian politicians, then, utilize their relationship with the RS as a tactical 
maneuovre to gain credibility among the nationalist right within Serbia to improve their 
electability. Their association with Dodik, who is noted for being the one to ‘stand up and 
say no to the west,’ proximates them to that position without having to concede on 
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Europeanist policies or ambitions.345 The RS, then, is a place where Serbian politicians 
can let nationalist myths live on without any consequence for European aspiration. 
Because of the political currency that brings with it and the limited rights of citizenship 
enjoyed by RS Serbs, unlike in the Croatian case, there is very little incentive for Serbian 
political elites to project a discourse that endorses a Europeanized Republika Srpska. 
 
Serbia and the War in Ukraine 
 
Protests broke out in February 2014 in Kiev following Ukrainian president Viktor 
Yanucovych’s refusal to sign an Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. 
The government’s violent response to the protests triggered a series of escalating events 
including the ousting of President Yanucovych, the Russian annexation of Crimea, and 
the advent of a protracted war in eastern Ukraine between factions loyal to Kiev and pro-
Russian separatists. These events are sometimes referred as the Euromaiden movement or 
the Euromaiden revolution. The ongoing struggle is complex and there are many factors 
that explain what is going on, but the tissue that ignited the conflict – Yanucovych’s 
failure to sign the Association Agreement – is fundamentally a struggle for the Ukraine to 
define whether it should align with Europe or with Russia.  
Polls conducted prior to the outbreak of violence and again during the period in 
which the annexation of Crimea was being carried out indicate strong public support for 
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EU membership in Ukraine. According to a GfK Ukraine survey more than three times as 
many Ukrainian would favor EU membership over a customs union with Russia.346 
                                                   Figure 175 
 
 Support for EU membership, breaks down quite predictable along the geographic 
lines of the conflict – 90 percent in the west, 70 percent in the center, 29 percent in the 
south, and 20 percent in the east.347 Given the popularity of the EU in some areas of 
Ukraine, and the events that the followed the failure of the Yunucovych government to 
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sign the SAA, it is clear the idea of the EU is powerful, and the extent to which that idea 
is critically challenged among supporters is questionable. 
Serbia has begun to formally negotiate its accession treaty, yet Serbia maintains 
close ties with Russia. The European Union launched a series of sanctions against Russia 
in response to the annexation of Crimea and evidence of support it was giving to 
separatists in Eastern Ukraine, who refer to themselves as ‘volunteers.’ This puts Serbia 
in a very awkward position. On one hand, Russia has been a longtime friend and 
represents an important ally whose UN Security Council veto power has aided the 
Serbian cause with respect to Kosovo. On the other hand, as a candidate of the EU, 
Serbia is expected to make strides to align its foreign policy with that of the EU, which in 
this case would mean joining the sanctions.  
Serbia has elected to declare its neutrality and not join sanctions against Russia. It 
would like to maintain good relations with Russia, Ukraine, and the EU. Prime Minister 
Dacic commented that:  
We respect the territorial integrity of every country member of the UN, including 
Ukraine, but Serbia will not join any sanctions on Russia, as that state is not just our 
friend and economic and political partner but a state that never imposed sanctions on 
Serbia.348 
 
Serbia is not required to take the official position of the EU as it is not yet a member, but 
by remaining neutral it is not sending a strong message to Brussels that it on the same 
page.  
In response to the EU sanctions, Russia imposed an embargo on food imports 
from EU countries on August 7, 2014. While this action is primarily intended to be a tit 
                                                
348 Balkan Insight, “Serbia Rules Out Joining Sanctions on Russia,” (April 30, 2014). 
289 
 
for tat between Russia and the EU, it can also function to entice countries not subject to 
the embargo, such as Serbia, to prosper through increasing production and exports to the 
Russian market.  If Serbia were to take advantage of this situation, its largely agrarian 
economy would stand to benefit greatly, which would work to further entrench what are 
already deep sympathies for Russia. The EU called on countries outside the scope of the 
embargo to not exploit the situation. Prime Minister Aleksander Vucic349 reiterated 
Serbia’s desire to remain friendly with both the EU and Russia, but offered a mixed 
message in saying the following: 
EU membership is our main goal. At the same time Serbia intends to maintain 
good relations with the Russian Federation. […] I don’t understand [the EU’s 
demand for] ‘solidarity with the EU.’ Solidarity in what? No one asked us when 
they imposed sanctions on Russia. Now both sides blame us.350  
 
Vucic affirmed that he would not exploit the situation, but he is clearly frustrated that 
neutrality is not earning Serbia favor with either side. 
Making matters more difficult, groups of Serbian fighters have left to join the pro-
Russian separatist ‘volunteers’ in eastern Ukraine. It is not the official policy of Serbia to 
provide any form of material support to any faction involved in the conflict, yet the 
presence of Serbian fighters in eastern Ukraine makes it challenging to maintain the 
appearance of neutrality. The Serbian government strongly condemns these foreign 
fighters and the legislature moved to pass a law that would impart criminal penalties of 
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twelve years in prison for organizers, and one to five years for the fighters themselves. 
The situation is an optics nightmare for Prime Minister Vucic, which could be read as 
revealing a preference for Russia. Reacting to the reports of Serb ‘volunteers,’ however, 
Vucic insisted on pointing out that: “dozens of Serbs can be seen fighting for both 
sides.”351  
Beyond Serbia’s present struggle to balance its relationships with Russia, the EU, 
and Ukraine, there is the confusing matter of how this conflict is challenging long-
standing principled positions on territorial sovereignty. Ukraine, which has always 
supported Serbia’s position on Kosovo, was disappointed that Serbia remained silent 
during the Russian annexation of Crimea.352 Russia, on the other hand, champion of 
territorial sovereignty, the main ally for keeping the idea of Kosovo’s belonging to Serbia 
alive, used Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, which it has always 
opposed, as justification for taking back Crimea. Accordingly, it is more likely that 
incredulity rather than neutrality is keeping Serbia silent on the matter of Crimea. 
The situation in Ukraine will continue to evolve. Serbia’s position vis-à-vis 
Ukraine will not have to evolve at any point in the near future unless there are dramatic 
changes on the ground in Ukraine or Serbia somehow accelerates its progress on the EU 
path to near light speed. The EU is wise to exercise restraint and not forcefully condition 
Serbia to adopt its positions in the near term. Like with Kosovo, maintaining a limbo 
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state buys the EU more time at the negotiating table, where it hopes that it can eventually 
persuade Serbia to come over to its side for good. 
   
*** 
 
The idea of the EU does hold sway with respect to Croatia and Serbia’s accession 
bids. The general trend we see emerge from the above proxy indicators is that Croatia 
acts and speaks with much less resistance to Europeanizing forces than does Serbia. This 
is not to say that nationalist groups are weak in Croatia, but as we saw in the case study 
chapter on Croatia, pro-EU political elites minimized nationalist opposition by re-framing 
integration as sovereignty-confirming, vindicating those who fought in the ‘Homeland 
War.’ Croatian political elites behave the same way when it comes to their Bosnian co-
nationals – showing the benefits of EU membership and depicting it as offering a space to 
protect national myths, rather than extinguish them. 
On the other hand, nationalist opposition in Serbia is particularly strong because it 
is connected an unsettled dispute, which reflects the deepest aspects of national 
identification. Serbian elites, unlike their Croatian counterparts, have not found a way to 
spin the Kosovo question in a way that makes Europe into anything but a threat. The 
major problem is assessing the weight of discourse in the Serbia case is that the discourse 
continues to cover both bases – both Kosovo and Europe – because they are not forced to 
choose yet. The trend, however, is toward incremental change and Europeanist discourse 
and action – there is evidence of this, especially of late. In this sense, change is taking 
place. One could make the theoretical jump that, like in Vachudova’s cases, where the 
EU is able to turn illiberal forces into liberal ones; in our cases, active levering helps turn 
292 
 
nationalist tendencies into Europeanist ones. Change needs to be filtered through an 
accompanying discourse that justifies the shift while keeping alive nationalist myths 
related to Kosovo. 
Looking at things from the other side, explaining these states relative resistance to 
or acceptance of conditionality and reform can assessed with respect to the attitude that 
Europe projects toward them.  Croatia was never on the Schengen ‘Black list.’ This 
conveys that, to Europe, Croatia is one of ‘us,’ and Serbia is not, meaning that from the 
outset Europe was less resistant to Croatia than it was to Serbia. As it pertains to 
sweeping identity narratives, this would mean that Croatian elites would only have to 
make the case for the ‘return’ to Europe, whereas Serbian elites would have to make the 
tougher case of ‘belonging’ because it was unclear if, fundamentally, they did belong. 
The cost of belonging is steep – parting with Kosovo. Conversely, the cost of returning is 
ultimately desirable – parting with the notion of being ‘Balkan.’353 In this context, it 
becomes easy to understand why Croatia was more open to Europe earlier on and was 
able to sustain its Europeanizing energy, which culminated its achieving EU membership 
on July 1, 2013. Serbia has been moving in this direction since 2008, it seems likely that 
unless there is a major shift in attitudes and discourse, its Europeanizing energy will run 
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out once the moment the Kosovo question becomes a formal question upon which the 
nation must decide. It is also understandable in this context, why Europe must employ 
more aggressive levering strategies vis-à-vis Serbia then it did for Croatia.  
 
Conclusions 
 
It is important to note that the argument that political elites attempt to mobilize 
support for a pro-EU or pro-domestic policy agenda through the strategic use of discourse 
does not assume that it is the only mechanism or the most powerful mechanism with 
causal influence on political outcomes. There are many complex and highly interactive 
structural variables that contribute to a state’s developmental trajectory that can be used 
to explain variation. For instance, Jovan Teokaravic argues that Serbian accession has 
been much slower than anticipated not simply because of the emotional attachments 
enrapt in the Kosovo issue, but because it is an unfinished state.354 Croatia began its 
journey to the EU in 2001. At that time, Slobodan Milosevic had just fallen from power, 
and Serbia was still rump Yugoslavia. It became Serbia and Montenegro in 2002. In 
2006, Montenegro peeled off, and then in 2008 Kosovo declared its independence. While 
Serbia’s borders were constantly undergoing revision, Croatia, a mostly stable polity, was 
in negotiations with the EU and progressing along that path. This point is simply to 
illustrate the possible influence of other variables and to help us understand why, in 2013, 
Croatia will join the EU and Serbia, is only getting a date to begin the negotiation. 
Discourse does not explain all institutional change, but it can help explain some. It 
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commands significant attention because it is the vector through which elites legitimate 
the choices they make – decisions that have a bearing on institutional development.   
Returning to the Croatian Constitution, which says: 
It is prohibited to initiate any procedure for the association of the Republic of 
Croatia into alliances with other states if such association leads, or might lead, to 
a renewal of a South Slav state community or to any Balkan state form of any 
kind.355 
 
This is not to imply that the EU and Yugoslavia are equivalent political projects. Rather, 
it is a call to reflect on the antecedent political associations of which this region was once 
a part – the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, 
and Yugoslavia. The EU, this collection of disparate peoples and states with its attendant 
supra-national structure, economic and political asymmetries, and ambiguous common 
identity, might seem quite familiar for the peoples of Croatia, or Serbia when they finally 
arrive there. This can be seen as paradoxical since it was many of the same forces just 
mentioned that drove Yugoslavia to its bloody dissolution. Now, a portion of the 
sovereignties that were gained in the wars must be immediately surrendered in order to 
enter this new association of states that shares many attributes with the one that was just 
exited. In the long-term, EU membership may be an inevitability as opposed to a choice 
for these states-- a slowly creeping behemoth without alternative. There is no advantage 
to being an island on your own in the middle of a sea of EU states. For Serbia, closer ties 
with Russia could be a counterbalance, as Russia has long been a ‘big brother’ or friend 
to Serbia, but most leaders see the need to balance both relationships. 
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For now, it appears on the surface that political leaders still have the tools of 
discourse in their disposal, which can be used either persuade their publics of the merits 
of joining this association or stem the tide of the latest iteration of external absorption. If 
we dig a little deeper, however, perhaps the true role of ideas and discourse in this story 
is not instrumentalization. Rather, if we take the historical institutionalist perspective – 
that the EU is nothing but a mere inevitability – then maybe the true role of discourse it is 
to create a distraction from the ever-present reality of this inevitability and create an 
illusion in the public mind that, through such conspicuous debate, these reforms are a 
matter of conscious choice. Whether you support or oppose integration, as humans, we 
find fate or things beyond our control very unsettling. If we can create the illusion of 
control, we, as citizens of states, take comfort in it. Political elites make their careers on 
it. 
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APPENDIX A: Elite Survey Questions 
 
 
1. Why is the EU good/bad for (country) and why is (country) good/bad for the EU? 
 
2. Reflecting on (country)’s path to the EU. What were the most difficult aspects of 
the accession process? What were the easiest? Why? 
  
3. When (country) gains EU membership next July, can you put that day in 
perspective? How will it be written about in history books? How will most people 
generations from now remember it? 
 
4. How does your government talk about the EU? What do they say about it? Are 
citizens receptive of the messages? Do you feel like political elites need to go out 
of their way to persuade the public of the legitimacy of their choices when it 
comes to EU compliance?  
 
5. There is a growing literature devoted to an emergent “European identity.” Is there 
such an identity? What does it mean to be European? Is the term “European” 
reserved just for members of the EU? Do think citizens of (country) feel any sense 
of attachment to a larger “European” community? Does this challenge what it 
might mean to be (country demonym)? 
 
6. Do you see a majority of citizens in (country) falling into the euro-enthusiast 
camp, the euro-skeptic camp, or another camp all-together? What do you feel are 
the bases for euro-enthusiasm or euro-skepticism in (country)? Does this have any 
effect on politics? 
 
7. What is your forecast for (country) over the next 25 years or so? Does the future 
look bright or does it look bleak? Will the EU play an integral role in determining 
a positive or negative future for (country)? 
 
8. What is your forecast for EU? Will it survive? Is its more important for (country) 
to have the EU or is it more important for the EU to have (country)?  
 
9. Do you think the answers you provided above reflect the dominant attitudes of 
people in (country)’s society? Why or why not? 
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APPENDIX B: Selected Quotes from Elite Interviews 
 
Croatian Respondents 
1. The government really doesn't talk about it at all. Even though there has always 
been support in the government for it, they never really make an effort to try to 
make it comprehensible to the public. They only started doing this right before the 
referendum, probably because they thought that the result was in question. 
 
2. Another negative is that although it took a long time to get to the EU, it should 
have taken longer. I would love it if Croatia were a candidate for 30 years, that 
way there is always an external presence monitoring you and making sure that 
you are on the right track. The problem with the situation now, and with Croatia 
acceding in July, is that those monitoring mechanism will go away and it is likely 
that some of the progress that has been made will be washed away or progress 
that needs to be made won’t go forward. 
 
3. On some level, at least in the beginning of the process Europe meant you were a 
part of the West. It meant you escaped the stereotypes of being “Balkan.” This 
was part of what leaders were saying. There was pretty much consensus about it 
being a policy objective, but nobody could really articulate what it would mean. 
 
4. For the 2004 countries accession was like climbing one of the Appalachian 
Mountains. For Croatia, it was like climbing Mt. Everest with no oxygen. 
 
5. Sandader, and the right, as well as the left framed it as joining a club of advanced 
powerful democracies. Always implicit, however, was the idea that Croatia 
should not be at all associated with Serbia or the Balkans. The EU was the way to 
get out of that. It was never explicitly stated that way, but people wanted to build 
a psychological wall between Croatia and the ‘wild east.’ 
 
6. Most people are sort of sick of the EU. There is a strange paradox where they 
have heard a lot about, yet they still don’t know anything about it. In general, 
people are not very supportive of the EU, but not so motivated to do anything 
about it. They have mostly resigned themselves to the fact that it is going to 
happen and not too much will change for the better. 
 
7. The government did a very poor job communicating the EU. What it said was 
very flat or shallow, the messages they put out in ads were so basic and cartoon-
ish that it was insulting to people’s intelligence. 
 
8. Sometimes I tell people “democracy started in the Balkans” and they freak out. 
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9. Croatia doesn't really have a foreign policy right now – joining the EU is its only 
foreign policy. 
 
10. European is a type of way that a government acts – they say “oh, that law isn’t 
‘European’’ – and what is essentially meant by this is a sense that being European 
means that laws are fair and equitable, that governments are transparent and 
accountable, and that markets are free and competitive. In essence, these are the 
main tenants of political and economic ‘good governance’ as set forth by a vision 
of liberal democracy. 
 
Serbian Respondents 
 
1. What is also positive is that the EU offers these countries a position at the table. 
Whether or not they are formally part of Europe, they still exist within a 
geopolitical space that relies on Europe in order to thrive. There has always been 
a sort of disproportionate amount of power and influence that the western part of 
Europe has exerted on these countries. It is not that joining the EU would 
necessarily correct that imbalance, it would just mitigate it a bit, and symbolically 
recognize these countries as equals. 
 
2. Someone said once: ‘the EU is pretending to enlarge, while elites from candidate 
states are pretending to reform.’ 
 
3. They don’t do a particularly good job with it. This could be attributed to a sense 
that they really don’t want people to know what is going on, either to push 
forward their own agenda or they think they don’t really need to know. Or this 
also might be attributed to the fact that they don’t really know what is going on 
and further transparency will expose that. 
 
4. People like projections of power in their politicians, people who are decisive. This 
is one reason they like Putin so much. He seems powerful and like he will protect 
us like a big brother. But, people also look at the EU like a place that might help 
us become a normal country. It could mean prosperity and good standards of 
living. Most people are ok with the EU, it is not ideal and mostly people don’t 
actually believe that they will become like the states of the west in terms of living 
standards. But, people are optimistic that things will get better. 
 
5. As for the EU country citizens that come here, they tend to think of Belgrade as a 
place to have fun, get drunk, go out. They may not be impressed with the way it 
looks, but they have fun and it is cheap. They also think we are violent and 
aggressive. Some people are, but there are many who are not. There are some 
Europeans that still don’t even know where Serbia is. They think it is Siberia. I 
went to Prague and a Czech person at the hostel did not know where Serbia is. 
And that isn’t even western Europe… 
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6. A colleague of mine once said: ‘there are two things to remember about 
communication 1. It is everything and 2. It is mission impossible.’ 
 
7. There are some bishops that write things like ‘joining the EU is becoming the 
west, which leads us down the road to hell’. 
 
8. The government talks about the EU as the end all, be all. Serbia is destined to 
finally join Europe and this will make her join the high, cultured, civilized, 
Europe with its ‘values’ and ‘standards.’ Balkan people will no longer be seen as 
backward. 
 
9. As for European identity, no such one exists. There is nothing really unique about 
those values or standards that makes them European. It is not really something 
people feel strongly about. But, there is something about the magical red passport 
that let’s you travel anywhere. Again, it makes you part of the civilized, cultured 
world. That sense is something people strive to attain. 
 
10. It is hard to know what identity means. I am Bosnian Serb. The label Bosnian 
doesn’t really do it, cause Bosnia isn’t really a thing, and I am not quite the same 
as a Serb even though I hold two passports. I identify most with a sense of being 
Yugoslav. This is how I grew up and what I came to know. These other terms are 
new and not really satisfying. 
 
11. Personally I am against the EU, but not for reasons of nationalism or that they 
would make Serbia recognize Kosovo. It is because they will force the restitution 
of public buildings and companies. This is a line in the sand. These were things 
that people fought a revolution for. They should not be privatized.  
 
12. It is paradoxical that the current government is the one that has become so pro-
European or done so much to make that stance known. It is either genuine or it is 
to compensate for their past positions and dispel any doubts that they still think 
like that. 
 
13. These days, you can’t say anything bad about the EU. I am critical, and a leftist, 
but you don’t want people to think that you are an extreme right-wing nationalist. 
 
14. The government tends to talk out of both sides of its mouth. With respect to the 
ICTY verdicts of the Croatian generals, Nikolic would have spun that to meet his 
purposes no matter how it came out. Again, people talk about the EU and wanting 
to be there and sometimes they do things that are directly contradictory to that 
message that set them back on the EU path. 
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15. Being European should be associated with cosmopolitan values and universal 
social welfare for all people on the continent, not just EU members. 
 
16. There is now more of a consensus about European Union membership. People are 
less euroskeptic about Europe because of what Europe is, but more so because of 
what Europe asks. There has been a growing tide of European support since the 
fall of Milosevic, which has resulted in parties forming the ‘The coalition for 
Europe.’ The main issue with such a coalition is that its platform adheres to the 
popular slogan: ‘both Europe AND Kosovo.’ This is seen as a pipedream and 
unsustainable as a platform. 
 
17. Now is a very interesting moment in the accession process. We have begun the 
negotiation and things have quieted down. The process has moved to the 
technocratic phase, which is very good. Now, instead of wrangling over should 
we go to the EU/should we not, this means that the real work of the accession 
process can begin. It will be done behind closed doors and quietly, but, that way, 
it can be done quicker. Of course, this is problematic because it means that the 
public is unaware of how it is being handled, and perhaps people will get angry 
when they are told what is going on, but that is how it is. This is all part of a 
process of becoming a ‘normal’ country. 
 
18. People have three different images of the EU – 1. The cow that you milk, 2. A 
fixer (peacebuilder) and 3.a  democracy/state builder. All of these are things that 
will lead to becoming a normal country. 
 
19. On the case of Kosovo. Most of your informants probably tell you what a huge 
issue it is. That is because you are foreign and they assume you know nothing. 
But, really nobody cares about Kosovo. It is economically terrible, nobody goes 
there, nobody from there comes here. The last time I was there was 45 years ago. 
The things people care about are the economy and living conditions. Most surveys 
will tell you that. Formal recognition will happen, but not until the end of the 
decade at least. We know it will be part of the negotiation, but it is probably best 
if we make a lot of progress on the technical issues before getting to the hard 
political ones. There will be a great debate and some tumult in Serbia at that time, 
but ultimately most people know Kosovo is gone and frankly don’t really care. 
 
Kosovar Respondents 
 
1. Life is hard here in Mitrovica and the situation will probably get worse before it 
gets better. Maybe there are more opportunities in Belgrade, but still finding work 
abroad and getting out is the best option. Maybe EU makes that easier. 
 
2. The government does not really tell us what is happening. They will say that the 
EU is a way to find prosperity and opportunity. The government is now 
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supposedly very pro-EU. They will tell people anything they want to hear. They 
don’t really do anything to make it better. They just do things for their own 
benefit. Nobody knows what the EU means. We don’t know if we want it, but the 
political leaders will do whatever they can to go forward with it 
 
3. EU is not a good thing. They don’t help with anything if you are a Serb from N. 
Kosovo. The political and economic situation is terrible and it will not get better 
with the EU. Freedom of movement would be good to get out, but with a Kosovo 
passport you can’t go anywhere. You are in a prison. That’s normal though. When 
you live in a cage, you get used to it.  
 
4. Don’t really know. It is just hard to be. Living in Mitrovica is living in a state of 
war. It only matters if you are one or the other. European doesn’t matter. Parents 
tell us not to go out at night. Not to walk outside or talk to anyone because it is 
not safe to be here. They also tell us wonderful things about the people and 
harmony of the Yugoslav years. We won’t ever get back there. This is what we 
live with now, it should be that way for a long time.  
 
5. It doesn’t really matter what you are, we are just trying to get by. No time to think 
about stuff like that. Older generations talk about the Yugoslav times. Those were 
the golden days when everybody lived together and life conditions where high 
and people had jobs. It would be nice to have that. The young people don’t know 
what that is like. All we know is tension and division.  
 
6. European identity has something to do with being in the EU. It is how people are 
connected in terms of laws and institutions and policy spaces. 
 
7. It doesn’t really matter if Kosovo becomes a member, the ‘journey’ of making 
those reforms is more important than the ‘destination’ of membership.  
 
8. What you think of the EU really depends where you come from and your 
education level. Most people are probably more easily manipulated into believing 
hard-line positions.  
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